Obligatory Presupposition Triggers in Discourse - Empirical Investigations of the Theories 'Maximize Presupposition' and 'Obligatory Implicatures' by Bade, Nadine
Obligatory Presupposition Triggers
in Discourse
Empirical Investigations of the Theories Maximize
Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures
D i s s e r t a t i o n
zur
Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktor der Philosophie
in der Philosophischen Fakultät
der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
vorgelegt von
Nadine Bade
aus
Berlin
2016
Gedruckt mit der Genehmigung der Philosophischen Fakultät
der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Jürgen Leonhardt
Hauptberichterstatterin: Prof. Dr. Sigrid Beck
Mitberichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Gennaro Chierchia
Prof. Dr. Gerhard Jäger
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 29/06/2015
Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen Online-Bibliotheksinformations-
und Ausleihsystem TOBIAS-lib
Für Marga und Auguste
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I want to thank my advisor Sigrid Beck. Without your
support, trust and encouragement this thesis would not exist. Your input and
advice were always valuable to me and much appreciated. You helped me to
structure my thoughts and focus on the important. I do not only owe most of
my knowledge in formal semantics and academic development to you, thanks
to you I also learned about dedication in general: to linguistics, running, cy-
cling, football. Thank you.
I also want to thank my second advisor Gennaro Chierchia. Thanks for believ-
ing in my capabilities, for your patience and for listening to all the ideas I had.
Without you I would not have been able to channel my creative energy into
valid arguments. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to visit Harvard
and to present my ideas to a broader audience.
Thanks for all the valuable input I received from all the people I met and
presented my work to at MIT and Harvard, especially the members of the
LFRG. Special thanks to Irene Heim and Uli Sauerland for taking the time to
meet with me and discuss my ideas. There is nothing better and more helpful
than constructive criticism from the people whose theory you are trying to
challenge.
Very many thanks to all my dear colleagues in Tübingen: Polina Berezovskaya,
Vera Hohaus, Verena Hehl, Anna Howell, Konstantin Sachs, Anthea Schöller,
Saskia Ottschofski and Sonja Tiemann. I could not have wished for a bet-
ter crowd around me. You helped with everything linguistic but also made me
happy to come to work every day. Special thanks to Daniel Oesterle for helping
with the material and for fruitful discussion in the project. Very many thanks
to Remus Gergel who was the first to show me the wonders of linguistics.
Thank you to everybody in project A2 of the collaborative research center,
especially Matthias Bauer, Angelika Zirker, and Carmen Dörge. You made
whatever challenges interdisciplinary projects have to face seem much less chal-
lenging and more enlightening due to your patience and commitment.
Thanks to everybody at the SFB 833 in Tübingen for the wonderful discussions.
Special thanks to Beate Starke and Sonja Haas-Gruber for all the (moral) sup-
port.
One person I would like to thank especially is Sonja Tiemann. Words cannot
express how much you mean to me. You are the closest thing to a sister I can
have. Your intelligence and kind heart impress me every day. You made me
focus when necessary, and you distracted me when necessary. Your personal
and professional advice were the most important to me. I seriously could not
have done this without you.
I would also like to thank the people who made this journey so much more
fun, and whom I love dearly. You were there in the bad and the good days and
always accepted me and my temper. Whatever personal growth is noticeable
in me, it is due to you. My lovely flatmates (and former flatmates): Timo and
Rita, you were always there when I needed you, thank you for your protection
and understanding, it means a lot me. Lee, what can I say, when I thought I
had seen it all, I met you. You are surely in inspiration, thank you for teach-
ing me to look beyond what is at the surface and to pay more attention to
the details. Benni, Carla, Daniel, Matthias, Aylin: thanks for all the amazing
times we had together. My other friends in Tübingen: Lotte and Severin, you
are surely two of the kindest people I know. Your presence always heightens
my mood, thanks for all the support. My friends Arne and Christina, thank
you for always giving a warm welcome and an open ear. My oldest and closest
friends at home: Marieke and Nici. I cannot tell you how much I appreciate
that you know me so well, that I never have to explain and that I always can
count on your love and acceptance. Thanks so much Verena, for everything
you taught me about friendship, loyalty, commitment and trust. I do not think
I would have believed in me the way I did if it was not for you.
I also want to thank my dearest Maxime, for his love, support and patience.
Seeing me through your eyes is the most amazing thing.
Of course I want to thank my family as well. My dear grandparents, Alfred
and Christa, Marga and Wilfried, and my great-grandmother Auguste. With-
out your love and support I would not be where I am today. I made this
journey under the best conditions possible thanks to you. I do not know how
to thank my lovely parents enough, Birgitt and Ralf. Whatever good qualities
I combine I have them thanks to you. You made me feel as if I never have to
worry about a thing in the world. Thank you for your love, it is the greatest
gift.
Abstract
The dissertation compares two theories on the obligatory insertion of presup-
position triggers. The first theory is based on a principleMaximize Presupposi-
tion (Heim 1991), the second theory is based on obligatory implicatures (Bade
2014). The empirical predictions of the theories are tested using experimental
methods in the main part of the thesis. The presupposition triggers "again",
"too", "know" and the definite determiner are tested with regard to their oblig-
atory insertion under negation and in other complex structures. Furthermore,
the influence of the broader discourse context on their obligatory insertion is
investigated. The empirical findings are summarized in the last part of the
thesis and the theoretical consequences for a theory of grammar are discussed.
It is argued based on the empirical results that presupposition triggers fall
into two classes regarding the mechanisms behind their obligatory insertion.
Whereas the obligatory insertion of lexical triggers like "too", "again" and
"know" is better explained by making use of Obligatory Implicatures, obliga-
toriness of definiteness and other feature marking should be accounted for by
using Maximize Presupposition.
presupposition, implicature, exhaustivity, questions, alternatives
Abstract
Die Dissertation untersucht zwei Theorien zum obligatorischen Einsetzen von
Präsuppositionsauslösern. Die erste Theorie basiert auf einem Prinzip Maxi-
mize Presupposition, die zweite Theorie auf obligatorischen Implikaturen. Die
empirischen Vorhersagen beider Theorien werden im Hauptteil der Disserta-
tion getestet. Die Auslöser "auch", "wieder", "wissen", und der definite Artikel
werden in Bezug auf ihren Einsatz in negierten Sätzen getestet, sowie in Hin-
blick auf den Einfluss des Diskurskontextes auf ihr obligatorisches Auftreten.
Die empirischen Resultate werden am Ende zusammengefasst und die theo-
retischen Konsequenzen in Bezug auf die Grammatiktheorie diskutiert.
Basierend auf den Ergebnissen wird argumentiert, dass Präsuppositionsaus-
löser in zwei Klassen eingeteilt werden können; folgend aus den Mechanis-
men, die hinter ihrem obligatorischen Einsetzen stecken. Während das obli-
gatorische Auftreten von lexikalischen Auslösern wie "auch", "wieder" und
"wissen" eher mit einer Theorie, die mit obligatorischen Implikaturen arbeitet,
erklärt werden muss, sollte man obligatorische Definitheit und andere obliga-
torische morphologische Merkmale mit Maximize Presupposition fassen.
presupposition, implicature, exhaustivity, questions, alternatives
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Goals of the dissertation
Recently, the maxim Maximize Presupposition originally introduced by Heim
(1991) has regained attention (Percus 2006, Chemla 2008, Singh 2011, Sauer-
land 2008a, Schlenker 2012). The purpose of the principle is to account for the
fact that if there is a choice between two sentences with identical assertions
the one with more presuppositions that are verified by the context has to be
used. Using the alternative in that context will result in infelicity. Current
approaches provide a more fine-grained formulation of the very general for-
mulation of the original maxim (Heim 1991) and discuss other presupposition
triggers besides the definite determiner. Their focus is not only on the fact
that in certain contexts sentences with presuppositions have to be used, but
that the alternative leads to the inference that the presupposition does not
hold. The core assumption of these theories is that sentences or lexical items
are ordered with regard to their presuppositional strength. They further as-
sume that sentences are in competition with respect to this ordering. In their
view it is due to this competition that a sentence without the presupposition
trigger has an inference with a status diﬀerent from implicatures and ordinary
presuppositions ("antipresupposition" (Percus 2006) or "implicated presuppo-
sition" (Sauerland 2008a)).
The phenomena that have been explained using Maximize Presupposition can
be put into three classes. The first class of examples includes the obligatory
use of presuppositional determiners like "the" and "both". The second class
of examples involves certain types of features, for example gender and number
1
2features (Sauerland 2002, Sauerland 2003, Sauerland 2005). The third class of
examples includes the obligatory insertion of "know", "too" and "again".
An alternative explanation for the obligatory insertion of this last class of pre-
supposition triggers has been proposed recently (Bade 2014). It is based on
formal non-Gricean approaches to implicatures (Fox 2007, Fox and Hackl 2006,
Chierchia, Fox, and Spector 2011). It argues that these presupposition triggers
are obligatory when the sentence has an implicature that contradicts the con-
text. The account is motivated by an observation made by Saeboe (2004) and
Krifka (1999) for obligatory additives. They claim that additives are inserted
to avoid a contrastive implicature from arising. Bade (2014) assumes that the
contradiction that is avoided by the insertion of the triggers "know", "too"
and "again" arises due to an implicature of the sentence which is the result of
obligatory exhaustive interpretation.
The literature has focused on the theoretical side of the issue of obligatory
presupposition triggers. The data never been investigated using empirical
methods. Most of all, there has been no systematic comparison of the two
theories just described and their predictions for the insertion of diﬀerent pre-
supposition triggers.
The aims of this dissertation are twofold. First, I want to provide an overview
over two theories on obligatory presupposition triggers and compare their em-
pirical predictions regarding the circumstances under which a trigger is obli-
gatorily inserted. Second, I want to test some of these empirical predictions
for the triggers "too", "again", "know" and the definite determiner.
Based on the empirical findings, I will argue that presupposition triggers fall
into two separate classes. I will show that the insertion of presuppositional
features and determiners fall into one class and should be subsumed under a
principle Maximize Presupposition. The insertion of presuppositional factives,
iteratives and additives will be shown to follow from the independently needed
mechanism of mandatory exhaustive interpretation.
Before I provide a short overview over the structure of the dissertation and
content of individual chapters, I want to introduce the basic theoretical back-
ground I assume for the discussion.
31.2 Preliminaries
The purpose of this section is to introduce the semantic and pragmatic frame-
work I take as a background. It is meant for readers with little background
in formal semantics and pragmatics. Readers who are more familiar with the
theoretical background should feel free to skip this section.
1.2.1 Compositional interpretation
I assume a theory of natural language which takes semantic interpretation to
be structure- and type-driven, and to work according to the principle of com-
positionality (Heim and Kratzer 1998). The principle of compositionality says
that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of its parts and
the rules by which they are combined (Frege 1892). The input for semantic
interpretation is a syntactic phrase structure tree. The system to derive the
meaning of complex structures in the tree consists of three components. It
defines a set of basic denotations for terminal nodes of a tree. It provides a
lexicon which specifies the denotation of individual lexical items. It provides
the rules for how the meaning of non-terminal nodes are derived from the ter-
minal nodes they are built from (rules of composition).
In an extensional semantic system, there are two basic types of denotations: an
element is either in the set of individuals or it is within the set of truth-values.
The set of truth-values only contains the values 1 (true) and 0 (false). Individ-
uals have the semantic type <e>, truth-values are of type <t>. Denotations
can be more complex which is also mirrored in them having more complex
types. This is why the more general definitions of types and denotations in (1)
and (2) are assumed (Heim and Kratzer 1998, p. 28).
(1) Semantic Types (first version)
a. e and t are semantic types
b. If   and ⌧ are semantic types, then < , ⌧> is a semantic type.
c. Nothing else is a semantic type
4(2) Semantic denotation domains
a. De := D (the set of individuals)
b. Dt := {0,1} (the set of truth-values)
c. For any semantic types   and ⌧ , D< ,⌧> is the set of all functions
from D  to D⌧
Two basic rules of composition are of importance for the subsequent discussion.
The first one is the rule of Functional Application, see (3).
(3) Functional Application
If ↵ is a branching node, { ,  } is the set of ↵’s daughters, and [[ ]] is
a function whose domain contains [[ ]], then [[↵]] = [[ ]]([[ ]])
The second rule which I will make use of is the rule for pronouns and traces,
see (4).1
(4) Pronouns and Traces
If ↵ is a proform or a trace, g is a variable assignment, and i 2 dom(g),
then [[↵i]]g = g(i). (Heim and Kratzer 1998, p. 111)
The assumption behind the rule for pronouns and traces is that pronouns are
variables. They carry an index and receive a value via a variable assignment
function, see the definition of variable assignments in (5).
(5) A variable assignment is a partial function g from the set of indices to
the set of all denotations, such that, for every <i,⌧> 2 dom(g), g(i,⌧)
2 D⌧
A pronoun will always be interpreted with respect to a variable assignment
function g. The assignment function will return an individual as a value, see
the examples in (6) (Heim and Kratzer 1998).
(6) [[ he1 ]]g[1!Bob] = g[1!Bob](1) = Bob
The definitions in (5) and (6) work for variables of type <e>. Variable assign-
ments can be more complex for variables of higher types. These higher type
variables include contextual variables like, for example, quantifier domain re-
1For a complete overview over the rules of semantic composition that I assume see Heim
and Kratzer (1998)
5strictions (von Fintel 1994, Marti 2003). The value the assignment returns for
these variables is a set of individuals of type <e,t>. I will return to this point
when discussing domain restrictions for quantifiers.
The system introduced so far is an extensional one, where sentences denote a
truth value. However, the denotation of a sentence can also be seen as a set
of situations in which it is true. This is called the intension of a sentence (von
Fintel and Heim 2011). In addition to the semantic types specified above, an
intensional system requires there to be a basic type <s> for possible worlds.
Possible worlds are considered ways how the actual world might be like (Lewis
1986). The intension of a sentence is a function of type <s,t>, a function from
possible worlds to truth values. Denotations are no longer just evaluated with
respect to an assignment but with respect to an evaluation world. They come
with a world parameter. The extension of an expression is its semantic value
in the evaluation world, see some examples in (7) (von Fintel and Heim 2011).
(7) a. [[ smart ]]w,g =  x. x is famous in w.
b. [[ John is smart ]]w,g = John is smart in w.
The intension of an expression is the function from any world to the extension
of the denotation of that expression in that world, see (8).
(8) a.  w.[[ smart ]]w,g =  w. x. x is smart in w.
b.  w.[[ John is smart ]]w,g =  w. John is smart in w.
For a detailed description of an intensional semantic system including a for-
mulation of the rules of composition with intensions, see von Fintel and Heim
(2011). I will use the notation in (9) to refer to the intension of an expression,
in this case the intension of ↵.
(9) [[ ↵ ]]g =  w.[[ ↵ ]]w,g
To capture that proposition are true at a certain point in time in a given world,
I further assume a basic type <i> for times. Examples of lexical entries which
are sensitive to a time parameter are given in (10).
(10) a. [[ thirsty ]]t,w,g =  x. x is thirsty at t in w.
b. [[ John is thirsty ]]t,w,g = John is thirsty at t in w.
6The inventory of semantic types I assume is thus extended to times and worlds:
(11) Semantic Types (final version)
a. e, s, i and t are semantic types
b. If   and ⌧ are semantic types, then < , ⌧> is a semantic type.
c. Nothing else is a semantic type.
(12) Semantic denotation domains
a. De := D (the set of individuals)
b. Dt := {0,1} (the set of truth-values)
c. Di := the set of times
d. Ds := the set of possible worlds
e. For any semantic types   and ⌧ , D< ,⌧> is the set of all functions
from D  to D⌧
1.2.2 Quantification
There is a huge amount of literature on quantification in natural language.
This section is not an attempt to give an overview over the topic. Its purpose
is to introduce some basic concepts related to quantifiers which are important
for the discussion in the thesis.
Quantifiers are natural language expressions whose meaning does not change
depending on the evaluation world. They take two functions of type <e,t>
and express a relation between them. A lexical entry for a universal quantifier
is given in (13-a.), a lexical entry for an existential quantifier is given in (13-b.)
(Heim and Kratzer 1998, von Fintel and Heim 2011).
(13) a. [[ every ]]w,g=  P<e,t>. Q<e,t>.8x[P(x) ! Q(x)]
b. [[ some ]]w,g=  P<e,t>. Q<e,t>.9x[P(x) & Q(x)]
The meaning of (14-a.) given these lexical entries is provided in (14-b.).
(14) [ [ Every [ boy ] ] [ is smart ] ]
a. [[ every ]]w,g( [[ boy ]]w,g)( [[ smart ]]w,g)
b. 8x[boy(x)(w)! smart(x)(w)]
Diﬀerent quantifiers have been associated with diﬀerent formal properties (see
Heim and Kratzer 1998 for extensive discussion). Two properties I would like to
7mention are upward and downward monotonicity. They are formally described
in (15-a.) and (15-b.).
(15) a. A determiner is upward monotone if for all A, B, C (which are
subsets of D): A ✓ B and <A, C> 2 RDet, then <B, C> 2 RDet
b. A determiner is downward monotone if for all A, B, C (which are
subsets of D): A ✓ B and <B, C> 2 RDet, then <A, C> 2 RDet
According to these definitions, "some" is upward monotone, whereas "every"
is downward monotone (for the first argument), see how the definition holds
in the examples in (16-a.) and (16-b.).
(16) a. Every tall boy is a smoker ; Every boy is a smoker
Some tall boy is a smoker ) Some boy is a smoker
b. Every boy is a smoker ) Every tall boy is a smoker
Some boy is a smoker ; Some tall boy is a smoker
It has been noted that a statement like (16) is surely not a claim about every
single boy in the world but that the domain of boys talked about is further
restricted by the context (von Fintel 1994). This context-dependency has
been modeled as a covert domain restriction variable which combines with
the meaning of the quantifier (But see also Schwarz 2012) . It receives its
value from the variable assignment function, see the modified lexical entry for
"every" in (17) below.
(17) [[ everyC ]]w,g=  P. Q.8x[P(x)&(g(C))(x) ! Q(x)]
Let us assume that we are talking about the students in the class I am teaching.
Then the value assigned to C will be the one in (18-a.). The meaning of (17)
given the modified lexical entry in this context is provided in (18-b.).
(18) a. g(C) =  y. in-my-class(y)(w)
b. [[ everyC ]]w,g( [[ boy ]]w,g)( [[ smart ]]w,g)
8x[boy(x)(w) & in-my-class(x)(w) ! smart(x)(w)]
1.2.3 Presuppositions
According to a standard semantic view on presuppositions they are restrictions
on appropriate contexts (Stalnaker 1973, Karttunen 1973, Heim 1990b, Heim
8and Kratzer 1998). A sentence like (19) is only felicitous in a context that
entails that John had snored before.
(19) Joe snored again.
Two main characteristics distinguish presupposition from other inferences.
They are conventionally triggered and they project through various opera-
tors.
The first characteristic describes the fact that presuppositions are encoded in
the lexical entries of presupposition triggers. For example, the definition of the
presupposition trigger "again" in (19) entails that the truth value of a sentence
containing it is undefined in a world where its presupposition does not hold,
see the lexical entry in (20).
(20) [[ again ]]g =  p. t. w: 9t’.p(t’)(w) = 1 & t’<t. p(t)(w)= 1
The definedness conditions encoded in the trigger are inherited by the sentence
containing it. The compositional outcome of the example in (19) given this
lexical entry of the presupposition trigger in the notation of Heim and Kratzer
(1998) in (21). The sentence denotes a partial function from worlds to truth
values. It is only defined for those worlds which entail the presupposition.
(21) [[ Joe snored again ]]g = w: 9t’.Joe snored in w at t’ & t’<t. Joe
snored in w at t.
The fact that (19) can only be uttered felicitously in a context that entails
its presupposition can be expressed more formally. I assume that context is
modeled as the "common ground" (Stalnaker 1973), defined as follows:
The common ground of a conversation [...] is the set of propositions
that the participants in that conversation [...] mutually assume to
be taken for granted [...] The common ground describes a set of
worlds, the context set, which are those worlds in which all of the
propositions in the common ground are true. The context set is
the set of worlds that for all that is currently assumed to be taken
for granted, could be the actual world. (von Fintel 2008, p.1)
The following relation has to hold between the context set c and presuppo-
sition of (19) in order for the sentence to be felicitously uttered:
9(22) c ✓ {w: 9t’.Joe snored in w at t’}
The second characteristic describes the fact that even when a presupposition
trigger is embedded in the scope of certain operators, like negation, questions,
modals and if-clauses, the sentence inherits its presupposition (see Kadmon
2001). All of the sentences in (23-a.) to (d.) presuppose that Joe snored
before.
(23) a. Joe did not snore again.
b. Did Joe snore again?
c. It is possible that Joe snored again.
d. If Joe snored again, Mary will be mad.
It has been observed that sometimes the presupposition of a sentence can be
accommodated if it is not entailed by the context. That means that hearers
can just assume that the presupposition holds in the context and add it to
common ground. For example, even if the hearer does not know that I have
a dog, by hearing (24) s/he can accommodate that I own a dog (see Heim
1990b).
(24) Sorry, I am late. I had to feed the dog.
Moreover, it has been claimed that presuppositions can be accommodated
locally, below the scope of an operator. The presupposition is thus visible to
the operator and can potentially be cancelled. That is, locally accommodating
the presupposition of (23-a.) yields the result in (25).
(25) It is not true that France has a king and that he is bald.
For further discussion on presuppositions, especially projection and local ac-
commodation and its relation to diﬀerent operators see Kadmon (2001) and
the literature cited therein.
1.2.4 Conversational Implicatures
The first theory of implicatures was spelled out by Grice (1989a). He proposed
that participants in a conversation are co-operative in a way that makes them
follow four basic guidelines, the maxims of conversation. He formulated the
co-operative principle and these four maxims as follows (Levinson 1983).
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(26) The Co-operative Principle
make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged
(27) The Maxim of Quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
a. Do not say what you believe to be false
b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
(28) The Maxim of Quantity
a. Make your contribution as informative as requires for the current
purposes of the exchange
b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required
(29) The Maxim of Relevance
a. Make your contribution relevant
(30) The Maxim of Manner
Be perspicuous and specifically:
a. Avoid obscurity
b. Avoid ambiguity
c. Be brief
d. Be orderly
It has been claimed that, based on the assumption that speakers are co-
operative, they can calculate an inference of the sentence that goes beyond
its semantic content. This inference is called an implicature. Consider the
example in (31) (Levinson 1983).
(31) A: Can you tell me the time?
B: Well, the milkman has come.
Given that A assumes B is being as informative as possible and that B’s re-
sponse is relevant to the question asked, s/he might draw the inference that
the actual time is after the time the milkman usually arrives.
Grice (1989b) and (1989b) claims that there are four characteristics that dis-
tinguish implicatures from other types of inferences, as presuppositions or en-
tailments.
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First, they are cancelable. That is, the implicature of (32) that John has ex-
actly three cows can be canceled, as in (32-a.), the entailment that John has
two cows cannot be canceled, see (32-b.) (c. Levinson 1983).
(32) John has three cows.
a. In fact, he might have four.
b. ??In fact, he might have two.
Second, implicatures are non-detachable from the context. That is, (31-a.)
does not generally allow for an inference about the time. It only does so in
a context where A asks the according question and A and B share a certain
knowledge state.
Third, implicatures can be calculated using deductive reasoning. For (31) the
reasoning of speaker A might look as follows: I assume that speaker B would
have uttered the exact time if he knew it. He does not know the exact time
but he and I know that the milkman comes at 11. He stated truthfully that
the milkman has already come. So, it must be past 11.
Fourth, implicatures are non-conventional. The inferences of the sentences in
(32) and (31) are not related to the lexical items therein but are due to an
interaction between the literal meaning with contextual information.
The stability of these properties has been argued (see Levinson 1983 for some
discussion). Furthermore, some of these characteristics might be more or less
prominent depending on the type of implicature. The two main types dis-
tinguished by Grice are conventional and conversational implicatures. Con-
ventional implicatures are related to certain lexical expression. The discourse
connective "and", for example, has been argued to generate the implicature
that there is a contrast between the two conjuncts it combines. Conversational
implicatures are less dependent on lexical material. However, conversational
implicatures, too, fall into two classes, generalized and particularized conversa-
tional implicatures. Generalized implicatures are claimed to be less dependent
on a specific context than particularized ones. The most prominent case of
generalized conversational implicatures discussed is the one of scalar implica-
tures. They arise only with certain lexical items that are part of a lexical
scale (Horn 1972). The sentences containing an item of a given scale stand in
an entailment relation to one another. For example, the stronger sentence in
12
(33) a. All boys came to the party.
b. Some boys came to the party.
<All, some> has thus been argued to be one of the lexical scales active in our
grammar (Horn 1972). A consequence of this assumption is that (33-b.) will
always be in competition with the stronger scalar alternative in (33-a.). As a
result, (33-b.) has the scalar implicature that all of the boys went to the party
is not true. The reasoning behind that is the same as described above. Since
the speaker is as informative as possible and did not use (33-a.), the hearer
assumes that (33-a.) must be not true.
It is important to note that this traditional Gricean view on implicatures sees
the derivation of implicatures as a global pragmatic step. That is, the relevant
alternatives considered are sentences (c. Sauerland 2012). This pragmatic
view faces obvious problems with examples of implicatures arising locally, as
in (34).
(34) If you take salad or dessert, you pay $20; but if you take both, there
is a surcharge. (Chierchia, Fox, and Spector 2011)
"Or" is taken to be the weaker item on a scale with "and". The scalar im-
plicature resulting from using "or" in (34) arises below the if-clauses: if you
take salad or desert but not both, you pay $20. To account for these data,
a lexical theory of scalar implicatures was introduced assuming that the core
meaning of "some" is "some but not all" and that the weaker meaning is a
case of cancellation (Chierchia 2004b, see Sauerland 2012 and the literature
cited therein for further discussion of the lexical theory).
A third theory of scalar implicatures, which captures both local and global
implicatures, is the grammatical approach to implicatures. It makes use of
an operator, abbreviated O or EXH (for "only" and "exhaust", respectively)
which derives the implicature. It exhaustifies a proposition with respect to a
set of alternatives, see the definition in (35) (Fox 2007).
(35) a. [[ EXH ]](A<<s,t>,t>)(p<s,t>)(w) ,
p(w) & 8q 2 NW(p, A): ¬ q(w)
b. NW(p,A) = {q 2 A: p ; q}
The exhaustivity operator identifies a proposition as the most informative
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proposition out of a set of alternatives. It is the proposition that entails all
other true propositions in the alternatives. Alternatives which are non-weaker
(not entailed) are thus excluded as false. For scalar terms, the alternatives
are defined via the items they are on a lexical scale with. The example given
in (36-c.) shows how the exhaustivity operator derives the implicature of the
sentences in (36-a.), the relevant alternatives are provided in (36-b.)
(36) a. John ate some of the beans.
b. { w.John ate some of the beans in w,  w.John ate all of the beans
in w}
c. EXH( w.John ate some of the beans in w,  w.John ate all of the
beans in w)( w.John ate some of the beans in w) , John ate
some of the beans(w) =1 and John ate all of the beans(w)= 0
The exhaustivity operator is a covert operator supposed to be inserted into
the syntactic tree. Moreover, it is assumed to move freely, i.e. it can be
inserted below the level of the clause. Local and global implicatures arise due
to diﬀerent attachment sites for the operator. For further discussion of the
grammatical approach see Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2011). For a more
elaborate discussion of the diﬀerences between the grammatical, lexical and
pragmatic approach see Sauerland (2012) and the literature cited therein.
1.2.5 Focus and questions
By focus I refer to the "part of the sentence [which] is marked by (contains)
a peak of prosodic prominence and is involved in the relevant pragmatic and
semantic eﬀects" (Kadmon 2001, p. 251). I will described some of the se-
mantic and pragmatic eﬀect of focus which are crucial for the understand-
ing of the discussion in the chapters to come (see Beck 2016 for a recent
overview/introduction).
As a theoretical background for the interpretation of focus, I will assume an
alternative semantics as proposed by Rooth (1985), (1992), (1996). According
to this theory, every sentence has an "ordinary semantic value" and a "focus
semantic value". The latter is the set of propositions "obtainable from the or-
dinary semantic value by making a substitution in the position corresponding
to the focused phrase" (Rooth 1992, p.2). The focus semantic value is the set
of relevant alternative propositions. The ordinary and focus semantic value of
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(37) are given in (37-a.) and (37-b.)
(37) [[ [S [ Mary ]F likes Sue ] ]]g
a. [[ [ [ Mary ]F likes Sue ] ]]f = { w.like(x,s,w) | x 2 De}
b. [[ [ [ Mary ]F likes Sue ] ]]o =  w.like(m, s, w)
The first important semantic/pragmatic eﬀect of focus is question-answer
congruence. That is, the focus in (38-b.) must match the question asked in
(38-a.). The answer will be infelicitous otherwise, see (38-c.)
(38) a. What does John like?
b. John likes CARROTSF .
c. #JOHNF likes carrots.
Another eﬀect of focus is that it associates with certain adverbs like "also"
and "only". This association with focus (Rooth 1985) has a semantic eﬀect.
The truth conditions of sentences with "only" and "too" change crucially with
diﬀerent foci, compare (39-a.) and (b.) as well as (40-a.) and (b.).
(39) a. John only introduced BILL to Sue.
b. John only introduced Bill to SUE.
(40) a. John also introduced BILL to Sue.
b. John also introduced Bill to SUE.
The adverb "only" takes a set of properties C in this case and a property p
and says that out of this set C only p is true of the individual it combines
with. In addition, there is a constraint that C must be a subset of the focus
semantic value of the phrase "only" combines with, see the truth conditions
for a sentence with "only" when it combines with a VP in (41) (Rooth 1992,
p. 5).
(41) a. [S John only VP]
b. 8P [ P 2 C & P(J) ! P = VP ]
c. Focus-determined constraint: C ✓ [[ VP ]]f
This yields the following, diﬀerent, truth-conditions for (39-a) and (39-b) in
(42-a.) and (42-b.).
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(42) a. 8P [ P 2 { y [introduce (x, y, Sue, w) ] | x 2 De} & P(John) ]!
P = { y [introduce (Bill, y, Sue, w) ] }
b. 8P [ P 2 { y [introduce (Bill, y, x, w) ] | x 2 De} & P(John) ]!
P = { y [introduce (Bill, y, Sue, w) ] }
According to Rooth (1992), focus has moreover an influence on the interpre-
tation of contrast and scalar implicatures. The following generalizations hold
for the interpretation of focus in interaction with adverbs, contrast, scales and
questions (Rooth 1992, p. 11).
(43) Focus Interpretation Principle
a. Focusing adverb constraint. If C is the domain of quantification
of a focusing adverb with argument ↵, then C ✓ [[↵]]f .
b. Contrasting phrase constraint. If a phrase ↵ is construed as in
contrast with a phrase  , then [[ ]]o 2 [[↵]]f .
c. Constraint on scales. If C is the underlying set of a scale used in
computing the implicatures of a sentence ↵, then C ✓ [[↵]]f .
d. Question-answer constraint. In a question-answer pair <  , ↵ >,
[[ ]]o ✓ [[↵]]f .
The relation of focus to questions and information structure in discourse is
especially important for the subsequent discussion. I will adopt a notion of
discourse which assumes that it is structured by questions which are being
discussed (Roberts 1996). A proposition is most relevant according to this
view if it addresses the last question under discussion (QUD, Roberts 1996).
The semantics of question Roberts (1996) assumes follows Hamblin (1973).
The meaning of a question is the set of propositions that are true answers. A
question like "Who readWar and Peace?" is the set of propositions of the form
"x read War and Peace" where x varies over individuals, see (44) (c. Krifka
2011).
(44)  p.9x[p=  w. [person(x)(w) ^ read(W & P)(x)(w)]]
Parallely, the meaning of "When did Bill read War and Peace?" is the one in
(45).
(45)  p.9t[p=  w. [time(t)(w) ^ read(W & P)(Bill)(t)(w)]]
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There are two main moves an interlocutor can make in a conversation. S/he
can assert a proposition and thereby add it to the common ground which is
the set of propositions all participants of a conversation believe to be true
(Stalnaker 1978). Or she can ask a question and add it to the set of QUDs (c.
Kadmon 2001). Based on Robert’s theory, Kadmon (2001) defines relevance of
a move as in (46). The definition of subquestion and partial/complete answer
used therein are given in (47) and (48) (Kadmon 2001, pp. 340-341).
(46) A move ↵ is directly relevant to a question Q iﬀ
a. if ↵ is a proposition, then ↵ is a partial answer to Q; and
b. if ↵ is a question, then ↵ is a subquestion of Q.
(47) A question Q2 is a subquestion of a question Q1 iﬀ the complete
answer to Q2 contextually entails a partial answer to Q1
(48) A proposition is a partial answer to a question Q iﬀ p contextually
entails the truth value of at least one element of the denotation of Q.
A proposition is a complete answer to a question Q iﬀ p contextually
entails the truth value of each element in the denotation of Q.
The role of focus is to mark the current QUD. There is thus a constraint
that the focus semantic value of a sentence must be identical to the ordinary
semantic value of the QUD.
The overall theory of discourse I will assume combines a notion of common
ground adopted from Stalnaker (1978) with an alternative semantics for focus
as developed by Rooth (1992, 1996) with the QUD account from Roberts
(1996). For further discussion of such a system see Kadmon (2001).
1.3 Outlook
The dissertation is structured as follows. The second chapter provides a the-
oretical overview over the phenomenon of obligatory presupposition triggers.
Two diﬀerent theories on how to explain this phenomenon will be discussed
in sections 2.1. and 2.2. The first theory works with the principle Maximize
Presupposition. The second theory is based on a grammatical account of im-
plicatures. The two theories will be compared with regard to their empirical
predictions in section 2.3. A summary and outlook will be provided in section
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2.4. It gives an overview over the predictions which will be tested in the main
empirical part of the thesis.
Chapters 3 to 6 are the empirical part of the dissertation. The third chapter
discusses empirical studies on the obligatory insertion of the presupposition
trigger "too". In section 3.1. a rating study on "too" under negation will be
reported. In section 3.2. three experiments on the influence of discourse on
the insertion of the trigger "too" will be presented.
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the presupposition trigger "again". An
experimental investigation of the insertion of "again" under negation will be
discussed in section 4.1..
Chapter 5 discusses the obligatory insertion of the factive verb "know". In
section 5.1. the obligatory insertion of "know" under negation will be investi-
gated. The influence of the QUD on the insertion of "know" will be looked at
in chapter 5.2.
Chapter 6 examines the obligatory occurrence of presuppositional determiners.
Section 6.1. discusses the singular definite and reports a study on its insertion
under negation. Section 6.2. revolves around the insertion of the plural def-
inite. A reading time study on the diﬀerence between the plural definite and
universal quantifier will be presented. It discusses the role of the QUD in the
obligatory insertion of the plural definite.
Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the empirical investigations. Given the
empirical picture, I propose a two-way distinction between presupposition trig-
gers based on the mechanisms behind their obligatory insertion. Features, in-
cluding the definiteness feature of certain determiners, are considered one class
of triggers to be captured with Maximize Presupposition. Factives, iteratives
and additives fall into a second class of triggers. Their insertion is directly
linked to exhaustivity implicatures. I discuss some additional evidence from
acquisition and cross-linguistic data which support this view.

Chapter 2
Obligatory Triggers
The following chapter gives a theoretical overview over the phenomenon of
obligatory presupposition triggers. Two diﬀerent theories which oﬀer diverging
explanations for why and under which circumstances presupposition triggers
are obligatory will be presented in sections 2.1. and 2.2. The first theory
is based on the principle Maximize Presupposition. The second theory uses
obligatory exhaustivity implicatures to explain the insertion of presupposition
triggers. The two theories are contrasted with regard to their empirical predic-
tions in section 2.3. Section 2.4. summarizes the chapter and gives an overview
over the predictions tested in chapters 3 to 6.
It has been observed (Schlenker 2012, Sauerland 2008a, Percus 2006, Chemla
2008, Singh 2011) that the use of diﬀerent presupposition triggers is obligatory
when their presuppositions are met in the context. In (1) to (6) below some
examples of obligatory occurrences of presuppositional items are given.
(1) a. #A sun is shining.
b. The sun is shining.
(2) a. #All of John’s eyes are open.
b. Both of John’s eyes are open.
(3) a. #John thinks/believes that Paris is in France.
b. John knows that Paris is in France.
(4) John came to the store.
a. #Bill did.
b. Bill did, too.
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(5) Jenna went ice skating yesterday.
a. #Today she went ice skating.
b. Today she went ice skating, again.
(6) a. #The suns are shining.
b. The sun is shining.
There exist two diﬀerent explanations for why the presupposition triggers
above are obligatory. One standard approach to explaining the data is by
making use of the pragmatic principle Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991).
The literature on Maximize Presupposition first focused on the explanation
of obligatory definite descriptions as in examples in (1) and (2). Then, the
attention shifted to obligatory features, as for example the number feature in
(6) as well as to obligatory additives, factives and iteratives, see (3) to (5)
(Percus 2006, Chemla 2008, Sauerland 2008a).
Another explanation for the obligatory occurrence of presuppositions discussed
in the literature works on the basis of obligatory implicatures. First, it has
been shown to work for the obligatory insertion of additives as in example (4)
in contexts with contrastive implicatures (Kaplan 1984, Krifka 1999, Saeboe
2004). Only recently has this proposal been extended to a wider range of
presupposition triggers, especially "know" and "again" (Bade 2014). I will take
the latter proposal as the background for a theory that works with implicatures
in 2.2. I will explain the basic mechanisms these theories assume to be behind
the obligatory insertion of triggers in more detail in the following two sections.
In section 2.3. I will contrast the predictions of the two theories for the insertion
of triggers in embedding structures and the influence of discourse.
2.1 Maximize Presupposition
Heim (1991) was the first to observe that the definite determiner is obligatory
in contexts that entail its presupposition. Using an indefinite determiner like
"a" or "some" in these contexts will result in infelicity, see (7-a.). Using the
definite determiner is obligatory in (7-b.) because it is common knowledge that
people only have one father.
(7) a. #A father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
b. The father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
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Heim (1991) observes that the assertions of the two sentences in (7-a.) and
(7-b.) are identical. Both assert that there exists an individual who is the
father of the victim and arrived at the crime scene, see (8).
(8) 9x[father-of-victim(x) & arrived-cs(x)]
The sentences in (1) only diﬀer with respect to what they presuppose. Whereas
(7-b) presupposes that the victim has one unique father, see (9) (Heim 2012),
(7-a) lacks this presupposition.
(9) 9x[8y[father-of-victim(y)] ! x=y] 1
The Gricean maxim of quantity cannot distinguish between the two sentences
in (1) because they are equally informative. To explain the contrast in (1),
Heim (1991) introduced the additional pragmatic maxim Maximize Presuppo-
sition. Her formulation of it is given below.
Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991) Make your contribution presup-
pose as much as possible!
Since (7-b) presupposes more than (7-a), the maxim explains why the for-
mer is to be preferred over the latter. It furthermore accounts for why speakers
assume that the presupposition of the definite is not fulfilled when the indef-
inite is used. This happens via the same type of Gricean reasoning at play
when deriving implicatures. Since the principle tells the speaker to use the
definite determiner when possible, the hearer deduces that its presupposition
is not true in the context when the indefinite is used. As a result, (7-a) has the
inference that the victim has not one unique father ("antiuniqueness") which
results in oddness.
Recent accounts of obligatory triggers using Maximize Presupposition tried to
extend the principle to other presuppositional phenomena besides the definite
determiner. The focus of the recent literature is on the lexical alternative to
the trigger that systematically leads to the inference that the presupposition is
not true (Schlenker 2012, Sauerland 2008a, Percus 2006, Chemla 2008, Singh
2011). The sentence in (3-a) with "believe", for example, has been argued to
1I am choosing this notation for the presupposition of the definite since it extends to its
plural version and will be picked up in chapter 6. For the present discussion nothing hinges
on this entry, as long as the presupposition expresses uniqueness and existence.
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lead to the inference that it is not part of the common ground that Paris is
in France. That inference contradicts what we know and therefore results in
oddness of the whole sentence. Refinements of the theory and the principle
Maximize Presupposition have been oﬀered that are sensitive to this observa-
tion.
Sauerland (2008) proposes thatMaximize Presupposition should be formulated
in a way that captures, first, that sentences are in global pragmatic compe-
tition and, second, that sentences with stronger presuppositions are gener-
ally preferred. The mechanism he suggests is an extension of his account of
scalar implicatures (Sauerland 2004a) where scalar implicatures are derived
from alternative sentences based on sets of lexical sets. The lexical sets for
presuppositions he supposes are given in (10) (Sauerland 2008a).
(10) Scales: {the, every, a, both} , {believe, know} , {SG, PL} , {SPEAKER,
HEARER} , {PRES, PAST}
Using these unordered sets of lexical alternatives, he defines a set of alternative
sentences as in (11).
(11) Alt(S) = {S’ | the only diﬀerence between S and S’ are replacements
of one member of one of the sets in Scales with another element of the
same set}
For Sauerland, competition hence exists between alternative sentences. In or-
der to block a sentence S, an alternative must satisfy three conditions: its pre-
supposition must be satisfied (12-a.), it must be true according to the speaker
(12-b.) and it must have more informative presuppositions (12-c.). This is
spelled out in his formulation of Maximize Presupposition in (12) below.
(12) Maximize Presupposition (Sauerland 2008)
Do not use S in context c if there is an S’ such that:
a. c ⇢ domain ([[ S’ ]])
b. you believe S’ to be true
c. domain([[ S’ ]])⇢ domain([[ S ]])
Not taking the sentence with the strongest presupposition leads to what Sauer-
land calls an "implicated presupposition", the inference that the presupposi-
tion of the competitor is false. I will shortly go through how this version ac-
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counts for the contrast between (3-b) and (3-a). The lexical entry for "know" I
assume is the one in (13-a.). "Know" presupposes the truth of its complement.
It asserts that the individual it combines with believes the complement to be
true. The resulting assertion is thus identical to the one of the sentence with
"believe". The lexical entry of "believe" in (13-b.) makes use of the function
in (13-c.) (von Fintel and Heim 2011). The truth conditions of (13) using this
lexical entry are given in (13-d.).
(13) John believes Paris is in France.
a. [[ know ]]w =  w. p. x: p(w). BELIEF(p)(x)(w)
b. [[ believe ]]w =  w. p. x. BELIEF(p)(x)(w)
c. [[ BELIEF ]]w =  p. x. w.8w’[w’ is compatible with x’s beliefs in
w ! p(w’)]
d. [[ believe ]]w([[ Paris is in France ]]w)([[ John ]]w)= 8w’[w’ is com-
patible with John’s beliefs in w ! Paris is in France in w’]
Following Sauerland’s version of the principle, speakers do not use (3-a) since
there is an alternative sentence (3-b) which fulfills all three conditions of Maxi-
mize Presupposition. The presupposition of (3-b) is met in the context since it
is common knowledge that Paris is in France. (3-b) has the same assertion as
(3-a) that John believes Paris is in France. If the speaker believes (3-a) then
s/he believes (3-b) to be true as well. The domain of (3-b) is smaller than
the domain of (3-a) since it is only defined in worlds where Paris is in fact in
France whereas (3-a) has no definedness conditions.
Sauerland’s definition of the principle works at the level of utterances; sen-
tences are assumed to be in global pragmatic competition. Percus (2006),
Sauerland (2008) himself and later Singh (2011) notice that complex sentences
are a problem for this analysis. If alternatives are compared at the level of
sentences, one cannot explain why triggers are preferred over non-triggers in
sentences where the presupposition is locally satisfied, as in (14) and (15)
below.
(14) a. If it was raining, John would know it.
b. #If it was raining, John would believe it.
(15) a. Everyone with exactly two students assigned the same exercise to
both of his students.
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b. #Everyone with exactly two students assigned the same exercise to
all of his students.
Other proposals therefore advocate that the principle is applying on a local
level (Percus 2006, Chemla 2008, Singh 2011). They assume that competition
between sentences is only the result of competition between lexical items. They
furthermore suppose that these items are parts of lexical scales that are ordered
with regard to their presuppositional strength, examples of which are given in
(16) below.
(16) {the, a} , {know, believe} , {too, ?}, {again, ?} , {both, all}
Alternatives to choose from are defined via these lexical scales. The compe-
tition involves the respective presuppositional content of sentences containing
these items. A formulation of the principle Maximize Presupposition that is
in accordance with these premises is given in (17) below.
(17) Maximize Presupposition (Percus 2006)
a. Alternatives are only defined for lexical items. For any lexical
item, the alternatives consist of all "presuppositionally stronger"
items of the same syntactic category.
b. Do not use   if a member of its Alternative Family is felicitous
and contextually equivalent to  (  is contextually equivalent to
 iﬀ for all w in the common ground,  (w) =  (w)).
According to this version of the principle, (3-a) cannot be used since "believe"
is on a scale with the presuppositionally stronger item "know" such that if
you replace "believe with "know" you get a sentence that is felicitous (it is
defined since Paris is in France) and contextually equivalent (it has the same
assertion).
These recent formulations of the maxim account for why a presupposition trig-
ger must be used if its presupposition is verified by the context. Moreover, they
explain why the alternative is infelicitous in the same context. They operate
with lexical scales of presuppositional strength. When the weaker item on the
scale is used felicitously, it gives rise to an "antipresupposition" (Percus 2006)
or "implicated presupposition" (Sauerland 2008). It says that the presuppo-
sition of the competitor is false. The pragmatic reasoning behind it works
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parallely to the one for scalar implicatures. Not using the presuppositional
stronger item will lead the hearer to believe that its presupposition is not ful-
filled.
They assume that this type of inference has to be distinguished from scalar
implicatures and ordinary presuppositions based on two characteristics (Sauer-
land 2008a). First, they have a weak epistemic status and resist strengthening.
Second, they are projective content.
The weak epistemic status of the inference that the alternative to the trigger
yields has first been observed for the so called "antiuniqueness" inference of
the indefinite (Heim 1991). (18) has the inference that there is not a unique
6ft. long catfish in the context.
(18) Robert caught a 6ft. long catfish. (Heim 1991)
Inferences arising from not using the trigger share the weak epistemic status
with implicatures. Unlike implicatures, these inference have been argued to
resist strengthening (Sauerland 2008a). That is, the inference of (18) cannot
be strengthened to the speaker being certain that there is more than one 6ft
long catfish. It must remain that it is not part of the common ground that
there is exactly one. However, it has been observed that this is not the case
for all presupposition triggers.
The inference arising from not using "know" can be strengthened in the same
way as implicatures by taking the "epistemic step" (Chemla 2008). The epis-
temic step is based on the "Competence Assumption", which says that speak-
ers are opinionated about the truth of sentences and their (scalar) alternatives
(Sauerland 2004b). That is, if a speaker utters a weaker sentence q, the hearer
can assume that the speaker believes the stronger sentence p to be false (and
not only that it is uncertain whether p holds). The same mechanism applies to
inferences arising from not using the trigger, if this trigger is not the definite
(Chemla 2008). (19) has a strong inference that the speaker does not have a
sister.
(19) Peter believes that I have a sister. (Chemla 2008)
This is because the hearer can be sure that in this case the speaker is opinion-
ated about having siblings or not (the truth of the complement). Unlike for
presuppositions, the strength of the epistemic status for the inferences result-
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ing from not using the trigger is largely dependent on context.
However, another characteristic Sauerland (2006) claims "implicated presup-
positions" possess is that they project through negation and other types of
embeddings, see (20) and (21). This is a property they share with presuppo-
sitions but not implicatures.
(20) a. #A father of the victim did not arrive at the crime scene.
b. #If a father of the victim arrived at the crime scene...
c. #Did a father of the victim arrive at the crime scene?
(21) a. #All arms of John are not broken.
b. #If all arms of John are broken...
c. #Are all arms of John broken?
The projection behavior of "implicated presuppositions" results from the fact
that presuppositions project as well. Leaving out the trigger in sentences with
negation and other embedding operators violatesMaximize Presupposition and
leads to the inference that the presupposition does not hold.
Whereas it is very clear for non-presuppositional determiners like the indefinite
and universal quantifier that their "implicated presuppositions" survive under
negation, it is less clear for the sentences in (a.) in (22) - (24) below.
(22) Jenna went ice skating yesterday.
a. ?Today she didn’t go.
b. Today she didn’t go again.
(23) Mary came to the party.
a. ?It is not the case that Peter came to the party.
b. It is not the case that Peter came to the party, too.
(24) Peter has a sister.
a. ?John does not believe that Peter has a sister.
b. John does not know that Peter has a sister.
The sentences without the trigger should be as odd as their unnegated coun-
terparts according to Maximize Presupposition. I will return to this point in
more detail when comparing the predictions of the two theories with regard to
the insertion of the trigger under negation and other operators.
Since the status of the inference resulting from not using the trigger is a point
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that diﬀerentiates the two theories discussed, I will from now on use the theory
neutral term "missing trigger inference" to refer to them.
2.2 Obligatory Implicatures
The alternative explanation outlined in this section mostly follows a proposal
made by Bade (2014). It is based on a grammatical approach to scalar im-
plicatures (Fox 2007, Fox and Hackl 2006, Chierchia, Fox, and Spector 2011).
Thereby it operates only with already existing and independently needed mech-
anisms. The assumption is that sentences are sometimes mandatorily inter-
preted exhaustively with respect to the Question Under Discussion (QUD)
(Roberts 1996). Focus is taken to mark what that QUD is. Exhaustive in-
terpretations are derived by assuming the presence of a covert exhaustivity
operator with a meaning given in (25) (Fox 2007). It takes a set of alternative
propositions A and a proposition p and identifies p as the single most infor-
mative and true proposition in the set, i.e. it says that all alternatives which
are non-weaker than p are false. The set of non-weaker alternatives includes
those propositions which are not entailed by p, see (25-b.).
(25) a. [[ EXH ]](A<<s,t>,t>)(p<s,t>)(w), p(w) & 8q 2 NW(p, A): ¬q(w)
b. NW(p,A) = {q 2 A: p ; q}
It has been successfully argued in various places that an operator of this sort is
needed and is covertly present in many structures in natural language. It ac-
counts for a variety of phenomena, for example the interpretation of questions,
especially under question embedding verbs (Heim 1994, Beck and Rullmann
1999) or the derivation of scalar implicatures (Fox 2007, Chierchia, Fox, and
Spector 2011) and the interpretation of degree constructions (Fox and Hackl
2006). The exhaustivity operator is taken to be responsible for the inferences
arising from using the alternative to the presupposition trigger. The insertion
of the trigger is seen as a result of this inference.
The proposal will first be outlined for examples involving obligatory "too" and
"again". To see how the analysis works, one has to determine what the miss-
ing trigger inferences of sentences without "too" or "again" are. If there is a
competing sentence with "too" for the sentence in (26-a.) the missing trigger
inference of (26-a.) would be the one in (26-b.).
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(26) a. MARYF was at the party
b. There was no other relevant person at the party besides Mary.
Parallely, assuming that there is a competing sentence with "again" for the
sentence in (27-a.) the missing trigger inference of that sentence would be the
one in (27-b.).
(27) a. Peter was in Norway [LAST YEAR]F .
b. There is no other relevant time before last year when Peter was
in Norway.
The proposal follows observations made by Saeboe (2004) and Krifka (1999).
They both argue that sentences without "too" generate an implicature and that
the insertion of the additive blocks this implicature. Krifka (1999) focuses on
stressed additive particles and argues that they are indicators of contrastive
topics (Büring 2003), rather than focus. According to Krifka, contrastive topics
come with the "Distinctiveness Condition", see (28).
(28) If [...TF ...CF ...] is a contrastive answer to a question Q, then there
is no alternative T’ of T such that the speaker is willing to assert
[...T’...C...].
This condition says that whatever the contrastive topic T of a sentence is, it is
the only relevant alternative for which C (the comment) holds. For sentences
like (29), where "Mary" is the contrastive topic, this means that there is no
alternative T’ to "Mary" for which it holds that T’ came to the party, see
(29-a.).
(29) MARYCT was at the party.
a. ¬9T’[T’ 6= Mary & T’ was at the party in w]
For Krifka, the condition is a result of the maxim of manner since "if the
speaker could assert [...T’...C...], the speaker would have asserted it right away
by way of conjoining T and T’", which is shorter. Whatever stressed "too" as-
sociates with must be the contrastive topic, according to Krifka. However, "the
use of "too" allows to violate distinctiveness by explicitly stating a discourse
relation" (Krifka 1999: 15). The insertion of "too" blocks the implicature by
explicitly stating, that there is another true alternative T’ for which C holds.
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According to Saeboe (2004), additives occur obligatorily when a contrastive
implicature results in a contradiction with the context. The meaning he as-
sumes for "too" is the one given in (30).
(30) [[ too ]]w =  C. q w: 9p[p 2 C & p(w) & p 6= [[q]]0]. q(w)
"Too" is focus sensitive according to this lexical entry. It takes a set of focus
alternatives C and a proposition q and states that there is a true alternative
in C which is not q. Saeboe (2004) notes that using a sentence q in a context
that verifies the presupposition of "q too" has the implicature in (31), namely
that there is no alternative in the set of alternatives that is true except for q.
(31) ¬9p[p 2C & p(w) & p 6= [[ q ]]0]
However, contexts that verify the presupposition of "q too" entail that there
is a relevant alternative which is represented in (32).
(32) 9p[p2C & p(w) & p 6= [[ q ]]0]
(31) and (32) together result in a contradiction. For example, if "Mary" is the
contrastive topic of the sentence in (33-b.), then the focus alternatives C are
defined as in (34).
(33) a. Peter was at the party.
b. MARYF was at the party.
(34) C = [ p. p =  w.  x.x was at the party in w]
The presupposition of "too" would be true in this context since it is entailed
that Peter was at the party. Hence, there is a proposition in the focus al-
ternatives C that is true and not identical to "Mary was at the party". The
contrastive implicature that arises for (33-b.) following Saeboe (2004) is the
one in (35) below.
(35) ¬9p[p =  w. x. x was at the party in w & p(w) & p 6=  w. Mary
was at the party in w]
This contradicts what is entailed by the context since "Mary was at the party"
is not the only true proposition in the focus alternatives. There exists an al-
ternative proposition that is also true, namely "Peter was at the party".
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Saeboe (2004) argues that this contradiction is the reason for the obligatory
insertion of "too". The contrastive implicature a sentence without "too" has
when it is established in the context that its presupposition is fulfilled is equiv-
alent to its missing trigger inference: It says that there are no true propositions
in the set of focus alternatives except for the proposition that is the ordinary
semantic value of the sentence.
Bade (2014) argues that a general mechanism derives these inferences which
does not only force the obligatory insertion of "too" but also "again" and
"know". This mechanism makes use of the presence of a covert exhaustivity
operator that forces exhaustive interpretation when there is obligatory focus
(Fox 2007). More specifically, missing trigger inferences arising from not using
additives, iteratives and "know" are argued to occur due to the fact that people
interpret sentences exhaustively with respect to the implicit Question Under
Discussion (QUD, Roberts 1996). A background assumption made is that fo-
cus marks what the implicit QUD is, also in cases of contrastive focus (Beaver
and Clark 2008). The alternatives used to derive missing trigger inferences are
taken from information structure, not lexical scales. The exhaustivity oper-
ator is taken to operate on the question set, the set of propositions that are
possible answers to the QUD (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977). It identifies a
proposition p as the most informative answer to the QUD, which means that
all other true answers have to be entailed by p. This operation is defined in
(36) below.
(36) [[ EXH ]](Q<s,<<s,t>,t>)(p<s,t>)(w) ,
p(w) & 8q[q 2 Q(w) & p ; q ! ¬ q(w)]
Another background assumption is that focus is forcing the insertion of an
exhaustivity operator into the syntactic tree, see (37). This operator takes as
its argument the ordinary semantic value of the proposition it combines with
and a question. Focus is interpreted by the squiggle operator which introduces
a covert variable C at LF that receives its value from the context through the
variable assignment function gC (Rooth 1992). The assignment comes with the
restriction that the assigned value must be the QUD, see (38-a.). Furthermore,
the question (QUD) has to stand in a specific relation to the focus semantic
value of the sentence it combines with. The question set, i.e. the set of
possible answers, must be a subset of the focus value of the proposition p that
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the sentences denotes, see (38-b.) (c. Roberts 1996, Rooth 1992).
(37) <s,t>
EXH C
⇠ C
p<s,t>
NP
MaryF
VP
came to the party
(38) a. [[ C ]]g = gc(C) = QUD
b. [[ QUD ]]o ✓ [[ p ]]F
Question-answer congruence is thus assumed to be maintained for the QUD.
Moreover, exhaustification of the QUD is considered mandatory with focus.
The proposition in (39-a.), for example, will be interpreted as the exhaustive
answer to the implicit QUD "Who was at the party?" since the question set
of this QUD is a subset of the focus alternatives of (39-a.), see (39-b.). The
result of this exhaustification is given in (39).
(39) MaryF was at the party.
a. [[ Who was at the party ]]o ✓ [[ MaryF was at the party ]]F
b. [[ EXH ]]([[ Who was at the party ]])([[ Mary was at the party ]])
(w), [Mary was at the party](w) &
8q [ q 2 [ p.9x.p=  w.person(x)(w) & at-the-party(x)(w)] &
 w.Mary was at the party ; q ! ¬ q(w)]
The exhaustivity operator identifies the proposition "Mary was at the party" as
the most informative answer to the QUD, which means that all other true an-
swers have to be entailed. Since the question is about individuals this amounts
to saying that Mary was the only person at the party. Hence, the contrastive
implicature of the sentence or its missing trigger inference are identical to the
result of interpreting the sentence exhaustively with respect to the QUD. By
assuming this mechanism to be active in (40) below the obligatory insertion
of "too" in the third sentence can be explained straightforwardly.
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(40) Peter was at the party. He was enjoying himself. Mary was at the
party #(too).
If "too" is left out in the third sentence, it is interpreted exhaustively with
respect to the QUD "Who was at the party?" due to the mandatory focus on
"Mary". This focus marking is obligatory since "Mary" is the only discourse
new information in the sentence in this context. Exhaustification is hence
assumed to be mandatory as well. The idea is that alternatives activated by
focus cannot be ignored. Since there is no other operator that uses alternatives
the exhaustivity operator is taken to be the default. Interpreting exhaustively,
however, yields a contradiction. The result of exhaustification is that "Mary
came to a party" is the most informative true answer to the question "Who
came to the party?" in a context that entails that Peter came to the party.
"Peter came to the party" is an active alternative that is not entailed by
"Mary came to the party" but necessarily excluded as false by the exhaustivity
operator.
A parallel explanation applies to examples containing "again". If "Peter was in
Norway this year" is interpreted exhaustively with respect to the QUD "When
was Peter in Norway?" due to obligatory focus on "this year" in (41) the result
is (42).
(41) Peter was in Norway last year. It rained a lot. Peter was in Norway
#(again) this year.
(42) [[ EXH ]]([[When was Peter in Norway]])([[Peter was in Norway this
year]]) (w) , [Peter was in Norway this year](w) &
8q [q 2 [ p.9t.p=  w [time(t)(w) & Peter was in Norway at t in w]]
&  w.Peter was in Norway this year ; q ! ¬q(w)]
The result in (42) contradicts what is entailed by the context since it says
that "Peter was in Norway this year" is the most informative answer to the
question "When was Peter in Norway?". All other true answers in the question
set have to be entailed. This means that "Peter was in Norway last year" which
is an active alternative and not entailed by "Peter was in Norway this year" is
excluded as false.
The insertion of a presupposition trigger will prevent this contradiction from
arising. To clarify how that works one has to look at what the presupposition
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of a sentence like "Peter was in Norway again this year" would be. Its truth
conditions is given in (43) below (c. Beck 2007).
(43) [[ Peter was in Norway againt1 this year ]]w = is defined only if Peter
was in Norway at g(1) and g(1) < this year. If defined, it is true iﬀ
Peter was in Norway this year.
Since "again" is dependent on an anaphoric element, it must refer to a time
mentioned in the previous context. Accordingly, g(1) will be mapped onto
"last year" in the example in (41) (Beck 2007). Hence, calculating the presup-
position and truth conditions of the sentence will yield "Peter was in Norway
last year and this year". The alternative that was excluded by the exhaustiv-
ity operator before is now presupposed to be true. The definedness conditions
of the sentence are only fulfilled without the presence of the exhaustivity op-
erator. Its insertion is thus assumed to be blocked. The covert exhaustivity
operator cannot be inserted into the LF and the implicature does not arise.
As a result, there is no contradiction and the discourse is not infelicitous.
A similar eﬀect is assumed to be yielded by the insertion of "too" in (44-b.)
below.
(44) a. Peter came to the party.
b. Mary came to the party, too.
"Too" is focus sensitive and makes use of the alternatives in the context. The
compositional outcome for (44-b.) is given in (45).
(45) [[ Mary came to the party, tooC ]] = is defined only if 9p 2 C & p(w)
& p 6=  w. Mary came to the party in w. If defined, it is true iﬀ Mary
came to the party in w.
Since the only salient alternative in C in this context is "Peter came to the
party", it is presupposed to be true. Hence, the exhaustivity operator does
not have to be activated to make use of this alternative and a contradiction
does not arise.
In sum, assuming that sentences are interpreted exhaustively with respect to
the QUD explains the obligatory occurrence of "again" and "too" without
making use of an additional principle like Maximize Presupposition. It can
also explain the inferences arising from not inserting the trigger: they are
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implicatures following from exhaustive interpretation.
The account predicts that additives and iteratives are not obligatory under
negation. The mechanism of exhaustifying with respect to a QUD is assumed
to also be active under negation. However, the QUD crucially changes with
negation. Consider the examples in (46) and (47) below.
(46) a. Peter went to Norway last year.
b. Peter did not go to Norway this year.
(47) a. Peter came to the party.
b. Mary did not come to the party.
Focus can either fall on "this year" in (46-b.) and "Mary" in (47-b.), or on
negation in both cases. The QUD hence either changes to "When did Peter
not go to Norway?" (for (46-b.)) and "Who did not come to the party" (for
(47-b.)) or to polar questions ("Did Peter go this year or not" in (46-b.) and
"Did Mary come to the party or not" in (47-b.)). Obligatory exhaustification
of both sentences with regard to these questions is triggered due to this focus.
However, exhaustifying with respect to the possible answers to these questions
does not result in a contradiction with the sentences in (46-a.) and (47-a.).
"This year" being the only time when Peter did not go to Norway does not
contradict that he went to Norway last year. And Mary being the only per-
son that did not come does not contradict that Peter came. It is predicted
under the present proposal that the triggers do not have to be inserted. Their
obligatory insertion is motivated by a contradiction which does not arise with
negation. The first sentences in (47-a.) and (47-b.) are not in the question
set and hence the exhaustivity operator cannot exclude them as false. I will
return to this point when comparing the predictions of Obligatory Implicatures
with the ones of Maximize Presupposition with regard to the insertion of the
trigger under negation and other embedding operators in the next section.
The core properties of the two theories, their theoretical diﬀerences and em-
pirical predictions will be reviewed in the next section (2.3.). This general
theoretical overview and comparison will serve as the background for the the-
oretical discussion and empirical investigation of individual triggers which will
be discussed in the following chapters of the dissertation.
35
2.3 Comparison and predictions
The main theoretical diﬀerences between the two approaches outlined above
will be discussed and compared in this section. Subsequently, these theories
will simply be referred to as Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Impli-
catures. The diﬀerences between both theories mainly concern the theoretical
points in (48-a.-d.), which I will examine in more detail in the following sub-
sections.
(48) a. Missing trigger inferences
b. Alternatives
c. The role of context
(i) Syntactic context
(ii) Discourse
d. Diﬀerent triggers
Whereas the points in (48-a) and (48-b) mainly address conceptual issues, (1-a)
and (48-d) concern the empirical predictions resulting from these conceptual
diﬀerences. I will summarize the result of the comparison of the theories at
the end of this section and will outline the scope of this thesis with regard to
the predictions the theories make.
2.3.1 Inferences resulting from not using the presuppo-
sition trigger
Before discussing the diﬀerent views of Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize
Presupposition on the status of the inference resulting from a missing trigger,
one has to look again at the points that are standardly assumed to distinguish
presuppositions from implicatures.2 Presuppositions are definedness condi-
2The traditional view on the diﬀerences between presuppositions and implicatures has
recently been challenged. On the one hand, it has been argued for certain presupposition trig-
gers that they do not always yield a presupposition (so called "soft triggers" (Abusch 2002,
Abusch 2010) or "part-time triggers" (“Presupposed Entailments: The Triggering Problem
Revisited”)). On the other hand, it has been shown for some generalized conversational
implicatures, especially scalar implicatures, that they do occur automatically, irrespective
of contextual information. Moreover, scalar implicatures have been argued to show up both
globally and locally (Chierchia, Fox, and Spector 2011). I will adopt a traditional view and
standard analysis of presupposition triggers and conversational implicatures for the purpose
of keeping the discussion simpler for now. The issue of soft versus hard triggers and local
and global implicatures will come up in the subsequent discussion, where I will review some
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tions that impose restrictions on how the context has to look like in order for
a sentence with a presupposition trigger to be felicitously uttered (Stalnaker
1973, Heim and Kratzer 1998). They are lexically triggered and non-cancelable
inferences. Moreover, they project under negation and other types of embed-
dings (Heim 1983, Heim 1990a, c. Kadmon 2001).
Conversational implicatures are inferences which enrich the sentence meaning
only under certain contextual conditions. They are non-conventional, i.e. they
do not arise with certain lexical material or semantic forms but rather attach
to a meaning of a sentence in a specific context (c. Levinson 1983). They are
cancelable inferences which do not survive under negation and other types of
embedding.
Maximize Presupposition predicts sentences without the trigger to create an
inference that is a mixture of both presuppositions and implicatures. These
special inferences are said to project under negation and from other embed-
ding structures. However, they are also epistemically weak. For Obligatory
Implicatures the inferences resulting from the missing trigger are exhaustivity
implicatures. They are predicted to be weak inferences which can, however,
be strengthened and do not project.
The diﬀerence between the two theories with regard to the status of the sen-
tence without the trigger can thus be seen as a conceptual one. Whereas
Maximize Presupposition assumes there to be another type of inference due
to the existence of a special pragmatic principle for the insertion of presup-
positions, Obligatory Implicatures claims that the missing trigger inference is
a conversational implicature which can be canceled or avoided by insertion of
the trigger. This conceptual diﬀerence also leads to a diﬀerence in empiri-
cal prediction regarding the circumstances under which the trigger should be
inserted. Maximize Presupposition predicts the trigger to be obligatory in em-
bedding structures, Obligatory Implicatures makes no such prediction. I will
return to this point below when discussing context and insertion of the trigger.
2.3.2 Alternatives
The second important diﬀerence between the two theories concerns the type
of alternatives that are assumed to be involved in the insertion of obligatory
presupposition triggers.
of the arguments for these distinctions.
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Maximize Presupposition works with lexical alternatives, more precisely scales
of presuppositional strength. The lexical alternative to the presupposition trig-
ger shares its assertion but lacks its presupposition. The lexical competition
is activated and relevant as soon as this alternative is used. Since presuppo-
sitions are by definition not at-issue content, focus and information structure
are not considered factors in the activation of these lexical alternatives. The
insertion of the trigger follows from a pragmatic principle which tells speakers
to always use the presuppositionally stronger item on a scale when possible.
Obligatory Implicatures assumes that information structure, more precisely
focus and the QUD corresponding to that focus, provides the alternatives rel-
evant for the insertion of the presupposition trigger. The insertion of the
presupposition trigger is necessary when an implicatures arises which is the
result of interpreting a proposition exhaustively with respect to the QUD.
2.3.3 The influence of context
The diﬀerent assumptions of the two theories regarding the relevant alterna-
tives and the status of the inference arising from not using the trigger result in
diﬀerent predictions for how context influences the insertion of the trigger. I
will talk about two diﬀerent types of contexts in this section. The first notion
of context I consider is a very narrow one, meaning the syntactic structure
of the sentence the trigger does (or does not) occur in. The second notion
of context is a broader one and refers to the immediate linguistic context the
sentence with the trigger is appearing in.
Syntactic context
Considering the syntactic context first, Maximize Presupposition assumes
triggers to be obligatory in embedding structures and complex sentences. This
is because lexical competition with the non-trigger arises locally and presuppo-
sitions project. Accordingly, the trigger has to be inserted obligatorily under
negation, in if-clause, questions as well as compound sentences with a coordi-
nating conjunction.
Obligatory Implicatures does not predict triggers to be obligatory in these em-
bedding structures since the exhaustivity implicatures arising with negation,
if-clauses and questions do not yield a contradiction with the context. Un-
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wanted exhaustivity implicatures are the reason for inserting the trigger under
Obligatory Implicatures. Since they are canceled or do not arise in embedding
environments or compound sentences, inserting the trigger into these struc-
tures is considered superfluous.
The relevant data are presented in (49) – (52) below.
(49) Jenna went ice skating yesterday.
a. Today she did not go (again).
b. If she went ice skating (again) today, she will be exhausted.
c. Did she go ice skating today, (again)?
d. And she went ice skating today (again).
(50) Mary came to the party.
a. It is not the case that Peter came to the party, (too).
b. If Peter came (too), John must have been upset.
c. Did Peter come (too)?
d. And Peter came (too).
(51) Peter has a sister.
a. John does not believe/know he has one.
b. If John believes/know that Peter has a sister, he wants to meet
her.
c. Does John believe/know it?
d. And John believes/knows it.
(52) a. A/ The father of the victim did not arrive.
b. If a/the father of the victim arrived, we don’t have to call the
mother.
c. Did a/ the father of the victim arrive?
d. And a/ the father of the victim arrived.
To see whether Maximize Presupposition or Obligatory Implicatures makes
the right prediction for the occurrence of the trigger in complex sentences, the
obligatoriness of the insertion of the trigger into the structures in (a.) to (d.)
must be tested for (49) to (52), respectively.
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Discourse
I will now turn to the predictions of the two theories regarding the influence
of the broader discourse context on the obligatoriness of the trigger. The
two theories presented diﬀer with regard to the sensitivity of the trigger to
discourse level factors, especially the presence of an implicit or explicit QUD.
To illustrate this, an example of a sentence with and without a trigger in a
context with and without an explicit QUD is given in (53).
(53) C: Who came to the store?
a. Peter came to the store.
b. John came to the store.
c. John came to the store, too.
Maximize Presupposition does not predict the insertion of the trigger to be de-
pendent on discourse factors like focus and the QUD. Irrespective of whether
a question is given in the context as in (53), (53-c.) should be preferred over
(53-b.). This is because Maximize Presupposition is a general pragmatic prin-
ciple requiring the presuppositionally strongest item to be chosen. The trigger
should be equally obligatory in all contexts since competition with the weaker
sentence without the trigger generally arises due to the activation of lexical
scales.
For Obligatory Implicatures, the alternatives the sentence with the trigger is
competing with come from the question set of the QUD. These alternatives
are only activated if the QUD is explicitly mentioned like in (53) or implic-
itly marked by focus. The trigger is obligatory if an exhaustivity implicature
mandatorily arises with the presence of focus or an overt QUD. Accordingly,
(53-a.) is exhaustified if a question is present in (53). Since the question is
already assumed to have a complete answer a contradiction arises with (53-b.)
and the trigger is inserted obligatorily in (53-c.). Thus, for this case, Obligatory
Implicatures also predicts (53-c.) to be the preferred option. If the question
is not present, the contextual pressure to exhaustify would be lower. Still,
focus would be required and mark what the question is implicitly. However
this should have a smaller eﬀect.
It is important to note at this point that Obligatory Implicatures makes the
prediction that the type of question that is in the context plays a role in how
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obligatory the trigger is. It has been argued that not all questions require
an exhaustive answer but that some questions can be answered felicitously
by naming one relevant true alternative (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, Beck
and Rullmann 1999, van Rooij 2004, George 2011). These answers have been
referred to in the literature as "mention-some" answers.
Obligatory Implicatures would only predict the trigger to be obligatory in con-
texts where the QUD is expected to receive an exhaustive answer. (54-a.)
below would be a standard example of a question allowing a "mention-some"
answer, whereas (54-b.) would be an example of a question that requires an
exhaustive answer.
(54) a. Where can I buy a newspaper?
b. Who is working in the project?
The example in (54-b.) represents the uncontroversial case. Most question
types are taken to require a complete answer as a default. However, it is
less clear what kind of questions and circumstances allow for "mention-some"
answers, or if they are allowed at all (c. van Rooij 2004, c. George 2011).
The empirical picture described in the literature is puzzling and reflects the
complexity of the issue. One question that is debated is whether it is encoded
in the semantics under which circumstances a question requires an exhaustive
answer or whether it is a purely pragmatic issue. There are accounts which
assume that there is a genuine ambiguity between "mention-all" and "mention-
some" readings and that this ambiguity is resolved pragmatically (van Rooij
2004). Under this assumption an answer will be exhaustive when the prag-
matic needs of the person who is asking the question demand it. In fact, it
has been observed that in most situations where (54-a.) is asked it would be
inappropriate to give a complete answer. However, pragmatic accounts do not
capture the fact that "mention-some" readings are often linguistically marked
and very limited in their distribution. The presence of existential modals and
existential quantifiers seems to be a trigger of "mention-some" readings, for
example (c. George 2011).
Another approach taken to "mention-some" answers is that they are, in fact,
exhaustive answers but with a very narrow domain. However, as George (2011)
argues, this kind of explanation is not able to capture the readings (54-a.) has
in embedded questions. Domain narrowing is less acceptable for embedded
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questions like "John knows where you can buy a newspaper". In general, the
debate is complicated by the fact that research on exhaustivity in questions
has focused on question embedding. Given the wide range of data that need to
be captured when considering both diﬀerent embedded and matrix questions
a flexible approach to exhaustivity seems reasonable (c. Beck and Rullmann
1999, c. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984).
Beck and Rullmann (1999) note that the facts might be quite diﬀerent for
embedded and unembedded questions. Without the semantic contribution of
the embedding verb, "mention-some" answers might be more readily avail-
able. It remains an open question whether a unified account of exhaustivity
in embedded questions and unembedded questions is possible. In addition,
the picture that presents itself for implicit questions might yet be distinct
from that. There is to my knowledge no systematic discussion on the question
whether an answer to the implicit QUD is understood as exhaustive or non-
exhaustive as a default or as a rule. Whereas Rooth (1992) and Roberts (1996)
already pointed out the relation between alternatives generated by focus and
questions, there is no investigation on whether exhaustification is the default
to evaluate alternatives provided by the QUD.
Another context where exhaustification of a proposition with respect to a ques-
tion might be dispreferred is one where people provide a list of propositions
that are answers to the QUD. This list-reading of an answer usually comes
with a specific intonation. English distinguishes between two main intonation
contours: a falling intonation beginning with a high tone followed by a low
tone (H-L) and a rising intonation beginning with low tone followed by a high
tone (L-H). The pitch accent falls on the first tonal element and is marked
by a star (H*-L, L*-H) (Truckenbrodt 2012).3 The rising contour is usually
associated with new information and assertive content. A sentence like (55-a.)
would receive the contour below in a context like (55).
(55) Who ate the cookies?
a. PETER ate the cookies.
b. H*- L - H
3Rather non-trivially, I will assume that the facts regarding English intonation extend to
the intonation of German phrases.
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A falling contour is usually attributed to non-assertive content like a state-
ment turning into a question, see (56) (c. Truckenbrodt 2012).
(56) Who ate the cookies?
a. LISA might know?
b. L* - L - H
Interestingly, the intonation in (56-a.) is the one chose for list readings as well,
compare (57).
(57) Who ate the cookies?
a. PETER ate some of them, RITA ate some of them, and FRANK
ate some of them...
b. L* - L - H // L* - L - H // L* - L - H
The intonation in lists is thus the same as for discourse-old and non-assertive
content. Since individual sentence are intonationally marked like this, hearers
do not anticipate a full answer right away and do not exhaustify the individual
propositions. This reading must be considered a special case of providing a
(possibly exhaustive) answer to the question that blocks exhaustification on
the sentence level. For the purposes of the studies I report in the subsequent
chapters, I assume that the default (also in reading a sentence) is to put a
falling intonation on discourse-new information. This intonation is associated
with a specific semantics (Truckenbrodt 2012). It evokes semantic alternatives
(Rooth 1992) that require to be evaluated by an operator.
In sum, giving an exhaustive answer is taken to be the pragmatic default
for an implicit QUD. "Mention-some" answers are considered to only arise
under special circumstances. In any case, Obligatory Implicatures predicts the
answer strategy chosen to interact with the insertion of the trigger. The cases
where "mention-some" readings are allowed should be the same cases in which
leaving out the trigger is felicitous even when its presupposition is fulfilled in
the context.
2.3.4 Empirical coverage
In this section, the empirical coverage of the two theories shall be discussed.
As became obvious in the last sections, the underlying principles and mecha-
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nisms the two theories assume for the obligatory insertion of triggers are quite
diﬀerent. Accordingly, the set of phenomena they capture diﬀers as well.
Maximize Presupposition is able to account for the whole range of presuppo-
sitional phenomena since the insertion of the presupposition triggers follows
from a general pragmatic principle. All presuppositional items are considered
to form a homogeneous group with regard to their obligatoriness. They are
always the strongest item on a scale of presuppositional strength.
Obligatory implicatures assumes that the insertion of the trigger follows from
another underlying mechanism - the exhaustification of a set of alternatives
with regard to a question. The theory is thus dependent on the competing
sentence without the trigger to generate an implicature, however, that is the
result of exhaustifying an explicit or implicit QUD. The trigger does not have to
have a lexical alternative or be on a scale. Its insertion is a discourse-managing
operation signaling non-exhaustivity.
2.3.5 Experimental evidence
Before I summarize and compare the predictions of the two theories, I want to
give a short overview over the experimental findings that support the view that
Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize Presupposition can be distinguished
based on experimental data.
Not using a presupposition trigger in a context where its presupposition is
satisfied leads to diﬀerent types of inferences according to Obligatory Implica-
tures and Maximize Presupposition. Based on previous experimental work the
status of the inference should have an impact on how people understand and
process sentences without a trigger.
According to Obligatory Implicatures, the missing trigger inferences are con-
versational implicatures. There has already been quite an amount of exper-
imental work on the processing of conversational implicatures. Most of this
work focuses on implicatures related to scalar items like “some” (not “all”) or
“or” (not “and”). There is a growing body of experimental evidence showing
that whatever mechanism is behind the computation of implicatures, it is ac-
cessed in incremental on-line interpretation (Katsos 2009, Huang and Snedeker
2009, Grodner et al. 2010, Degen 2007, Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos 2013a).
An open question is the time course of the computation of conversational im-
plicatures. Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos (2013a) found in an eye-tracking
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study that the scalar implicature of “some” can be made immediately and in
anticipation of disambiguation. That is, the computation of the implicature
arises even before the reader knows whether drawing the inference is justified.
However, both Degen (2007) and Huang and Snedeker (2009) in eye-tracking
studies found a delay of scalar implicature processing.
There is considerably less psycholinguistic research on implicatures which are
of particular interest for Obligatory Implicatures. These are implicatures which
do not operate with lexical scales but other alternatives, e.g. resulting from in-
formation structure (particularized conversational implicatures). There is one
interesting result from Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos (2013b), who, again in
an eye-tracking study, found that hearers can access context specific particu-
larized implicatures in on-line comprehension as well.
According to Maximize Presupposition, the missing trigger inference is a spe-
cial type of inference resulting from competition with a stronger item on a
presupposition scale. There is some support for the view that inferences aris-
ing from competition of items on a presupposition scale behave diﬀerently
from ordinary implicatures. Kirsten et al. (2011) report an experiment on
the felicitous use of the definite and indefinite determiner using the self-paced
reading paradigm. They created two diﬀerent types of contexts, one where
the (uniqueness) presupposition of the definite is fulfilled, see (58-a.), and one
where it is violated, see (58-b.).
(58) a. Antje visited the Duesseldorf Zoo yesterday and saw a polar bear.
b. Antje visited the Duesseldorf Zoo yesterday and saw several polar
bears.
The test sentence appeared in either of two conditions, with the definite and
with the indefinite determiner, see (59).
(59) a. Antje noticed that the polar bear was very aggressive.
b. Antje noticed that a polar bear was very aggressive.
They found reading time eﬀects of a violated presupposition with the definite
determiner on the word right after the trigger and two words after the trigger.
Reading times were higher on these regions in contexts where the uniqueness
presupposition was not fulfilled, as in (58-b.), compared to when it was verified
by the context, as in (58-a.). Acceptability judgments mirrored this eﬀect. The
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sentences with a definite were less acceptable in contexts where the presuppo-
sition was violated than in contexts where it was not (Kirsten et al. 2011).
They observed a rather diﬀerent behavior of sentences with the indefinite in
the same contexts. They found that the sentences with the indefinite were
less acceptable and took longer to read in contexts where one polar bear was
introduced than in contexts were several polar bears where introduced. The
higher reading times were found on the first, the second, and the third word
after the trigger and the final word.
The study was conducted in German where the indefinite "a" and the nu-
meral "one" are the same word ("ein"). For contexts with several polar bears,
the numeral interpretation was most likely the one chosen so that "a polar
bear" meant "one of the polar bears". The indefinite thus picked up one of
the polar bears in the context and introduced it as a new discourse referent.
This was impossible in the contexts where only one polar bear was introduced.
The indefinite could not refer to this polar bear due to the novelty condition
for indefinites (Heim 1982). A completely new referent had to be introduced.
Competition with the definite is activated since its presupposition is fulfilled
and the familiarity condition satisfied in the context. That is, in addition to
the introduction of a new referent, the inference had to be drawn that there is
not exactly one polar bear (missing trigger inference).
Kirsten et al. (2011) speculate that this inference was the reason for the higher,
and more persistently higher, reading times for sentences with the indefinite
in contexts where the presupposition of the definite was fulfilled.
In sum, the experimental literature on implicatures has shown that they pro-
duce measurable eﬀects with a variety of methods. I will discuss some of the
results of the studies in more detail when they are relevant. Data from the on-
line and oﬀ-line comprehension of sentences with missing trigger inferences are
thus a way to distinguish between the Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize
Presupposition theory. Whereas Obligatory Implicatures would predict these
inferences to pattern with conversational implicatures, Maximize Presupposi-
tion would predict these to be inferences with a diﬀerent status and pattern
more with the results found by Kirsten et al. (2011).
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2.4 Summary and outlook
A systematic empirical investigation of obligatory presupposition triggers is
so far missing. This dissertation aims to fill this gap. The goal is to provide
a clear empirical picture of the phenomenon by including experimental evi-
dence. It will be shown that based on the empirical findings, it is possible to
distinguish between which of the two theories Maximize Presupposition and
Obligatory Implicatures make the more accurate predictions for the insertion
of diﬀerent triggers. I will demonstrate that this evidence is of importance be-
yond deciding between Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize Presupposition.
Given the diﬀerent explanations the theories provide for the obligatory inser-
tion of presupposition triggers, they conceptually diverge with regard to two
main points. Whereas Maximize Presupposition makes use of competition be-
tween lexical items and assumes inferences arising from not using the trigger
to have a special status, Obligatory Implicatures assumes competition between
contextual alternatives and missing trigger inferences to be implicatures.
These conceptual diﬀerences result in diﬀerent predictions with regard to the
insertion of triggers under embedding structures and with regard to the influ-
ence of broader discourse level concerns on the insertion of the trigger. Oblig-
atory Implicatures predicts the QUD to have an influence and triggers to not
be obligatory in embedding structures. Maximize Presupposition predicts the
trigger to be obligatory in embeddings and assumes no influence of the larger
discourse on the insertion of the trigger. The comparisons with respect to these
conceptual and empirical points are summarized in the table in 2.1 below.
Figure 2.1: Overview over the comparison between Maximize Presupposition
and Obligatory Implicatures
The empirical predictions of the two theories are the basis for the empirical
investigations discussed in the following chapters of this dissertation. The pre-
dictions will be tested for individual triggers. Each chapter will be dedicated
to one of the triggers. By doing that, the empirical coverage of Maximize Pre-
supposition and Obligatory Implicatures will be under scrutiny.
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The individual chapters are structured as follows. The first part of each chapter
discusses empirical evidence for or against the predictions of the two theories
for the trigger under negation. The second part looks at empirical evidence for
or against the predictions of the theories regarding the influence of the QUD
and contextual alternatives.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the presupposition trigger "too" (German "auch").
In the first part, a study by Oesterle (2015) will be reported on the obligatory
insertion of "too" under negation. The second part focuses on the influence of
the QUD on the insertion of "too". One on-line and two oﬀ-line studies on the
obligatory insertion of "too" will be reported. The studies test the influence
of contextual factors, including presence of the QUD and presence of explicit
alternatives, on the insertion of the trigger. By doing so, this chapter will also
discuss the contextual factors for the arising of exhaustivity implicatures. It
will add to the current debate of where and under which conditions a covert
exhaustivity operator is, maybe mandatorily, active. Especially the issue of
the influence of diﬀerent types of alternatives - triggered by focus and ques-
tions or triggered by lexical scales - on exhaustification and insertion of the
trigger will be addressed. Since the experimental research has so far focused
on scalar implicatures, the data presented are an important supplement to the
debate on conversational implicatures. This regards the theoretical as well
as the processing side. It will be shown that the insertion of "too" is first,
not obligatory under negation and, second, sensitive to the contextual factors
for exhaustification. The most important finding regarding these contextual
factors for exhaustification is that first, exhaustification is not mandatory in
every matrix clause and, second, that contrast is the crucial factor for the
mandatory insertion of an exhaustivity operator into the LF.
In chapter 4, the obligatory insertion of the iterative "again" will be discussed.
The first part is concerned with the insertion of "again" under negation. An
oﬀ-line study on the insertion of "again" under negation will be reported which
shows that "again" is not obligatory under negation. It will be argued that
indeed "again" and "too" fall into the same group of triggers when it comes
to obligatory insertion, they block the insertion of an exhaustivity operator.
In chapter 5, the obligatoriness of the factive "know" will be investigated.
In the first part, the obligatory insertion of "know" under negation will be
discussed. In the second part, the influence of the QUD on the insertion of
"know" will be in focus. I will argue that the presuppositional status of "know"
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depends on what is at issue in a conversation (c. Simons et al. 2011). This
discussion will add to the recent debate on "know" being a "soft" presupposi-
tion trigger (Abusch 2002). Accordingly, its obligatory insertion will be shown
to depend on other factors than presuppositionality, especially the QUD. My
conclusion is that "know" thus also falls into the class of triggers that should
be accounted for by Obligatory Implicatures.
In chapter 6, I will address the issue of obligatory definite determiners. The
first part focuses on the singular definite and its obligatory insertion under
negation. It demonstrates that the singular definite, indeed, is obligatory un-
der negation. Obligatory Implicatures falls short in accounting for the whole
range of empirical facts since it neither predicts the definite to be obligatory
in aﬃrmative sentences or under negation.
The second part of chapter 6 is dedicated to the influence of the QUD on
the insertion of the plural definite. I will present a study on the diﬀerence
between the plural definite and universal quantifier. I will argue that presup-
positionality alone cannot explain why one is used over the other. I claim that
presuppositionality, however, does play a role in deciding what the QUD is.
I will argue that diﬀerent constraints and conditions hold for answering this
QUD for the plural definite and the universal quantifier, respectively. Dis-
cussing the relation between the QUD and the felicitous use of the definite
versus quantificational determiner, will shed new light on their lexical compe-
tition. It will be seen that Maximize Presupposition alone cannot account for
whole range of data.
Obligatory definiteness will be shown to not be dependent on the presence of
an exhaustivity operator. It is less dependent on contextual factors. It will
be argued that definiteness is a feature and, along with other presuppositional
features, should be accounted for using Maximize Presupposition.
The structure of the chapters treating individual triggers is summarized in the
table in 2.2 below.
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Figure 2.2: Overview over the empirical predictions tested in individual chap-
ters of the dissertation
In the final chapter 7, I will summarize the results by discussing the empiri-
cal coverage of both theories. On the basis of the empirical evidence provided,
I will argue that obligatory triggers fall into two groups. Maximize Presuppo-
sition, I claim, is a grammatic constraint on presuppositional features which
require one or the other setting. It is operative on a morhpho-syntactic level
and can account for obligatory definiteness. The obligatory insertion of the
triggers "again", "too" and "know" follows from Obligatory Implicatures. In-
serting these triggers into the structure is related to the contextual factors for
exhaustification. They thus have a discourse managing function.

Chapter 3
Obligatory Additives
The following chapter is dedicated to the additive particle and presupposition
trigger "too" (German "auch"). I will present empirical data on why and when
the insertion of "too" is obligatory. I will argue that, based on these data, one
can distinguish between the theories Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory
Implicatures.
In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss an empirical study by Oesterle
(2015) on the insertion of German "too" into negated sentences. WhereasMax-
imize Presupposition predicts "too" to be obligatory under negation, Obliga-
tory Implicatures predicts "too" to be not obligatory under negation. It will
be shown that inserting "too" in negated sentences is dispreferred.
The second part of the chapter addresses the question whether the insertion
of "too" is influenced by the presence of the QUD and contextual alternatives.
In section 3.2.1., an acceptability rating study on the German additive "too"
will be reported. It tested the acceptability of sentences with and without
the trigger in simple aﬃrmative sentences, in compound sentences with “and”,
and in contexts that provide an explicit QUD. In section 3.2.2., a reading time
study will be presented which tests the influence of explicit alternatives in the
context on exhaustification and insertion of the trigger. Another acceptability
rating study on the insertion of "too" will be reported and discussed in section
3.2.3. It tested the eﬀect of contrastive focus and wrap-up sentences on the
insertion of the trigger.
I will argue that the results overall suggest that Maximize Presupposition is
not the right principle to explain the distribution of obligatory additives. An
account based on obligatory implicatures makes more accurate predictions re-
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garding its insertion. It predicts "too" not to be obligatory under negation.
Moreover, it predicts the inferences arising from leaving out the trigger to be
exhaustivity implicatures which show up more or less reliably depending on
context. Furthermore, the prediction is that "too" can cancel this implicature.
These predictions find empirical support by the studies presented.
3.1 "Too" under negation
In the following section I discuss a study by Oesterle (2015) which tested the
predictions of Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize Presupposition regarding
the insertion of "too" under negation. I will first revisit the predictions of the
two theories for the insertion of "too" in simple aﬃrmative sentences and then
look at the predictions for the insertion of the trigger under negation. Then I
will present the material and result of the study conducted. Last, I will discuss
the results and their theoretical consequences.
3.1.1 Idea and predictions
Even though the two theories diﬀer with respect to the explanation why "too"
is obligatory in simple aﬃrmative sentences, they both predict the sentence to
be degraded without the trigger, as in (1-b.) below.
(1) a. Mary came to the party.
b. #Bill came to the party.
According to Obligatory Implicatures the oddness of (1-b.) is due to its
exhaustivity implicature that Bill was the only one who came to the party
which is contradictory to (1-a.). The derivation of this implicature is given in
(2).
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(2) Obligatory Implicatures
a. <s,t>
EXH Q w
Q ⇠ VP
BillF came to the party
b. [[EXH]]([[ Who came to the party ]])([[ Bill came to the party ]])(w)
, [Bill came to the party](w) &
8q [ q 2 [ p.9x.p=  w.person(x)(w) & came-to-the-party(x)(w)]
&  w. Bill came to the party ; q ! ¬ q(w)]
’Only Bill came to the party’
For Maximize Presupposition the oddness of (1-b.) is due to the fact that there
is a competitor with the trigger, see (3-a.) which has the same assertion but
more presupposition. The result is that the inference arises that the presup-
position of the competitor does not hold, see (3-c.).
(3) Maximize Presupposition
a. [[[ Bill came to the party ]]]o,g =  w.Bill came to the party in w
b. [[[ [too C] [BillF came to the party] ] ]]o,g = w: 9p[p2C & p(w) &
p6=  w.Mary came to the party in w].Bill came to the party in w
c. ) ¬9p [p 2 C & p(w) & p 6=  w.Bill came to the party in w]
The theories both explain the oddness of the sentence without the trigger by
assuming that the sentence without "too" has an inference which is contra-
dictory to the context. Accordingly, they cannot be distinguished empirically
based on the need to insert the trigger in aﬃrmative matrix clauses.
However, the two theories Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implica-
tures make crucially diﬀerent predictions regarding the insertion of the pre-
supposition trigger "too" under negation.
The negated sentence without the trigger in (4-b.) would violate Maximize
Presupposition since the presupposition of "too" is still fulfilled in the context.
There is a competitor, (4-c.), which has more presuppositions and the same
assertion as (4-b.). The trigger is predicted to be obligatory when its presup-
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position is fulfilled and thus (4-c.) should be preferred. The meaning of (4-c.)
is given in (4-d.). The inference arising from using (4-b.) is given in (4-e.). It
says that the presupposition of (4-d.) is false.
(4) a. Mary came to the party.
b. Bill did not come to the party.
c. Bill did not come to the party, too.
d. [[[ not [too C] [BillF come to the party] ] ]])= w: 9p [p 2 C & p(w)
& p 6=  w.Bill came to the party in w ]. Bill didn’t come to the
party in w
e. ) ¬9p [p 2 C & p(w) & p 6=  w.Bill came to the party in w]
However, according to Obligatory Implicatures "too" should only have to be
inserted if the sentence in (4-b.) yields an exhaustivity implicature which is
contradictory to (4-a.). There are two possible attachment sites for the ex-
haustivity operator for (4-b.), above and below negation. If the operators is
above negation, as in (5), and focus remains on "Bill", the QUD must change
to "Who did not come?" to satisfy question-answer-congruence.
(5)
QUD7
Who did not come
(EXH)
C7
< s, t >
s C not VP
BillF came
However, this configuration does not yield an implicature which is contradic-
tory to a context which establishes that Mary came. The result of exhaustifi-
cation is given in (6), the implicature that Bill was the only person who did
not come is not contradictory to the fact that Mary came.
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(6) [[ EXH ]]([[ Who did not come to the party ]])([[ Bill did not come to the
party ]])(w) , [Bill did not come to the party](w) &
8q [ q 2 [ p.9x.p=  w.person(x)(w) & ¬ at-the-party(x)(w)] &  w.Bill
did not come to the party ; q ! ¬q(w) ]
’Only Bill did not come to the party’
Another possibility is that focus now falls on negation itself, see in (7). The
QUD then changes to the polar question "Did Bill come?". The implicature
arising from this configuration is also not contradictory to the fact that Mary
came, since it simply says that Bill did not come, see (8).
(7)
QUD7
Did Bill come
(EXH)
C7
< s, t >
s C notF VP
Bill came
(8) [[ EXH ]]([[ Did Bill come to the party? ]])([[ Bill did not come to the
party ]])(w) , [Bill did not come to the party](w) &
8q[q2[ p.p= w.Bill did not come to the party in w_p= w.Bill came
to the party in w]&  w.Bill did not come to the party ; q ! ¬ q(w)]
’Bill did not come to the party’
The second option is that the exhaustivity operator is attached below negation,
see (9).
(9)
QUD7
Who came
not
(EXH)
C7
< s, t >
s C
VP
BillF came
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Given that the exhaustivity operator is assumed to be a syntactically fully flex-
ible operator according to grammatical theories of implicatures, this syntactic
configuration is not ruled out per se. However, if focus remains on "Bill", the
QUD has to be "Who came to the party". Exhaustifying the sentence with
respect to this question and then negating the result leads to the reading in
(10).
(10) [[ NOT ]]([[ EXH ]]([[ Who came to the party ]])(w)([[ Bill came to the
party ]])) ,
¬ [ [Bill did came to the party](w) & 8q [ q 2 [ p.9x[p=  w.person(x)(w)
& at-the-party(x)(w)]] &  w.Bill came to the party ; q ! ¬q(w)] ]
# ’It is not the case that Bill was the only person at the party’
The reading in (10) is a reading the sentence does not have and thus this con-
figuration should be ruled out. It has been argued for scalar implicatures that
this reading exists and involves meta-linguistic negation (Horn 1989, Chierchia,
Fox, and Spector 2011), see (11).
(11) John didn’t see Mary or Sue, he saw both. (Chierchia, Fox, and Spec-
tor 2011)
As Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2011)) notes this reading involves special con-
textual circumstances and requires that the implicature is made explicit im-
mediately after. However, even under these circumstances this reading seems
to be ruled out for cases of particularized conversational implicatures like (10),
compare (12).
(12) ??John didn’t come to the party, Mary and John came.
The syntactic configuration where the exhaustivity operator has scope below
negation is thus not available since the corresponding reading is unattested.
The option where the exhaustivity operator is attached above negation changes
the QUD and thus yields an implicature which is not contradictory to the
context. Since the contradiction is the reason for the insertion of the trigger
under Obligatory Implicatures, it is not expected to be obligatory in (4-b).
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3.1.2 Material and design
Oesterle (2015) notes that creating the material for an acceptability rating
study testing the insertion of "too" under negation is complicated by the fact
that "too" and negation are ungrammatical when appearing in one sentence,
both in German and in English, see (13-a.) and (13-b.).
(13) Peter came to the party. / Peter ist zur Party gekommen.
a. #John did not come to the party, too.
b. #Johannes ist nicht auch zur Party gekommen.
The only available and grammatical version of the two sentences in (13-a.) and
(13-b.) is one where "auch" and "too" have scope over negation. For English,
"too" would have to be changed to "either", see (14-a.). For German, word
order would make this scopal relation transparent by having "too" precede
negation, see (14-b.).
(14) a. John did not come to the party, either. not >> either
b. Johannes ist auch nicht zur Party gekommen.
This, however, is not the reading that satisfies the presupposition in (13) but
instead presupposes that someone else did not come. I assume that the un-
grammaticality of (13-a.) and (13-b.) is due to the fact the "too" and "auch"
are Positive Polarity Items and cannot appear in the scope of negation. As-
sociation of the additive with the focus across negation is impossible since
it would yield an intervention eﬀect (see Beck 1996, Beck 2006, Beck 2016).
Negation is an intervening operator in this case, disturbing the association of
"too"/"auch" with the focus on "John"/"Johannes", see (15).1
(15) #[ too C [ NEG [ [⇠ C] JohnF come ] ] ]
These facts are confounding factors for testing the acceptability of sentences
with "too" under negation. It can, however, be avoided with using sentential
negation like in (16-b.). Negation is high enough to not block the association
of "too" with focus which is why adding the particle is not unacceptable.
1Under the assumption that negation is a focus-sensitive or evaluating operator
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(16) a. Peter came to the party.
b. It is not the case that John came to the party, (too).
c. It is the case that John came to the party (too).
To contrast (16-b.) with the positive aﬃrmative case in (16-c.) in an experi-
mental study, one has to find contexts where both the negated and aﬃrmative
version of this sentence are equally acceptable.
Oesterle (2015), in his study on the German trigger "auch", used contexts in
which two individuals were introduced and made a plan to do something to-
gether. One of the individuals was picked up again in the context, the other
one was mentioned in the target. He included the discourse particles "nun"
and "so" in the target to make the discourse sound more natural. For the
design of the study the two factors too and negation were crossed. The
first factor too appeared in the conditions "with too" and "without too".
The second factor negation appeared in the conditions "with negation" and
"without negation". The target thus appeared in four conditions. A sample
item in all four conditions is given below (Oesterle 2015, p.17-18).
(17) Context: Lukas und Melanie sind beide passionierte Kinogänger. Sie
haben vereinbart, am Freitag gemeinsam ins Kino zu gehen, wenn sie
beide Zeit haben. Lukas hat am Freitag Zeit.
’Lukas and Melanie like to go to the cinema together. They agreed to
go to the cinema on Friday, if both have time. Lukas has time to go
on Friday.’
a. Es ist nun so, dass auch Melanie am Freitag Zeit hat. Deswegen
reservieren die beiden Karten für die Spätvorstellung.
’It is the case that Melanie has time to go on Friday, too. This is
why they order tickets for the late show.’ (-neg, +too)
b. Es ist nun so, dass Melanie am Freitag Zeit hat. Deswegen re-
servieren die beiden Karten für die Spätvorstellung.
’It is the case that Melanie has time to go on Friday This is why
they order tickets for the late show.’ (-neg, -too)
c. Es ist nun nicht so, dass auch Melanie am Freitag Zeit hat. Deswe-
gen überlegen sie sich einen anderen Termin.
’It is not the case that Melanie has time to go on Friday, too.
This is why they are trying to find another time.’ (+neg, -too)
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d. Es ist nun nicht so, dass auch Melanie am Freitag Zeit hat. Deswe-
gen überlegen sie sich einen anderen Termin.
It is not the case that Melanie has time to go on Friday, too. This
is why they are trying to find another time.’ (+neg, +too)
Participants saw and were asked to read the context carefully. They were then
presented with the target sentence in one of the conditions in a gray box. They
were asked to rate the acceptability of the target within the context on a scale
from 1 to 7, where 7 meant "completely acceptable" (Oesterle 2015). They
were advised that "acceptable" meant that the sentence made sense in the
context and could be uttered by a native speaker.
3.1.3 Results
Oesterle (2015) found a significant interaction between the factors too and
negation. Without negation, the sentences with "too" were judged signifi-
cantly better (p<.01, M= 5 with "too", M= 3,9 without "too"). With nega-
tion, the sentences without "too" were judged better (M=3,6 without "too",
M=3,5 with "too"). There were significant main eﬀects for both too and
negation, but in opposite directions. The presence of the trigger generally
increased the acceptability of the sentences (p<.01), the presence of negation
generally decreased the acceptability of sentences (p<.01). There was a sig-
nificant simple eﬀects for negation in the conditions -too and +too. The
+negation condition was significantly worse than -negation both with the
trigger (p<.01) and without the trigger (p<.05). There was no simple eﬀect
of too for +negation. For +negation there was a significant simple eﬀect,
the sentence with the trigger were judged significantly better than without the
trigger (p<.01).
The results are summarized in the table in 3.1 below (c. Oesterle 2015: 21-22).
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Figure 3.1: Mean average acceptability for sentences with or without "too" in
sentences with or without negation
3.1.4 Discussion
The interaction between the insertion of "too" and negation is expected un-
der Obligatory Implicatures. Since no implicature arises with negation which
contradicts the context, the insertion of the trigger is not obligatory. The fact
that inserting "too" under negation even leads to a decrease in acceptability
can also be explained with Obligatory Implicatures. Negation and "too" evoke
questions of diﬀerent kinds. Whereas "too" suggest that the QUD is the one in
(18-a.), negation makes the QUD either (18-b.) or (18-c.), as discussed above.2
(18) a. [[ Who was at the party ]] =  q.9x[q =  w.person(x)(w) & at-the-
party(x)(w)]
b. [[ Who was not at the party ]] =  q.9x[q=  w.person(x)(w) & x
was not at the party in w]
c. [[ Was Peter at the party? ]]= q.q =  w.Peter was not at the
party in w _ q =  w.Peter was at the party in w
The sentences with "too" and negation signal the relevance of diﬀerent sets of
alternatives. Readers are confused as to which of these questions to answer
2The fact that two diﬀerent questions seem to be introduced through the presence of
"too" and negation already hints at the idea the contrastive topics (Büring 2007, Büring
2015, Constant 2014) might play a role in the interpretation of these examples. I will return
to this point in the general discussion at the end of the chapter.
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and which set of alternatives to exhaustify. As a result, sentences are perceived
as pragmatically odd and receive a lower rating.
The interaction is not predicted by Maximize Presupposition. Inserting "too"
should have improved ratings according to Maximize Presupposition, irrespec-
tive of the presence of negation (c. Oesterle 2015).
It is not expected under either of the two theories that the main eﬀect negation
had a greater (negative) impact on acceptability than leaving out the trigger
in positive sentences (M=3,9 -too, -negation, M= 3,6 -too, +negation).
However, the result is also not surprising given that the negation used is not
the preferred way to express negation in German. In fact, Oesterle (2015)
notes that participants commented on the fact that negation with a matrix
clause did not sound natural to them in the targets. However, since the same
structure was used for the positive sentences, this is not considered to be a
problem for the results overall.
The interaction is the most important finding of the study. It supports the
view of Obligatory Implicatures that the inferences arising from not using the
trigger are exhaustivity implicatures resulting from exhaustifying a sentence
with respect to the QUD (c. Oesterle 2015). It speaks against an analysis of
the insertion of "too" making use of Maximize Presupposition.
According to Obligatory Implicatures, the additive is only obligatory where the
exhaustivity operator is. But when looking at the results from negation, the
relationship must be considered to be even stronger: the additive cannot occur
where the exhaustivity operator cannot. Take again into consideration (19).
It was argued that the interpretation in (19-a.) is ruled out since it yields an
unattested reading.
(19) Peter ist nicht gekommen.
a. #[ NEG [ EXH C [ ⇠ C PeterF ist gekommen ] ] ]
The additive is impossible in this position, too, since it is a PPI and cannot
occur in the scope of negation. The only possible attachment site for the
exhaustivity operator is the same as for the additive, above negation. However,
like the additive, it cannot evaluate the focus on "Peter" since this association
is blocked by negation, which leads to an intervention eﬀect, see (20).
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(20) #Peter did not come, too.
a. #[ too C [NEG [ [⇠ C] PeterF come ] ] ]
Explaining the non-availability of (20-a.) with covert intervention still entails
that the exhaustivity operator is not syntactically flexible in a way that en-
ables it to move across negation since movement would be an obvious way to
avoid intervention (c. Beck 2006). However, it does not speak against the
assumption that a covert exhaustivity operator is present in the structure in
(19) as a default.
This view has obvious consequences for the predictions regarding other downward-
entailing (DE) operators besides negation. Obligatory Implicatures predicts
that any embedded occurrences of the exhaustivity operator also allow for the
embedding of the additive. If further evidence is found for this predictions then
a reliable measure for the positions and the obligatoriness of the exhaustivity
operator opens up: the (obligatory) insertion of the additive.
I will now turn to the second important predictions of Obligatory Implicatures
that the presence of the QUD and contextual alternatives make a diﬀerence
for when these inferences show up and aﬀect the insertion of the trigger.
3.2 The additive particle and contextual alter-
natives
As was discussed in chapter 2, the two theories Maximize Presupposition and
Obligatory Implicatures make diﬀerent predictions with regard to the influence
of the broader discourse, especially the presence of a QUD and contextual al-
ternatives, on the insertion of the trigger. Whereas Maximize Presupposition
does not predict an influence of the discourse context, Obligatory Implicatures
predicts the contextual circumstances under which the trigger is obligatorily
inserted to align with the circumstances under which a proposition is inter-
preted as an exhaustive answer to the QUD.
The hypotheses of the two theories regarding the influence of the broader dis-
course on the insertion of additive particles have never been tested empirically.
One exception is Eckardt and Fränkel (2012) who tested how likely it is that
participants used an additive in a production task. The participants were di-
vided into two groups with diﬀerent instructions. One group was asked to give
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a protocol-like description of a comic, the other group was asked to tell a story.
In both cases, the story-line of the comic included two protagonists carrying
out the same action at some point. The authors note that the task influenced
the use of the trigger. However, they also note that the results are not conclu-
sive based on the fact that there is quite some inter-speaker variation (Eckardt
and Fränkel 2012).
The three studies presented in the next section aim to provide more solid em-
pirical evidence for the contextual factors influencing the insertion of "too".
3.2.1 The additive particle and the QUD
Goals and predictions
The overall purpose of the study reported in this section is to test the em-
pirical predictions of the two theories presented in chapter 2 with using an
acceptability judgment task (also c. Bade 2014).3
Three main aims are behind the design of the experiment. A first goal of the
study was to empirically verify the hypothesis that the presupposition trig-
ger "too" (German "auch") is obligatory in contexts where its presupposition
is fulfilled. The two theories presented in chapter two do not diﬀer in their
predictions regarding this point. They both predict the sentence without the
trigger in these contexts to result in oddness. However, the data have never
been investigated systematically. They are important to get the full empiri-
cal picture even though Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures
cannot be distinguished based on these findings alone.
The second aim of the study was to test the diﬀerent predictions of Obligatory
Implicatures and Maximize Presupposition regarding the obligatoriness of the
trigger "too" in complex sentences with the conjunction "and". The data are
repeated in (21) below.
(21) a. Mary came to the party and Peter came, too.
b. Mary came to the party and Peter came.
Obligatory Implicatures predicts (21-b.) to be as acceptable as (21-a.) whereas
Maximize Presupposition predicts it to be degraded compared to (21-a.). The
3The material, design, procedure and results of the study I report here are mostly similar
to what I present in Bade (2014). The analysis and the discussion of the results are modified
to fit the purpose of the theoretical discussion of this dissertation.
64
source of this diﬀerence is the explanation either of these two theories entertain
for the reason the trigger is inserted.
Obligatory Implicatures predicts the insertion to be a result of an unwanted
exhaustivity implicature. That is, according to this theory, the trigger would
only be obligatory when an exhaustivity operator is inserted into the second
conjunct in (21-b.) and yields the contradiction "Mary came to the party and
only Peter came". However, exhaustification of this kind is blocked due to
the assertion of (21-b.). Under a standard analysis for "and" it takes two
propositions and asserts that both are true, see the lexical entry for "and" in
(22-a.) and the analysis of (21-b.) in (22-b.).4
(22) a. [[ and ]] =  p. q. w. p(w) & q(w)
b. attend(party)(P)(w) & attend(party)(M)(w)
Inserting the exhaustivity operator in the second conjunct would exclude the
alternative that Mary came. However, inserting the operator in any conjunct
would not yield a stronger meaning but would make the sentence contradictory.
The only available possibility is to attach the exhaustivity operator high. The
potential syntactic position of the operator are given in the tree in (23).
4An alternative view is one where "and" is an additive particle that carries a presuppo-
sition (Zeevat 2007). I agree that "and" expresses additivity. However, I don’t think that it
should be considered a presupposition. This presupposition would be rather unrestrictive in
saying that another proposition (of any kind) has to be true (whereas for "too" this proposi-
tion must be part of the focus alternatives). Accordingly, the presupposition of "and" would
be fulfilled in all contexts where it combines with (any) two propositions. If it is not, that is
if a sentence with "and" just occurs out of the blue with one argument, the sentence would
not just be infelicitous but ungrammatical, see the contrast in (i).
(i) (It is flu season)
a. Peter is sick now, too.
b. *And Peter is sick now.
I will continue to assume that in the case where "and" only combines with one proposition,
it is not a case of presupposition failure. "And" is missing an argument in (i-b.) which
results in unacceptability.
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(23) < s, t >
(EXH) < s, t >
(EXH)
IP<s,t>
Mary came to the party
AND
(EXH)
IP<s,t>
Peter came to the party
Given that the relevant alternatives are the one in (24-a.) (same as generally
assumed for disjunction, see e.g. Fox 2007) the only reading the sentence can
have is outlined in (24-b.), whereas the configurations in (24-c.) and (24-d.)
lead to a contradiction.
(24) a. Alt = {M came, J came, M & J cam, M or J came}
b. EXH (Alt) (M & J came) = M & J came
c. M came & EXH (Alt) (J came) =
M came & (J came & ¬ M came) ) Contradiction
d. EXH (Alt)(M came) & J came =
(M came & ¬ J came) & J came ) Contradiction
Since exhaustification of one of the conjuncts is blocked the trigger is not
obligatory according to Obligatory Implicatures.
According to Maximize Presupposition, there is a competitor to (21-b) which
is (21-a). However, (21-b) does not have more presuppositions than (21-a).
The presupposition of "too" gets filtered since it is locally satisfied and thus
does not project to end up being a presupposition of the whole sentence. To
capture this, a dynamic semantic system as, for example, introduced by Heim
(1982) has to be considered. In such a system, meanings of expressions are
defined via their potential to change and update the context, their context
change potential (see als Kadmon 2001) for an overview). The context change
potential of conjunction is defined in a way that captures that a context is first
updated with the information of the first conjunct before the presupposition of
the second conjunct is considered. This definition is given in (25) (c. Kadmon
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2001: 44), where c is the context set, the set of worlds where all propositions
the participants of a conversation believe to be true are true (Stalnaker 1978).
(25) Updating a context with conjunction
a. c+ (S1+S2) = (c+S1)+S2
Since Maximize Presupposition applies locally according to most accounts 5
there are now two competitors for S2 at the point where S1 has already been
added to the context set: the two competitors are given in (26-a.) and (26-b.)
below.
(26) a. [[ [IP Peter came ] ]] =  w. Peter came in w.
b. [[ [IP [NP Peter too] [VP came]] ]] =  w: 9x[x6= Peter & x came
in w]. P came in w
If (26-a.) is chosen over b. as in (21-b), then a missing trigger inference arises
that the presupposition of the competitor ((26-b.)) is not true:
(27) ¬9x[x 6= Peter & x came in w]
Combined with the first conjunct in (21-b) this leads to a contradiction, namely
Mary came and no one besides Peter came. This contradiction is avoided when
(26-b.) is chosen for the second conjunct which has the same assertion but more
presuppositions. (21-a) is thus predicted to be better than (21-b) according to
Maximize Presupposition.
A third purpose of the study was to test the influence of an explicit QUD on
the insertion of the trigger "too". The prediction of Obligatory Implicatures
is that the obligatoriness of the trigger depends on whether a sentence is in-
terpreted as an exhaustive answer to the QUD. Only if an implicature that
is the result of this exhaustification arises, is the trigger considered obliga-
tory. The presence of an explicit question in the discourse is assumed to make
5It is not clear that global versions of Maximize Presupposition (Sauerland 2008a) make
the same prediction. However, when assuming that the context is not updated with infor-
mation in the first conjunct by the time that the reader experiences the second conjunct,
the prediction would be that inserting the trigger into the second conjunct should be un-
acceptable since its presupposition is not entailed by the context. That does not seem to
be true. According to Obligatory Implicatures, inserting the trigger is not expected to be
degraded due to an unfulfilled presupposition, just unnecessary, since it is trying to avoid
an implicature that would not occur in the first place. At most the sentences is predicted
to sound redundant.
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exhaustification more or less prominent. Depending on the strategy chosen,
the trigger should be more or less obligatory. That is, an interaction between
interpretation of the sentence without the trigger and its acceptability should
be found. If an exhaustivity implicature arises, leaving out the trigger should
be less acceptable.
Maximize Presupposition does not predict the presence of a QUD to aﬀect the
obligatoriness of the trigger. As long as the presupposition of "too" is fulfilled,
the sentence without the trigger should always result in the same oddness due
to the activation of a lexical scale.
The predictions of the two theories for the interpretation and acceptability of
the last utterance are summarized in table 3.1. The columns represent what
the theories each predict for the acceptability and interpretation of the target
sentences, depending on the factors which were manipulated in the experi-
ment, i.e. whether the utterance of the last speaker contained no expression,
the trigger, or "and".
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Condition Maximize
Presupposition
Obligatory
Implicatures
Target with the trigger not contradictory
acceptable
not contradictory
acceptable
Target without ex-
pression
contradictory
not acceptable
contradictory
not acceptable
Target with "and" contradictory
not acceptable
not contradictory
acceptable
Table 3.1: Predictions of Obligatory Implicatures andMaximize Presupposition
for obligatory "too" in discourse
Method and design
36 experimental items in German were created for the study. The stimuli were
presented as comic-like pictures depicting a dialog between 3 participants in
a conversation. The first part of the comic showed one of the participants
(speaker A) making a general, introductory statement. In the second part
the speaker B replied to the first statement with either a general remark like
"nice!" or by asking a question. Speaker A responded with another statement
(an answer to the question in the question condition). This sentence always
verified the presupposition of the following sentence with the presupposition
trigger (when it contained one). In the fourth part of the comic the third
participant of the conversation, speaker C, gave a parallel answer/made a
parallel statement to the one given by speaker A in the third picture. His/Her
answer either had "auch" ("too") in it, or it started with "und" ("and") or it
had no additional expression it it. The pattern of the dialog is given in the
sample item in (28).
(28) a. A: Peter had a party at his house last night.
b. B: Cool.
B’: Who came to the party?
c. A: Mary came to the party.
d. C: Julia came to the party, too.
C’: And Julia came to the party.
C”: Julia came to the party.
A corresponding comic that functioned as the stimulus (in the condition no
question and no expression) is given in 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Visual Stimulus
The study had a 2x3 and between-subjects design. The factor context ap-
peared in the two conditions "with question "and "without question". The sec-
ond factor expression appeared in one of the three conditions "last sentence
contained "auch"", "last sentences contained "und""/"last sentence contained
no expression". Items were pseudo-randomized over six lists so that every item
appeared in one of the six conditions in each list. 72 filler items were created.
24 German native speakers participated in the experiment. The stimuli were
presented visually, on a computer screen. After reading the instructions, par-
ticipants were presented with one of the comic-like dialogs. They were then
asked how they interpret the utterance of the last speaker in the dialog. They
were given two options for the interpretation: they could either say that the
last speaker is agreeing with what the speaker before him/her said ("both"-
reading), or they could say that the last speaker contradicts the speaker before
her/him ("only"-reading). After choosing an interpretation, participants were
asked to judge the last speaker’s utterance on an acceptability scale ranging
from 1 (unacceptable) to 5 (completely acceptable).
Results
I will first discuss the results for the acceptability judgments. Then I will
report the results for interpretation.
Acceptability judgments were subjected to a repeated measure analyses of
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variance (ANOVA). They were aggregated across items and within participants
and condition. No significant main eﬀect of the factor context was found
(F<1). The factor expression had a highly significant eﬀect on acceptability
(p<0.001). A diﬀerence contrast (reverse Helmert contrast) was calculated for
the factor expression. It compared "too" against "and" in a first step and
then compared the mean of these two conditions with "no expression". The
contrast revealed that the main eﬀect of expression is due to a diﬀerence
between the conditions no expression versus "and" and "too" (p<.001). There
was no diﬀerence between "and" and "too" (F<1). The results are summarized
in the tables and diagrams in 3.3 and 3.4.
Figure 3.3: Mean average acceptability for sentences with "too" and "and"
and no expression in all contexts
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Figure 3.4: Mean average acceptability for sentences with "too" and "and"
and no expression in context with a question and without a question in the
dialogue
The data for interpretation were transformed after they were aggregated
across items and within participants and condition. The aggregated data were
subject to a repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA
revealed that expression chosen had a highly significant main eﬀect on inter-
pretation (p<.001). For the three level factor expression a diﬀerence contrast
was calculated. It showed that the eﬀect is due to a diﬀerence between the
conditions "no expression" and "too"/"and" (p<.001). There was no diﬀer-
ence between "and" and "too" in interpretation (F<1). The factor context
had no significant main eﬀect on interpretation (F<1). There was, however,
a significant interaction between the conditions context and choice of ex-
pression in interpretation. This interaction is due to a contrast between no
expression and "too"/"and" (p<.02). There were more non-contrastive read-
ings with the presence of a question for the sentences that had no expression.
Contrastive readings became available for the sentences with "and" and "too"
when there was a question. There was no contrast between "and" and "too"
(F<1). The results are summarized in the tables and diagrams in 3.5 and 3.6.
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Figure 3.5: Untransformed mean percentage of non-contrastive interpretation
("both"-readings) of sentences with "too", "and" and no expression in all
contexts
Figure 3.6: Untransformed mean percentage of non-contrastive interpretation
("both"-readings) in contexts with a question and without a question for sen-
tences with "too", "and" and no expression
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Discussion
The predictions of both Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures
regarding the sentence without the trigger are borne out. A sentence like
(29-b.) is most often (72% of the time) read as a contradiction in a context
like (29-a.), where the presupposition of the sentence is fulfilled.
(29) a. Mary came to the party.
b. Julia came to the party.
Moreover, the sentences without the trigger were significantly less acceptable
than the sentence with "too" (M= 3.62 vs. M=4.78) or "and" (M= 3.62 vs.
M=4.72). For Obligatory Implicatures this is due to the fact that the sentence
in (29-a.) has an exhaustivity implicature that is contradictory to the context.
An alternative explanation is that (29-b.) violates Maximize Presupposition.
From the perspective of both theories, however, the average acceptability of
the sentences without without the trigger seems relatively high. Moreover,
28% of the time the sentence without the trigger is read as an addition to
what the previous speaker said, not a contradiction. There is no correlation
between acceptability and interpretation. Contradicting the last speaker as
well as agreeing with her/him is approximately equally (un)acceptable (M=
3.6 for the contrastive reading vs. M= 3,67 for the non-contrastive reading).
The numbers speak for the fact that the sentences are, in both cases, perceived
as pragmatically odd and not as ungrammatical. It is very likely that judg-
ments were influenced by the presentation of the items as a dialog. It is clearly
more preferred to contradict others in a conversation than to contradict your-
self. In addition, there is no information on what is shared knowledge between
speakers and in what kind of relationship they stand. This might have influ-
enced the results since participants could not judge how likely a contradiction
is.
Even though the influence of context was not statistically significant for in-
terpretation, looking at the interpretation of individual items revealed that
the type of question played a role in how likely people found a contrastive
versus non-contrastive reading. It was not the question word per se ("who",
"where" or "what") that changed the interpretation. It rather played a role
how plausible it was that there is one answer to the question. For answers
where it is quite obvious that there is more than one true answer (Who was
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at the party? Who went to the concert?), participants were more likely to
choose the interpretation where both of the sentences uttered by the last two
speakers are considered true. That is, in this kind of context they thought that
the speakers gave "mention-some" rather than exhaustive answers. Crucially,
the domain of individuals asked about is unknown to the participants. What
else might have played a role in giving an interpretation is that participants
just considered it unlikely that the speakers know an exhaustive answers. It
is implausible for someone to know all individuals who attend a party, concert
etc. For questions like "What did Mary plant in the garden?" and "Where
does Birgit work?" participants more often chose the contrastive interpreta-
tion. Participants assumed that the speakers gave a complete answer. This
suggests that exhaustification of an answer is a pragmatic default rather than
obligatory.
Since the non-contrastive interpretation is as (un)acceptable as the one where
the last speaker is contradicting the previous speaker, the question arises
whether the results display a genuine availability of "mention-some" readings.
It is possible to override the pragmatic default of exhaustification contextually
by asking a question that is biased towards only requiring a partial answer.
However, it is still not to be considered the preferred strategy due to its low
frequency and low acceptability ratings.
The second prediction tested in the study regarded sentences with the con-
junction "and" in the last utterance. The prediction of Maximize Presup-
position is that the sentence with "and" should be less acceptable than the
sentences with "too" due to a missing trigger inference. Furthermore, this in-
ference should make the sentence contrastive to the one preceding it according
to Maximize Presupposition. Obligatory Implicatures predicts the sentences
with "and" to receive the same interpretation and average acceptability rating
as the sentences with "too". The result show that the predictions of Obligatory
Implicatures are borne out. Sentences with "and" are read as an addition, not
a contradiction, to the previous utterance in almost all cases (98% on average).
Moreover, they are not significantly less acceptable than sentences with "too"
(M= 4.72 vs. M=4.78). This suggests that in the sentences with "and", no
inference arises that contradicts the penultimate sentence in the dialog. This
is surprising from the viewpoint of Maximize Presupposition since the sentence
lacks the presupposition and should thus have a missing trigger inference.
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Last, the predictions of the two theories regarding the influence of the pres-
ence of an overt question in the discourse was tested. Maximize Presupposition
does not predict an impact of a QUD being overtly expressed in the discourse.
However, the assumption of Obligatory Implicatures is that the presence of a
QUD influences exhaustification and thereby the insertion of the trigger.
As was mentioned above, there was no main eﬀect of the presence of a ques-
tion on interpretation or acceptability that could straightforwardly support
the view of Obligatory Implicatures. However, there was an interesting inter-
action between the type of expression chosen and the presence of a question
in interpretation. This interaction resulted from a contrast between sentences
with no expression and sentences with "and" or "too". Sentences missing the
trigger or "and" were read as a contradiction with the previous sentence more
often when there was no question in the discourse (76% of the time) than in
contexts where there was a question (68% of the time).
It is surprising from the viewpoint of Obligatory Implicatures that the pres-
ence of a question makes exhaustification less prominent and allows for more
"mention-some" answers. Again, this might be explained with the set-up of
the experiment. Nothing is known about the epistemic state of the speakers,
whether they share the same knowledge or are equally equipped to answer the
question fully. They might even have diﬀerent sets of individuals in mind.
That is, participants interpreted, for example that "John came" according to
the knowledge of speaker A and "Mary came" according to the knowledge of
speaker B. When assuming that speaker B accumulates knowledge with regard
to the question, the discourse might very well be understood as speaker B be-
lieving both answers to be true in the end.
As a result, one should be cautious in concluding from these results that the
presence of a question generally increases the availability of "mention-some"
readings. Even though "mention-some" answers were available in the experi-
ment (on average 30% of the time), and more so with the presence of an explicit
question, this interpretation was not the default. Second, as was mentioned
above, the percentage of contrastive readings changed with the type of ques-
tion. Third, the same proportion of "mention-some" readings is not expected
if both statements were made by one and the same speaker. This is because in
this case, it can be taken for granted the speaker believes both answers to be
true from the beginning. The non-even distribution of the two diﬀerent inter-
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pretations chosen by the participants speak in favor of an analysis that makes
exhaustification of answers to the QUD the pragmatic default. An approach
to exhaustification of QUDs should thus allow for some flexibility, as suggested
by Beck and Rullmann (1999), in order to account for the fact that this default
can be overridden by contextual factors. Providing an explicit question is one
of these factors, as well as having diﬀerent speakers.
Conclusion and outlook
The oﬀ-line study just presented provides empirical support for the view that
the inference arising from the missing trigger is an exhaustivity implicature.
This implicature results from interpreting a proposition as the most infor-
mative answer to the present QUD. The study shows that having the QUD
explicitly in the context influences the availability of exhaustive versus non-
exhaustive readings.
Moreover, the type of question word used played a role in whether the two
answers were considered contradictory or not in the context. The results sug-
gest that exhaustification of a question is the pragmatic default. It can be
overridden by contextual factors like explicitly stating the question. Another
factor is having diﬀerent speakers with possibly diﬀerent knowledge states an-
swer the question. Maximize Presupposition is not able to predict that the
stability of a missing trigger inference is related to the presence of a QUD
or the fact that diﬀerent speakers are uttering the sentences. The influence
can be explained by adopting the view that missing trigger inferences are ex-
haustivity implicatures. However, Obligatory Implicatures would also predict
a correlation between acceptability of the sentence without the trigger and
interpretation. This was not borne out. Leaving out the trigger in sentences
that were understood as "mention-some" answers to the question was just as
unacceptable as contradicting the previous utterance with the sentence with-
out the trigger. Overriding the pragmatic default of exhaustifying an answer
was still dispreferred.
Another finding of the study which supports the view of Obligatory Impli-
catures is that there is no diﬀerence in acceptability between the sentences
with "und" and "auch". The conjunction has the same interpretative eﬀect
as presuppositional "auch", but on the level of assertion. It does not yield
an implicature and thus makes sentences equally acceptable as sentences with
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"too" in contexts where its presupposition is fulfilled. This is surprising from
the viewpoint of Maximize Presupposition.
To fully confirm the predictions of Obligatory Implicatures, one has to identify
the contextual factors which not only allow for "mention-some" readings but
make them plausible and fully acceptable. Since there is almost no research
on exhaustification of answers to the QUD, the next two studies will also focus
on the question how and when the context promotes non-scalar exhaustivity
implicatures. This line of research is important in its own and regards the
ongoing debate on what the status of these inferences is (default, automatic,
context-driven). It also provides further evidence for the treatment of types
of answers to questions. Crucially, it is important to distinguish between the
predictions of Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize Presupposition regarding
the influence of discourse. The contextual factors for an exhaustive reading of
an answer to a QUD should influence the insertion of the trigger according to
Obligatory Implicatures, but not Maximize Presupposition.
3.2.2 (C)overt "only" and cancellation with the additive
One assumption of Obligatory Implicatures is that focus makes reference to
at-issue content, more precisely the Question Under Discussion (c. Beaver and
Clark 2008, Simons et al. 2011). The study reported in the previous section
has shown that exhaustification seems to be the default interpretation of focus.
However, saying that this covert operation is the default for evaluating focus or
scalar alternatives is not revealing with regard to the question what exactly the
contextual factors that trigger or promote the process of exhaustification are.
Identifying these contextual factors is not only crucial for the debate whether
Obligatory Implicatures or Maximize Presupposition makes the right empirical
predictions for the insertion of presupposition triggers, but is an interesting
theoretical issue on its own.
I the next section, I will discuss the main theoretical positions regarding con-
versational implicatures, especially when and where they arise. I will report
previous experimental work on the contextual factors for the computation of
implicatures and its time course. Then I will present an on-line study on the
influence of contextual alternatives on the cancellation of exhaustivity with
the additive particle "auch" ("too") in German.
78
Idea and previous work
Most of the theoretical and experimental research on exhaustivity implicatures
has focused on the question how obligatory and/or automatic exhaustification
is in the domain of generalized conversational implicatures, especially the scalar
implicatures of "some" and "or". These scalar items are assumed to be on a
lexical scale (Horn 1984) with a stronger term ("all" and "and", respectively).
The implicatures they yield are less dependent on the context than particular-
ized scalar implicatures according to standard theories (Levinson 1983). The
latter are of importance for the study that will be reported. However, the
theoretical and experimental research in the domain of scalar implicatures is
crucial for the predictions regarding particularized implicatures.
One can identify two main theoretical positions in the literature on how scalar
implicatures arise. One of them sees exhaustification of the lexical scale as a
grammatical mechanism (Chierchia 2004a, Spector 2008). Under this gram-
matical, or neo-Gricean, view to scalar implicatures the exhaustivity operator
is present in the syntax and is activated automatically and locally to produce
the scalar inference. The implicature is computed immediately as a default,
irrespective of context. Only if the context makes clear that the implicature is
dispreferred, will it be canceled after it arises. In the experimental literature,
this theoretical position is usually referred to as the default view on scalar
implicatures.
The other position, following the traditional Gricean picture, sees exhausti-
fication as a pragmatic enrichment mechanism that is activated globally and
under certain contextual conditions only (Geurts 2009). Scalar implicature are
neither considered to be computed as the default nor are they considered to
be automatic. Applying a global pragmatic mechanism to compute the scalar
inference is the preferred option according to this view. Local mechanisms
only apply in a subset of special cases (Geurts 2009). This type of theories is
usually summarized under the term contextualist view of scalar implicatures
in the experimental literature.
There is a vast amount of experimental research on which of these two theories
makes the right predictions for processing and acquisition (Bott and Noveck
2004, Breheny, Katsos, and Williams 2006, Huang and Snedeker 2009, Grod-
ner et al. 2010, Huang and Snedeker 2011, Lewis 2013, Breheny, Ferguson, and
Katsos 2013a, Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos 2013b, Degen and Tanenhaus
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2015). For the two theoretical positions just outlined the predictions for pro-
cessing look roughly as follows: If implicatures are computed as a default and
automatically, they should lead to immediate processing eﬀects. If established
by the context that the weaker meaning is intended, the implicature is subse-
quently canceled. The default view thus predicts the literal interpretation to
be more complex than the pragmatically enriched one since it requires default
computation and cancellation of the implicature.
If implicatures are calculated only under certain conditions, there should be
no processing costs for implicature computation when it is clear from the con-
text that the weaker meaning is the intended one. Accordingly, no subsequent
processing costs for cancellation is expected. That is, under the contextualist
view, the literal meaning should require less processing eﬀort than the prag-
matic meaning.
There is, so far, no definitive and satisfying answer with regard to the question
what the right view is based on processing data. The findings point in diﬀer-
ent directions. Some studies found that scalar implicatures lead to processing
costs compared to the literal meaning (Bott and Noveck 2004, Breheny, Kat-
sos, and Williams 2006). Bott and Noveck (2004) used truth value judgment
tasks for single sentences without providing additional context. They tested
sentences like "Some elephants have trunks" with diﬀerent instructions for
the participants. Some participants were instructed and trained to consider
the literal meaning of "some" ("some and possibly all") and other participants
were instructed to consider the pragmatically enriched meaning "some and not
all". They found that the pragmatic group was "exceptionally slow" (Bott and
Noveck 2004, p.43) in reading the under-informative statement. They argue
that these results speak against a default view. However, as they themselves
note, the role of context remains unclear due to the nature of their items,
which require world knowledge to make the inference more or less plausible.
Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006) presented further evidence against a de-
fault and for a contextualist view. In a reading time experiment, they provided
participants with scalar terms either with a context that favored the upper-
bound (pragmatically enriched) reading or the lower-bound (literal) meaning.
Their results show that participants only drew the implicature with contex-
tual pressure. In a second experiment, where they provided participants with
a neutral context, they found no evidence for the computation of an impli-
cature. Recent studies focused more on the time course of the computation
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of implicatures rather then the overall processing diﬃculties that arise with
them.
Huang and Snedeker (2009) found that the scalar inference is not computed
immediately but that its computation is delayed in contrast to assertive mean-
ing. They tested, using eye-tracking and the visual world paradigm, whether
participants disambiguated a sentence with "some" immediately by drawing
the implicature. The results show that fixating the target which requires prag-
matic enrichment is delayed for sentences with "some" compared to the sen-
tences with "all". However, in a similar study Grodner et al. (2010) found that
the implicature of "some" is computed immediately, upon hearing the scalar
item.
Degen and Tanenhaus (2015) suggest that the diﬀerence lies in "the diﬀerent
sets of alternatives that participants in those experiments were led to believe
were available to speakers" (Degen and Tanenhaus 2015, c. Breheny, Fer-
guson, and Katsos 2013a). They observe that Huang and Snedeker (2009)
oﬀered number terms as alternatives to the quantifiers ("point to the girl with
two of the socks") whereas Grodner et al. (2010) did not, as they themselves
note. Also, in the experiment of Huang and Snedeker the smaller set was
always associated with the existential quantifier whereas the bigger set was
always associated with the universal quantifier. Degen and Tanenhaus (2015)
tested the hypothesis that those were the crucial factors for the diﬀerent re-
sults Grodner et al and Huang & Snedeker found in their respective studies.
In fact they found "that time course of scalar implicature is aﬀected by the
availability of context-specific alternatives that cannot be considered mem-
bers of context-independent scales" They conclude "that the availability of
alternatives aﬀects the interpretation of utterances containing quantifiers and
the speed with which they are processed" (Degen and Tanenhaus 2015, p.25).
They argue that this speak against models of implicature processing that are
not able to factor immediate influence of context on the interpretation of scalar
terms, like the default model.
Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos (2013b) found a similar result in an eye-
tracking experiment using a "look-and-listen" paradigm. They found that
upon hearing "some" participants fixated the right target (that required the
implicature), i.e. the fruit such that the water which contained it was only
partly poured into a bowl. They report that this reaction was as rapid as in
the "all" condition. They argue that the results suggest that the implicature is
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computed immediately and with no additional processing diﬃculty with this
rich context that made the stronger alternative relevant. The findings also
support a view that makes implicature computation dependent on context.
However, the model must also be able to capture the fact that integration of
context happens immediately upon experiencing the scalar term. The results
from the literature seem to point to a contextualist view on implicatures. How-
ever, they do not necessarily speak for a globalist view on implicatures. Scalar
implicatures seem to arise with contextual pressure but if contextual informa-
tion is incorporated immediately in on-line processing then the inference can
arise immediately and locally as well.
Lewis (2013) who focuses on data from acquisition claims that calculating im-
plicatures is highly dependent on retrieving the right contextual information
(Lewis 2013), which might be even more diﬃcult for children. Children are
better in calculating implicatures if the scalar alternative is made explicit in
the context or if the question which of the scalar alternatives hold in the con-
text is made prominent (Papafragou 2003).
The data together suggest that the presence of alternatives facilitates the pro-
cess of exhaustification, at least in the case of scalar implicatures. There is
notably less research on the question whether all conversational implicatures
are influenced by the presence of alternatives (Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos
2013b). The two positions regarding exhaustification outlined above extend to
other quantity implicatures. One could imagine the insertion of the exhaus-
tivity operator to be a grammatical and default operation, not only for scalar
implicatures. However, one could also imagine that exhaustivity implicatures
which are not the results of exhaustifying lexical (Horn-)scales (Horn 1984)
are computed only with enough contextual input. When adopting the second
position, the question that remains is what constitutes enough contextual pres-
sure. Especially the role alternatives play would be expected to be diﬀerent
from a theoretical point of view for particularized versus scalar implicatures.
Whereas the scalar alternatives should be predefined for lexical scalar items
like "some" and "or" they are completely dependent on context, especially fo-
cus and the QUD in the case of other conversational implicatures (c. Breheny,
Ferguson, and Katsos 2013b).
Results from Katsos (2009) suggest that for children under-informative sen-
tences with lexical and context-dependent scales are perceived as equally se-
vere violations, whereas for adults lower-bound readings with lexical scales are
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perceived as a more severe violation of informativity than lower bound read-
ings with context-dependent scales. Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos (2013b)
found that particularized conversational implicatures behave similarly to gen-
eralized conversational implicatures in processing for adults, however. Like in
his experiment on scalar implicature the "look and listen" paradigm was used
in combination with eye-tracking. The authors conclude that particularized
scalar implicatures are rapid and automatic inferences with the right context,
that is with the presence of alternatives. However, they point out that salient
alternatives are only one factor for this incremental processing of scalar impli-
catures. The two other factors they mention are (i) the conversational purpose
of the task and (ii) the epistemic state of the speaker. They controlled for both
in the study. Since participants were asked to give a report, it was expected
that they give a complete and accurate description of events. Moreover, par-
ticipants shared an epistemic state because they saw the same video in the
experiment.
The goal of the reading time study that I will report in this chapter was to
test the influence of alternatives on the computation exhaustivity implicatures.
More precisely, I wanted to test whether the presence of alternatives in the con-
text might change the interpretation and processing of sentences due to the
arising of an implicature. The results are relevant for the ongoing debate re-
garding how automatic quantity implicatures in general are. Moreover, they
are important for the empirical distinction between Obligatory Implicatures
and Maximize Presupposition.
The Obligatory Implicatures theory predicts that the insertion of the additive
"too" prevents an exhaustivity implicature from arising. The insertion of the
trigger is dependent on this implicature since it is the resulting contradiction
with the context that makes it necessary. Accordingly, the prediction of Oblig-
atory Implicatures is that the trigger should be obligatory only in contexts
that promote exhaustivity implicatures. Opposed to that view, Maximize Pre-
supposition predicts the trigger to be obligatory as soon as its presupposition
is satisfied by the context. As a result, the relation between the insertion of
the trigger and the arising of exhaustivity implicature is one crucial factor in
empirically distinguishing between the two theories.
Based on the experimental data regarding scalar implicatures, the idea be-
hind the experimental set-up was that mentioning explicit alternatives in the
context might influence how likely it is that participants draw a quantity im-
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plicature. A further reason to believe that there is a relation between giving an
explicit domain for exhaustification and exhaustivity implicatures is the fact
that the presence of alternatives should create a certain focus structure. It
became clear from the first experiment reported in section 3.2.1. that partici-
pants prefer to put contrastive focus on discourse new material even when only
reading a sentence. In addition to finding contexts where exhaustification is
the preferred strategy, the purpose of the experiment was also to see the time
course of drawing the inference. If alternatives pose enough contextual pres-
sure to create exhaustivity implicatures, the processing cost of drawing this
exhaustivity inference was expected to occur early in the sentence, as soon as
the phrase carrying the focus is encountered.
The idea for the study is based on an experiment done by Drenhaus, Zimmer-
mann, and Vasishth (2011). They, in an EEG experiment, tested the diﬀerent
behavior of sentences with it-clefts and with overt "only" with regard to ex-
haustivity. The idea behind the experiment was to show participants sentences
with "only" or "it-clefts" and then present them a sentence that contradicted
the exhaustivity part of the sentences explicitly by containing an additive. A
sample item is given in (30).
(30) a. Only Mary plays the piano. Peter plays the piano, too.
b. It is Mary that plays the piano. Peter plays the piano, too.
The authors found an N4006 eﬀect for the cancellation of exhaustivity in
the case of overt "only". They found a P6007 eﬀect for the cancellation of
exhaustivity in the case of clefts. They argue that this diﬀerence in eﬀects
is the result of the diﬀerent status exhaustivity has in the two cases tested.
The N400 is a sign for the truth-conditional eﬀect exhaustification has in the
6The N400 is an event-related brain potential (ERP) signaled by an EEG, it "is a broad
negative deflection of the ERP that starts 200–300 ms after a word has been presented
auditorily or visually and peaks after approximately 400 ms [...]. Although the N400 re-
sponse is often associated with semantic anomaly, it can be elicited by most meaningful
stimuli, including isolated words, pronounceable non-words (such as ’blicket’; also known as
pseudowords), faces and pictures." (Lau, Phillips, and Poeppel 2008)
7The P600 is an event-related brain potential (ERP) signaled by an EEG, it "is a positive-
going wave that onsets at about 500 ms after presentation of the anomalous word and
persists for several hundred ms. P600 eﬀects are routinely elicited by anomalies involving
grammatical agreement, tense, case, and verb subcategorization. By contrast, the N400
component is sensitive to properties of words (such as lexicality and word frequency), a
word’s predictability, and the “semantic fit” between a word and its context"(Mehravari et
al. 2015)
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case of "only", the authors claim. They argue that the lack of an N400 in
the case if clefts shows that exhaustivity in this case is just an inference and
not part of the lexical meaning. The data also speak against theories treating
exhaustivity as a presupposition of clefts, according to the authors.
Design and material
The experimental design of the following study was inspired by the design used
by Drenhaus, Zimmermann, and Vasishth (2011). The idea was to present
sentences with overt "only" and contrast them with cases where there was no
overt "only". The context was manipulated in a way that it either explicitly
mentioned alternatives or not. The alternatives were always individuals of
semantic type <e>. "Only" always associated with the subject NP of the
target sentence and thus appeared in the sentence initial position. A second
target sentence contained the additive "also" and thereby either contradicted
the assertion of the first target sentence when it occurred with overt "only"
(like in the experiment by Drenhaus et al. 2011) or canceled the exhaustivity
implicature of the first target sentence that was expected to arise with a covert
exhaustivity operator. Whether this implicature was drawn was expected to
be dependent on the presence of alternatives in the context. An example of
a context sentence is given in (31-a.). The explicit alternatives are given in
brackets. An example of the corresponding target is given in (31-b.).
(31) a. Petra wants to order pizza for her birthday. She invites her neigh-
bors [Jonas, Rafael and Lukas] to join her.
’Petra will zu ihrem Geburtstag Pizza bestellen. Sie lädt ihre
Nachbarn [Jonas, Rafael und Lukas] zum Pizzaessen ein.’
b. [Only] Petra’s neighbour Jonas is coming to her birthday. Her
neighbors Rafael and Lukas are also coming and are bringing
wine.
’[Nur] Petras Nachbar Jonas kommt zum Pizzaessen. Ihre Nach-
barn Rafael und Lukas kommen auch zum Pizzaessen und bringen
Wein mit.’
The study had a 2x2 design. The first factor that was manipulated was whether
explicit alternatives were given in the context or not (+/- alt). The second
independent factor was the presence of an overt "only" in the first target (+/-
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only). Participants first read the context as a whole and were then presented
with the two target sentence word by word. A moving window technique was
used for this word by word presentation of the target. That is, participants
first saw a series of lines, each corresponding to a word in the two target
sentence. They saw the first word by pressing a button. By pressing the button
again, the first word disappeared and the second appeared. This procedure
was repeated until they read both target sentences. By using this technique,
reading times for the sentences are measured on-line. After reading the context
and both targets, participants were asked to judge the coherency of the whole
discourse on a 5 point scale, where 5 corresponded to the judgment that the
discourse was completely coherent and 1 to the judgment that the discourse
was not coherent. Thus, two measures were considered for the analysis. As a
first dependent factor, the reading times for the targets were analysed. As a
second dependent factor, the coherency judgments of the whole discourse were
analysed.
Predictions
For the reading times it was expected that eﬀects for the computation of an
exhaustivity implicature would occur in the -only sentences when there were
alternatives in the context. This eﬀect should start to show up immediately
when reading the alternative picked up by the first target. This expectation
was based on the assumption that the presence of alternatives in the context
require the alternative in the target to carry focus ("Jonas" in the example in
(31)) and that this focus should force the insertion of an exhaustivity opera-
tor. Based on the previous evidence from experiments on scalar implicatures,
it was moreover expected that there would be an eﬀect of cancellation in the
second target sentence in this condition (-only,+alt). The eﬀect of an impli-
cature and its subsequent cancellation was not expected in the -alt condition.
Since the alternatives are not explicitly mentioned in the context, no focus
was assumed to be required on the alternative in the target that could trigger
exhaustification.
For the sentences with overt "only", exhaustification is considered to be part of
the truth conditions and therefore has to take place in both context conditions,
with and without alternatives. The reading times for the +only conditions
were thus expected to not diﬀer depending on the presence of alternatives.
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Since exhaustivity is part of the assertion of the first target with "only", a
contradiction arises with the second target sentence where exhaustivity is ex-
plicitly canceled by "also". The expectation was that the processing of this
contradiction would not diﬀer depending on whether alternatives were explic-
itly mentioned in the context or not.
As a result, an interaction was expected: whereas the reading time patterns
of the -only sentences should change depending on the presence of alterna-
tives, the reading time patterns of the +only sentences should not change
with the presence of alternatives. An increase in reading times was expected
for the -only/+alt condition (as opposed to the -alt condition) on the noun
("Jonas" in (31)) and the following regions due to an implicature arising.
Moreover, an increase in reading times was expected on "also" and the follow-
ing regions in the second target in the -only/+alt condition but not in the
-only/-alt condition. This increase in reading times was expected for both
+only irrespective of the presence of alternatives since a contradiction arises.
The expectation for reading times on the two critical regions are depicted in
figures 3.7 and 3.8 below.
Figure 3.7: Expected reading time eﬀects (ms) for exhaustification of the first
sentence (critical region "Jonas" and following regions)
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Figure 3.8: Expected reading time eﬀects (ms) for cancellation in the second
sentence (critical region "auch" and following regions)
For the coherency judgments, the expectation was that the discourse would
be judged less coherent in the -only/+alt condition than in the -only/-
alt condition. This expectation was, again, due to the assumption that with
the presence of alternatives an exhaustivity implicature should arise without
"only" that is then canceled in the second target sentence with "also". With-
out alternatives no implicature was expected to arise and thus no cancella-
tion was expected in the second target. The sentences with overt "only" and
"also" should behave alike again in the -alt condition and the +alt condition.
A contradiction arises in both conditions that should lead to low coherency
judgments. Once more an interaction was predicted that results from the as-
sumption that +only sentences do not diﬀer depending on the presence of
alternatives whereas the -only sentences do. This expectation is depicted in
3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Expected coherency judgments for sentences with and without
"only" in contexts with and without alternatives
Results
Analyses were carried out using the R programming language (R Develop-
ment Core Team) as linear mixed eﬀect models (Baayen, Davidson, and Bates
2008), using the program lmer (Bates 2005). The fixed factors were alter-
natives in the context (present/absent) and only in the target (overt/not
overt). Random factors were subjects and items. Additionally, models with
random slopes for both subjects and items were calculated. When an ANOVA
revealed a significant diﬀerence between the models, the more complex one
was chosen.
First I report the results for coherency. There was a significant main eﬀect of
the factor only for coherency (p<.001). The discourses where the first target
sentence had no overt "only" were judged significantly more coherent than the
discourses where the first target had an overt "only" (M=4.1 versus M=2.1).
There was no significant interaction of conditions and no significant main eﬀect
of alternatives. There were no simple eﬀects. Results are summarized in figure
3.10 below.
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Figure 3.10: Mean coherency judgments for sentences with and without "only"
in contexts with and without alternatives
Next, the reading times for the first critical region are reported. The first
critical region looked at was the head noun of the subject NP in the first target
sentence ("Jonas" in the examples in (31)).
A significant interaction was found between the presence of "only" and the
presence of alternatives (p<.01) in reading times on this region. There was,
moreover, a significant simple eﬀect for alternatives in the case of -only
(p<.01). With alternatives the sentences without "only" were read faster,
without alternatives they were read slower. There was also a marginally sig-
nificant simple eﬀect of alternatives in the case +only. With alternatives the
sentences with "only" were read slower (p<.07). There were significant simple
eﬀects of only for both context conditions, +/-alt (p<.05). There were no
significant main eﬀects of only or alternatives. Results are summarized
in figure 3.11 below.
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Figure 3.11: Untransformed mean reading times on the right boundary of the
NP ("Jonas") with and without "only" in contexts with and without alterna-
tives
Last, I report the results for the reading times for the second critical region
looked at. This critical region was the one immediately following the additive
"also" in the second target sentence ("zum" in the example in (31)).
There was a marginally significant interaction between the presence of "only"
and the presence of alternatives (p<.07). There was no simple eﬀect for al-
ternatives in the case of -only. There was a significant simple eﬀect of alter-
natives in the case +only: with alternatives the sentences were read slower
(p<.05). There was a significant simple eﬀect of "only" for the cases without
alternatives (p<.05): without alternatives the sentences with "only" were read
faster than the sentences without "only". No eﬀect of only was found in the
case with alternatives. There were no significant main eﬀect of alternatives
or only. There were no other significant eﬀect of reading times on any other
region of the two target sentences. The results for the second critical region
looked at are summarized in figure 3.12 below.
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Figure 3.12: Untransformed mean reading times of the word after "also" (auch
+1) with and without "only" in the first target and in contexts with and
without alternatives
Discussion
The expectations for the coherency judgments were not borne out. There was
no interaction between the presence of "only" and the presence of alternatives.
Most importantly, it was not the case that the presence of alternatives played
a role in how coherent the discourse was perceived when there was no overt
"only" in the first target. This was unexpected from the point of view of Oblig-
atory Implicatures since exhaustification was assumed to be triggered with the
presence of alternatives and the resulting focus. The discourses were overall
judged coherent in the -only condition, irrespective of whether alternatives
were explicitly mentioned in the context. Unsurprisingly, there was a main
eﬀect of "only" for coherency. The discourses with overt "only" were judged
less coherent than the discourses with covert "only". This was expected given
that a contradiction arises between the second target with "also" and the first
target with overt "only" in both context conditions (with and without alter-
natives).8
8A methodological remark is in order at this point. Jesse Snedeker (p.c.) points out that
the results for reading times might have been confounded by the fact that people were asked
to judge the acceptability of the sentence. Thus, people were aware that they had to judge
coherency of the discourse which might have made them more alert when reading "only"
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The expectations for reading times were not borne out either. The interaction
found was in the opposite direction of what was expected. Whereas alterna-
tives had an influence on the processing of the target sentences when there
was an overt "only" they did not play a role in the processing of the sentences
without "only". The fact that reading times were faster on the first critical
region in the +alt/-only condition might simply be explained by semantic
priming: the fact that the noun was previously mentioned in the context facil-
itated processing and sped up reading times. However, this eﬀect of previous
mentioning disappeared with the overt occurrence of "only". The presence
of alternatives slowed down reading times on the first NP significantly when
there was an overt "only" even though the noun was previously mentioned.
The results suggest that overt exhaustification with "only" was thus aﬀected
by the presence of alternatives. Alternatives still played a role in the discourses
with overt "only" for the reading times of the second target. Reading times
were higher on the second critical region looked at when there was an overt
"only" and alternatives in the discourse.
Overall the results suggest that no exhaustification was triggered without
"only" when there were alternatives in the context. There is no evidence
for an implicature arising in the +alt/-only condition, neither in coherency
judgments nor reading times. This means that the presence of alternatives did
not pose enough contextual pressure for an exhaustivity implicature to arise.
One possibility to analyze the results is that participants read the first target
sentence without the focal stress that was supposed to be triggered by the
explicit alternatives. In fact, the mentioning of explicit alternatives in the dis-
course might have evoked a list reading of the target sentences. This is not
implausible given that the alternative mentioned in the target is not discourse
new in the +alt condition. As I mentioned in the last chapter, list-readings
and discourse-old information come with the same, falling (L*-H), intonation
contour. Participants might have read the sentences with this intonation con-
tour and developed the expectation that something will be said about all of
these alternatives at the end of the discourse. In this case, exhaustification
would not be the preferred strategy.
A list-reading is impossible for scalar terms with just one relevant alternative.
since only in those condition the sentences could end up fully contradictory. For further
studies on should therefore look at the acceptability of these sentences and measure their
reading times in separate experiments.
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This is because in this case the alternatives necessarily stand in an entailment
relation to each other. As soon as the stronger meaning is true, the weaker one
is automatically true. There is no reason to mention the weaker alternative
if the stronger alternative is true; giving a list will always sound redundant.
The same is not true for an alternative set of (singular) individuals, see the
contrast in (32).
(32) a. #All students came, some students came...
b. Rafael came, Lucas came,...
That is, the influence of alternatives in the discourse on exhaustification might,
after all, be diﬀerent for generalized and particularized implicatures. This has
to do with the fact that the alternatives in this domain are not ordered items,
or at least their ordering is not fixed by the lexicon as in the case of scalar
terms. Hearers or readers might impose an ordering on non-scalar alternatives
based on the context. For example, they might order the individuals based
on their relevance. Thus, the focus might be interpreted with "even" instead
of "only". This kind of interpretation strategy does not yield a contradiction
when more than one alternative is mentioned. It might very well be one ap-
plied by the participants in the experiment described above. That is, another
possibility to explain the results is to assume that even though the first NP
carried stress in the +alt condition, the focus (or the QUD it evokes) is not
evaluated by a covert exhaustivity operator but by a silent "even". This would
speak against theories assuming that exhaustification is the default mechanism
to evaluate focus in every context. The results speak against Magri (2009) who
assumes a covert exhaustivity operator which "blindly" (irrespective of con-
text) generates implicatures to be mandatorily present in every matrix clause.
It is thus expected under his theory that there is also a mandatory cancella-
tion with "also" in the second target. This should have been visible in the
coherency judgments and reading times of the sentences. The lack of an eﬀect
can be explained by Obligatory Implicatures. Under the assumption that no
implicature arose that led to a contradiction, there was no implicature to be
canceled with "too". This fits the explanation given above and the observation
that additives are not obligatory when providing a list of answers (Amsili and
Beyssade 2009). Yet another possibility is to assume that the NP did not carry
focus but was interpreted as a contrastive topic instead (Büring 2003). In this
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case no exhaustification is expected to take place, either. As a consequence, a
further prediction of Obligatory Implicatures would be that the trigger could
have been left out in this context.
The large influence explicit alternatives had on the interpretation of sentences
with "only" is an interesting result on its own. What is especially intriguing
is where these eﬀects in reading times showed up depending on the presence
of alternatives. It is a standard assumption regarding the interpretation of
"only" that it takes the set of alternatives and says that out of these alterna-
tives only the alternative it combines with is true (Rooth 1992). Since "only"
is a quantificational adverb, the set of alternatives are modeled as its domain
of quantification introduced into the LF via the domain restriction variable
C (Rooth 1992, von Fintel 1994). Moreover, "only" mandatorily associates
with focus, i.e. what exactly the alternatives look like that "only" combines
with is dependent on the focus structure of the sentence. Therefore it has
been proposed that the domain of quantification for "only" is subject to the
focus determined constraint in (33-c.) (Rooth 1992). The truth conditions for
a sentence with "only" where it combines with the VP as in (33-a.) are given
in (33-b.) (Rooth 1992).
(33) a. [S NP only VP]
b. 8P[P2C & P([[ NP ]]) !P=[[ VP ]] ]
c. Focus-determined constraint: C ⇢ [[ VP ]]F
The "only" used in the experiment above always associated with the subject
NP, as in (34-a.). The truth conditions of these sentences are that all alter-
natives in the quantificational domain which have the property described by
the VP must be identical to the NP, see (34-b.). This is identical to saying
that all alternatives "only" associates with which are in C and are not in the
NP do not have the property described by the VP, see (34-c.). As before, the
quantifier domain restriction was subject to the constraint in (34-d.).
(34) a. [S onlyC NP VP]
b. 8x[x2C & VP(x)!x=[[ NP ]] ]
c. 8y[y2C & y6=[[ NP ]] ! ¬[[ NP ]] (y)]
d. Focus-determined constraint: C ⇢ [[ NP ]]F
It is clear from (33-b.) and (34-b./c.) that the truth conditions of sentences like
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(34-a.) and (33-a.) can only be known after the whole structure is interpreted
and the content of the VP is known. It is only then when it is obvious which
property the alternatives not mentioned in the sentences are excluded from
having.
However, the reading time eﬀects evoked by the presence of alternatives for
the sentences with "only" occur well before the whole sentences is read and
processed. It seems that readers reconstruct what the alternatives are they
have to exclude as soon as they know the constituent "only" combines with,
in this case the subject NP9. In other words it seems that people define what
is in C as soon as they know the restrictor of "only". That is, for the sample
item discussed above - a simplified version of which is repeated in (35) below
- participants form the representation in (35-b.) at the point when they hear
(35-a.). Since they have explicit alternatives at their disposal they already
know at this point that (35-c.) holds, i.e. that Lukas and Rafael do not have
the relevant property. Interpreting the sentences with "only" in contexts with
explicit alternatives would thus be a case of predictive processing (Altmann
and Mirkovic 2009, Farmer, Brown, and Tanenhaus 2013, Kutas, DeLong, and
Smith 2011).
(35) (C: Petra invited her neighbors Jonas, Lukas and Rafael.) Only her
neighbor Jonas came.
a. Only her neighbour Jonas
b. {P:8y[y2 {Jonas, Lukas, Rafael}& y6=Jonas! ¬(P)(y)]}
c. ¬(P)(Lukas) & ¬(P)(Rafael)
Looking at the condition of the sentence without explicit alternatives, it be-
comes clearer why there might be a diﬀerence in processing between -alt and
+alt condition for "only". There is contextual information on what C looks
like by saying that the invitees are neighbors. This information can be in-
corporated in the representation of the sentence immediately as well, see the
representation of (36-a.) in (36-b.). However, the alternatives are less explicit
than in the case in (35). Without knowing what individuals are in the set
of neighbors there are no specific alternatives to exclude, as was the case in
9With Reis (2005) I assume that, syntactically, German "nur" can be adjoined to all
kinds of maximal projections, including NPs, as long as it c-commands its focus. Together
"nur" and the NP form a constituent of type <,<s,t>,t>. Semantically, the type is thus
the same type as for quantified NPs, looking for a property as an argument.
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(35-c.).
(36) (C: Petra invited her neighbors.) Only her neighbor Jonas came.
a. Only her neighbor Jonas.
b. {P:8y[y2 {x: x is a neighbor}& y6=Jonas! ¬(P)(y)]}
This explanation also accounts for why there is another reading time eﬀect
for the presence of alternatives in the second sentence right after the additive
"too". After having processed the first sentence readers assume that Lukas
and Rafael did not come. That is, they have specific assumptions about these
individuals. Reading the names again in the second sentence reactivates these
assumptions and tells the reader that s/he gets additional information. How-
ever, by also knowing the "too" has a presupposition that has to be fulfilled
the contradiction can be anticipated right away. In the case without alterna-
tives readers first have to update their knowledge with the information that
Lukas and Rafael are in C as well. That is, only at this point they know that
they are relevant alternatives that they should exclude from having property
P. The process of explicit exclusion thus happens later than in the case with
explicit alternatives in the context. The assumption is that readers becoming
aware of the obvious contradiction is delayed as well. This is why they do not
perceive the contradiction as as strong.
Conclusion and outlook
It seems that the focus alternatives relevant for interpreting sentences with
"only" are activated as soon as they are discovered. They are incorporated
into the semantic representation right away and thus an example of incremen-
tal processing. Assuming that covert "only" (if mandatorily activated) behaves
just like overt "only" in processing, the same should be true for sentences where
a covert exhaustivity operator is mandatorily inserted. The results from overt
"only" suggest that exhaustification of non-ordered sets of items should thus
happen as rapidly as the exhaustification of ordered alternatives of scalar items.
That is, based on the observation about overt "only", the hypothesis is that
non-scalar conversational implicatures can be observed in on-line processing in
the same way as their scalar counterparts. However, the alternatives must be
prominent and the contextual pressure to insert a covert operator high enough.
The results suggest that just mentioning the alternatives does not pose enough
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contextual pressure to justify this insertion. In fact, mentioning alternatives
could allow for a so called "list-reading" of the following sentences that comes
with a specific intonation and disallows exhaustification. The same is not
allowed for scalar alternatives. The contextual factors for mandatory exhaus-
tification seem to be diﬀerent for the two types of implicatures. However, the
data suggest that the time course of their computation, when they arise, might
be identical.
The findings align with the results of the first study. Contexts where an alter-
native set is made prominent, by either providing a question or providing the
alternatives explicitly, seem to open the possibility for "mention-some"/"list"
readings.
3.2.3 Contrastive focus and "too"
Idea and predictions
The idea behind the study reported in this section was to create enough con-
textual pressure to make the insertion of an exhaustivity operator obligatory.
The goal was to identify the contextual clues that force this obligatory inser-
tion. The study reported in section 3.2.1 suggested that the presence of an
explicit question had an influence on the arising of exhaustivity implicatures.
The second study showed that mentioning of explicit alternatives in the dis-
course is not a strong enough factor to force exhaustification of the QUD. The
study reported in this section investigated the influence of contrast on exhaus-
tivity implicatures. The assumption was that contrastive focus would force
exhaustification. Pressure to insert the trigger should be high. Leaving it out
should lead to a significant decrease in acceptability according to Obligatory
Implicatures. Maximize Presupposition does not predict contrastive focus to
have an influence on the insertion of the trigger.
Material and method
Two context manipulations were used in the present study. First, the clause
where an exhaustivity implicature was supposed to occur was embedded in a
list of related clauses. Together the clauses described a sequence of events. The
purpose of that was to create a contrast between the activity described in the
relevant clause and other actions described in the discourse. The contrastive
98
focus was supposed to make exhaustification more prominent and disallow for a
non-exhaustive reading (Gennaro Chierchia, p.c.). As a second manipulation,
the last of the clauses in the list was made such that it concluded the discourse
in a way that made a continuation unlikely. A sample context is given in (37)
below.
(37) Rita ist ins Büro gekommen, hat Kaﬀee gekocht, Stefan und Sabine
begrüßt und sich an ihren Schreibtisch gesetzt.
’Rita came to work, made coﬀee, greeted Stefan and Sabine and sat
down at her desk.’
The assumption was that in the context above "greeting Stefan and Sabine" is
considered the only relevant greeting event. This is because, first, the contrast
between the activities listed forces the reader to put focal stress on the VP
"Stefan und Sabine begrüßt". Second, the temporal order evoked by this
kind of listing makes it less likely that there were other relevant events. As
a consequence, exhaustification is triggered with regard to the question "Who
did Rita greet" with the result that "Stefan" and "Sabine" are considered the
only people she greeted, see derivation below:
(38) [[ EXH ]]([[ Who did Rita greet ]])([[ Rita greet Stefan and Sabine ]])(w)
, [Rita greeted Stefan+Sabine](w) & 8q[q 2 [ p.9x.p=  w.person(x)(w)
& Rita greeted x in w] &  w.Rita greeted Stefan+Sabine;q! ¬q(w)]
’Rita greeted only Stefan and Sabine’
To see whether this prediction was borne out, a continuation was created. It
appeared in four diﬀerent conditions. To keep the idea of the previous experi-
ment, the continuation either appeared with or without "too". It was expected
that the sentence without "too" will result in infelicity due to a contradiction
with the exhaustivity implicature that is evoked in the context (condition A,
without "too"). The sentence with "too" was supposed to cancel the impli-
cature of the previous sentence (condition B, with "too"). This cancellation
was supposed to have an eﬀect on the coherency of the whole discourse. Two
control conditions were created which neither contradicted the implicature of
the previous sentence nor did they cancel it. The first control condition con-
tained negation (condition C, with negation). The second control condition
was added that repeated one of the alternatives in the context and was thus
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entailed (condition D, entailed). The target item in the four conditions is given
in (39) below.
(39) a. Sie hat Lisa begrüßt.
She greeted Lisa. (condition A, no "too")
b. Sie hat too Lisa begrüßt.
She greeted Lisa, too. (condition B, "too")
c. Sie hat Lisa nicht begrüßt.
She did not greet Lisa. (condition C, "neg")
d. Sie hat Stefan begrüßt.
She greeted Stefan. (condition D, "entailed")
Six items were created per condition which made for a total of 24 experimental
items. 48 fillers were created and used in the experiment. 24 German native
speakers participated in the experiment. The study was conducted online by
following a link and was programmed using the free software OnExp (OnExp
1.2 User Manual). Participants read the context first and then were presented
with the target sentence in one of the four conditions. They were asked to
judge how acceptable they found the last sentence within the given context
on a 7-point scale. 7 indicated that the sentence was completely acceptable.
Participants were instructed that "acceptable" meant that the sentence made
sense in the given context and could be uttered by a native speaker like that.
Predictions
The predictions of both Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures
are identical, once more, regarding the sentence without "too" compared to
the sentence with "too" (condition A versus B). Both predict the A condition
to be significantly worse than the B condition in this context. This is because,
as opposed to the B condition, the A condition has a missing trigger inference
which is contradictory to the context.
Since A has a missing trigger inference, it should also be significantly less
acceptable than the control condition in C according to the Obligatory Impli-
cature theory. This is because the implicature of the negated sentence in C is
not contradictory to the context. According to Maximize Presupposition, the
trigger should be obligatory under negation. As a consequence, the sentence in
(39-c.) should have the same missing trigger inference which results in oddness
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Contrast Maximize Presupposition Obligatory Implicatures
A versus B A<B A<B
A versus C A=C A<C
A versus D A<D A<D
B versus C B>C B<C
Table 3.2: Predictions ofMaximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures
for obligatory additives in contrastive contexts
as A.
Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures both predict condition
A to be worse than the control condition in D. Since this option is entailed by
the discourse and not presupposed, Maximize Presupposition does not predict
the trigger to be obligatory in D. No exhaustivity implicature is supposed to
occur in this sentence since it is already asserted that D is not the only true
alternative.
There is another important prediction of Obligatory Implicatures regarding
the sentence with "too" (condition B) compared to the control with negation
(condition C). Since the context tried to force exhaustification, a cancellation
eﬀect should be visible in the acceptability judgment for the sentence in B. B
is thus predicted to be worse than C according to Obligatory Implicatures. The
opposite is predicted by Maximize Presupposition. Sentences in the C condi-
tion should have a missing trigger inference which projects through negation.
The sentence in B lacks this inference since it has the trigger in it and should
be significantly more acceptable than C as a consequence. Thus predictions for
the contrasts are summarized in 3.2 (where ">" means "more acceptable").
Results
Analyses were carried out using the R programming language (R Develop-
ment Core Team) as linear mixed eﬀect models (Baayen, Davidson, and Bates
2008), using the program lmer (Bates 2005). The fixed factor was the expres-
sion used in the target (condition A-D). Random factors were subjects and
items. Additionally, models with random slopes for both subjects and items
were calculated. When an ANOVA revealed a significant diﬀerence between
the models, the more complex one was chosen.
A contrast was found between condition A (without the trigger) and B (with
the trigger). A was significantly less acceptable than B (M=2,1 versus M=4,1,
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p<.001).
Sentences in condition C with negation were judged significantly better than A
sentences without negation even though both were lacking the trigger (M=5,7
versus M=2,1, p<.001). A was also judged significantly worse than the other
control condition in D (M=5,4).
Another contrast was found between condition B and C. B was significantly
less acceptable than C (M=4,1 versus M=5,7, p<.001). The results are sum-
marized in the diagram in table 3.13.
Figure 3.13: Mean acceptability of sentences with and without "too", with
negation and with entailed alternative (condition A-D)
Discussion
The results show, once more, that in fact the two theories presented make
the right predictions regarding the obligatory insertion of "too" when its pre-
supposition is fulfilled in the context. Leaving out the trigger will lead to a
significant decrease in acceptability. Comparing the absolute numbers of the
acceptability judgments for sentences missing the trigger of the first study,
reported in section 3.2.1., and the present study (M=3,62 on a 5-point scale
versus M=2,1 on a 7-point scale), it becomes obvious that people chose the
lower half of the scale in the present study but they still used the upper half of
the scale in the first study. This suggests that discourse factors do play a role
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in how strong the oddness of the sentence without the trigger is perceived. The
acceptability for these sentences was extremely low in the present study where
exhaustification was made prominent in the context and the discourse was not
presented as a dialog. It thus should be considered a crucial factor for ex-
haustification whether sentences are uttered by one or diﬀerent speakers. It is
more commonly accepted that partner in a conversation contradict each other
than when a discourse is contradictory in itself. The decrease in acceptability
observed in the first study might rather be due to the fact that contradicting
implicitly, with an inference, is a pragmatically dispreferred strategy.
The sentences without the trigger and with negation (condition C) were not
judged as unacceptable as the sentences without the trigger and without nega-
tion (condition A). This suggests that the missing trigger inference does not
project and that "too" is not obligatory under negation. The predictions of
Obligatory Implicatures regarding the contrast between condition A and C
were completely borne out. Since the sentence in the C condition should not
contradict the exhaustivity implicature arising in the context, the sentence
was predicted to be significantly more acceptable than in the A condition that
forced the contradiction.
The most important result regarding the goal of this study is the contrast be-
tween condition B with "too" and condition C with negation. Since this time
exhaustification was already forced in the context, it was expected under Oblig-
atory Implicatures that the sentence with "too" will cancel this exhaustivity
implicature. The results suggest that this is, in fact, the case. The sentences
with "too" were judged less acceptable than the sentences in control conditions
C or D. That is, as opposed to the study before where people accepted the
continuation with "too" without problems, making an addition with "too" in
this context was dispreferred. This speaks in favour of the analysis presented
above that alternatives did not evoke an exhaustivity implicature which needed
to be canceled. In the present study, however, contextual pressure to draw the
inference was high enough. The results show that people, in fact, computed
the implicature and then had to cancel it. This led to significantly decreased
coherency of the discourse as a whole.
Overall the results suggest that the way in which the context was set up in
this experiment forced an exhaustivity implicature in the third clause. This
explains why sentences canceling or contradicting this implicature (condition
A and B) were judged significantly less acceptable than sentences which were
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not contradicting it (condition C and D). Creating a contrast with other ac-
tivities like in the present experiment and wrapping up the discourse with a
concluding sentence are crucial factors for exhaustification.
Summary and outlook
The results of the last experiment show that exhaustification is the preferred
strategy in a context that requires contrastive focus and contains a sentence
creating a wrap-up eﬀect. Contrastive focus is thus taken to be evaluated with
a covert exhaustivity operator as a default. This focus seems to behave dif-
ferently from the one arising with mentioning one alternative out of a set of
alternatives, as was the case for the study presented in section 3.2.2.. Focus
was not evaluated by an exhaustivity operator. No cancellation eﬀect arose
with the presence of "too" accordingly. In the present study the strength of
the exhaustivity implicature was high enough to decrease the acceptability of
the discourse as a whole when there was a cancellation with "too". Measuring
cancellation eﬀects oﬀ-line is thus a useful method for identifying the context
that require the activation of an exhaustivity operator. The studies together
provide important insights into the contextual factors for exhaustification.
To further test the predictions of Obligatory Implicatures, the obligatoriness
of "too" in contexts which require exhaustification and which do not require
exhaustification will need to be looked at. For a follow-up reading time ex-
periment, sentences with and without the trigger should be presented in these
diﬀerent types of contexts. Based on the findings of the studies conducted, the
context factors that ought to be manipulated are, first, pre-defining the do-
main of exhaustification by providing explicit alternatives or not and, second,
creating a wrap-up eﬀect by listing diﬀerent activities that stand in contrast
to the focused alternative in the discourse.
When alternatives are provided and activities do not appear in a list, exhaus-
tification should be the dispreferred strategy (like in the context in (40-a.)).
When the alternatives are not previously mentioned and activities are given
in a list (like in (40-b.)), exhaustification should be the preferred strategy.
(40) a. Sonja kommt ins Büro, scherzt zur Begrüßung mit ihren Kollegen
Tom und Jana. Sie gibt ihrer Kollegin Jana eine Einladung zu
ihrer Hochzeit.
Sonja walks into the oﬃce, is joking with her colleagues Tom and
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Jana. She is giving Jana an invitation to her wedding.
b. Sie gibt [auch] Tom eine Einladung zu ihrer Hochzeit. (-exh)
She is giving Tom an invitation to her wedding, [too].
(41) a. Sonja kommt ins Büro, scherzt zur Begrüßung mit ihren Kollegen
Tom und Nadine und gibt ihrer Kollegin Jana eine Einladung
zu ihrer Hochzeit.
Sonja walks into the oﬃce, is joking with her colleagues Tom and
Nadine and is giving her colleague Jana an invitation to her
wedding.
b. Sie gibt [auch] Tom eine Einladung zu ihrer Hochzeit. (+exh)
She gives Tom an invitation to her wedding, [too].
The sentences in (40-a.) and (41-a.) satisfy the presupposition of the test sen-
tences with "too" in (40-b.) and (41-b.), respectively. Leaving out the trigger
should thus yield a missing trigger inference according to Maximize Presup-
position. It should be degraded and lead to processing costs in both type of
contexts presented.
According to Obligatory Implicatures the sentence without the trigger should
only result in oddness if it has an exhaustivity implicature which is contra-
dicting the context. No such implicature is supposed to arise with the context
in (41-a.). Both alternatives introduced by the first sentence ("Tom" and
"Jana") are picked up by the following sentences. They should thus receive
no contrastive focus. No obligatory insertion of the exhaustivity operator is
required for either of the alternatives. Consequently, no contradiction is ex-
pected to arise. For (41-b.), it is expected that the contrast evoked by "Jana"
with "Nadine" in the context forces exhaustification. Adding another alterna-
tive with the target sentence will yield a contradiction with this implicature.
Leaving out the trigger should be less acceptable in (41-b.) than in (41-a.) as a
consequence. Parallely, for the reading times, it is expected under Obligatory
Implicatures that processing costs for the exhaustivity implicature show up
for the sentence without the trigger in contexts like (41-b.), but not (41-a.).
Based on the findings for overt "only", the processing costs for exhaustification
should arise upon reading the focused item in the critical sentence, "Jana" in
the case above.
For the sentences with "too" a cancellation eﬀect should occur in contexts like
(41-b.) but not (41-a.) according to Obligatory Implicatures. This eﬀect is ex-
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pected to be mirrored in the reading times and coherency judgments. Reading
times should increase on the trigger and following regions due to the antic-
ipation of a fulfilled presupposition. This expectation is based on the eﬀect
observed with the overt contradiction of the sentence with "too" and overt
"only" in the second study presented in this chapter.
In sum, whereas Obligatory Implicatures expects an interaction between the
context and insertion of the trigger, no such interaction is expected under
Maximize Presupposition.
3.3 Summary and discussion
There are two main empirical findings in this chapter. First, the empirical
data presented in this chapter speak in favor of an analysis of obligatory "too"
which is based on obligatory exhaustivity implicatures. Second, the data on
the contextual factors for exhaustivity implicatures suggest that not the pres-
ence of alternatives, either explicitly mentioned or introduced implicitly via
questions, are the relevant factor for making exhaustification mandatory but
contrast.
The findings show that the presupposition trigger "too" is in fact obligatory
in contexts where its presupposition is fulfilled. Leaving out the trigger leads
to an inference that is contradictory to the context. Sentence without the
trigger are furthermore less acceptable than sentences with the trigger. This
is predicted by both Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures.
The results of a study by Oesterle (2015) reported in section 3.1. show that
"too" is not obligatory under negation. This is predicted by Obligatory Im-
plicatures, but not Maximize Presupposition. The findings suggest that the
additive is even dispreferred in environments where the exhaustivity operator
is impossible. Both the presuppositional additive and the exhaustivity oper-
ator cannot associate with focus across negation. For the overt additive, it
leads to an intervention eﬀect. For the covert exhaustivity operator it leads to
an implicature which the sentence cannot have.
The results of the three studies reported in section 3.2. together suggest that
inferences arising from the missing trigger are in fact implicatures. They are
sensitive to the presence of alternatives and an explicit QUD. They interact
with the insertion of "too". Leaving out the trigger in contexts where the
pressure to exhaustify was higher was clearly less preferred than leaving out
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the trigger in contexts where exhaustification was not forced. Moreover, can-
cellation with the trigger was perceived as less acceptable in context where
exhaustification was the preferred strategy.
The results of the first study reported in section 3.2.1. show that exhaustifica-
tion was the preferred strategy for the sentences without the trigger. However,
with the presence of an explicit QUD, the percentage of exhaustive interpreta-
tions went down. Most likely, this is connected to the fact that the sentences
which were answers to the question in the context were uttered by diﬀerent
speakers. This is supported by the fact that the acceptability of sentences not
having the trigger was relatively high compared to the other studies. The fact
that the lack of the trigger was perceived and judged diﬀerently depending
on the discourse is not predicted by Maximize Presupposition. It is, however,
expected under Obligatory Implicatures.
The results of the study presented in section 3.2.2. show that the presence
of contextual alternatives does not pose enough pressure for exhaustification.
No reading time eﬀects for exhaustification could be observed. This is in line
with the observation that the ’cancellation" with "too" was not aﬀecting the
coherency judgments.
It could be seen that overt exhaustification with "only" is sensitive to these
alternatives and does happen rapidly, upon experiencing focus. For particu-
larized conversational implicatures, it seems that there is another option for
treating alternatives other than exhaustification, which is assuming that a list
is provided (possibly ordering alternatives by salience or relevance). This op-
tion is not available for scalar implicatures. That is, whereas the time course
of their processing might be the same, the contextual factors for comput-
ing generalized conversational implicatures are diﬀerent from the factors for
computing scalar implicatures. The findings support contextualist views of
conversational implicatures. The inference does not automatically occur in
the cases discussed. However, they can still be considered the default or even
mandatory under certain circumstances, overt contrast being one of them.
The results of the third study reported in section 3.2.3. suggest that con-
trastive focus is one key factor in creating a mandatory implicature. Another
factor is including a sentence which is marking closure of the discourse. The
sentence without the trigger was unacceptable in contexts with contrastive
focus and a wrap-up sentence. The sentence with the trigger was less accept-
able than a sentence containing negation. This is surprising from the point
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of view of Maximize Presupposition. It is expected under Obligatory Implica-
tures. Whereas the sentence with "too" satisfied Maximize Presupposition, it
also had to cancel an implicature. This cancellation decreased the acceptabil-
ity of the discourse as a whole. Since no implicature had to be canceled with
"too" in the study reported in 3.2.2. no decrease in acceptability could be
measured. This diﬀerence of acceptability cannot be explained by Maximize
Presupposition. It furthermore fails to explain why the sentence with negation
was not perceived as odd due to a missing trigger inference.
In sum, the results thus support the analysis of Obligatory Implicatures for the
obligatory insertion of the additive.
Taken together, the data suggest the following picture for the circumstances
under which exhaustivity implicatures arise in simple aﬃrmative sentences. A
sentence like in (41-b.) is obligatorily exhaustified when "Bill" is understood
as contrastive to "John".
(42) Who came to the party?
a. John came.
b. Bill came.
The LF yielding this interpretation is given in (43).
(43)
EXH
C<<s,t>,t>
< s, t >
s C VP
BillF came
In order to explain under which circumstances this LF is chosen for the in-
terpretation of (42-b.) one has to go through the key properties of a focus
semantics according to Rooth (1996) again. The following three assumptions
are important for the interpretation of focus:
1. On the level of proposition focus introduces a free variable C which is
restricted by the following constraint: C ⇢ [[ VP ]]F
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2. The semantic value of every phrase   is a discourse object which can
function as an antecedent for C
3. If [[ ]]O 2 [[↵]]F holds, then   can function as an antecedent for the
variable C which is introduced by focus on the level of phrase ↵
Focus interpretation is conceptually distinct from assigning a value to the
free variable. Both questions and contrastive phrases are appropriate an-
tecedents for assigning C a value (Rooth 1996). The constraints in (44) and
(45) have to hold in order for contrastive phrases or questions to be antecedents
for focus.
(44) Contrasting phrases. Construe a phrase ↵ as contrasting with a
phrase  , if [[ ]]O 2 [[↵]]F .
(45) Question-Answer-Congruence. [[Q]]O ⇢ [[↵]]F
Given these premises, the assumption is that the sentence in (46-b.) is am-
biguous. There are two diﬀerent intonation contours related with two diﬀerent
foci and interpretations.
(46) Who came to the party?
a. John came.
b. BillF came.
The first option is that the question is the antecedent for focus. The free
variable introduced by focus receives as the value the QUD, see (47-c.). The
QUD has to fulfill question-answer-congruence. The corresponding intonation
is in accordance with simple information focus.
(47) Option A
a. Who came?
b. BillF came.
c. g(7) = QUD =  p.9x[p=  w.person(w)(x) & x came to the party
in w ]
Exhaustifying is optional, see the LF in (49). The interpretation of (48) is
given in (49-a.). The optional implicature of the sentence is given in (49-b).
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(48)
QUD7
Who came
(EXH)
C7
< s, t >
s C
VP
JohnF came
(49) [[ Bill came to the party ]]
a.  w.Bill came to the party in w
b. 8p [p 2 [ q.9x.q =  w.person(x)(w) & came-to-the-party(x)(w)]
&  w.Bill came to the party ; p ! ¬p(w)]
With this reading there is not necessarily a contradiction with a context where
it is established that someone else besides Bill came since exhaustification is
not mandatory.
The second option is that "Bill" in (50-b.) is carrying contrastive focus. This
makes the contrastive phrase10 "John came" the appropriate antecedent for
the free variable C, see (50-c.).
(50) Option B
a. John came.
b. BillCF came.
c. g(6) =  p. p= w. John came to the party in w.
In this case, exhaustification is assumed to be obligatory. The relevant LF and
its interpretation are given in (51) and (52).
(51)
ConP6
John came
EXH
C6
< s, t >
s C
VP
BillF came
10Abbreviated as ConP in the tree below
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(52) EXH(C)([[ Bill came to the party ]]) , [Bill came to the party](w)
& 8p [p 2 [ q.q =  w. John came to the party in w] ! ¬p(w)]
With this second reading, there is necessarily a contradiction with the context.
Like for other cases of variable assignment, the closeness of the variable to
the antecedent plays a role. Taking the immediately preceding sentences as a
reference is preferred. This is why the sentence is preferably read as contrastive
(exhaustively) if a contrastive phrases is the closest antecedent like in (42).
Which focus structure is invoked can only be manipulated by using auditory
stimuli. The first study presented in section 3.2.1. suggests that people prefer
information focus over contrastive focus.
It seems that in addition to contrastive focus, the notion of contrastive topics
is relevant for exhaustification. For the examples used in the first study there
was only one possibility to put focal stress (since there was only one discourse
new entity in the relevant sentence). For the more complex examples chosen
for the last study presented more than item could receive focal stress since
whole phrases were contrasted. A contrastive topic-focus contour was possible
(Constant 2014), like in the example in (53).
(53) Manuel ist nach Hause gekommen, hat eine BananeF gegessenCT , einen
TeeF getrunkenCT und sich vor den Fernseher gesetzt.
’Manuel came home, ate a banana, drank a cup of tea, and sat down
in front of the TV.’
It has been observed that in the presence of a contrastive topic focus is exhaus-
tified obligatorily (Krifka 1999, Saeboe 2004, Constant 2014). If something is
interpreted as a contrastive topic, a set of questions is generated in addition to
the of alternatives generated by focus, see the example in (54) (Büring 2015)
and its alternative sets in (54-b.) and (54-a.).
(54) SHECT wants to kick MEF out
a. F-Alternatives: the set of proposition "she wants to kick x out",
for some individual x = {She wants to kick me out, she wants to
kick her mother out,....}
b. CT-Alternatives: the set of question meanings "Who does y want
to kick out?", for some individual y = {Who does Peter want to
kick out, Who does Lisa want to kick out...}
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Two inferences are yielded by a sentence with this focus contour. The sentences
is interpreted exhaustively with respect to the F-alternatives ("she wants to
kick only me out"). In addition, there must be an open question in the CT al-
ternatives which has not been answered yet and the answer to which is distinct
from "she wants to kick me out". This first inference is called "Distinctiveness"
by Krifka and is repeated in (55).
(55) Distinctiveness: If [... TF .... CF ...] is a contrastive answer to a
question Q, then there is no alternative T’ of T such that the speaker
is willing to assert [...T’...C...] (Krifka 1999)
What (55) states is identical to saying that the sentence is interpreted ex-
haustively with respect to its focus alternatives. The second inference, or CT
interpretation rule (Büring 2015), is characterized in (56). The question must
still be relevant ("at-issue"), see (56-a.), the set of answers it denotes must be
independent of the ordinary value of the sentence (it cannot be an answer),
see (56-b.), and it must be retrievable from the context, see (56-c.).
(56) CT Interpretation Rule For a sentence SCT+F to be felicitous, there
must be at least one question meaning in SCT+F ’s value which is
a. currently pertinent, and Pertinence
b. logically independent of [[SCT+F ]]O and Independence
c. identifiable Identifiability
Given these assumptions, the relevant phrase "hat eine Banane gegessen" in
(53) has the LF in (57).
(57)
EXH C
< s, t >
s C VP
BananeF
VP
gegessenCT
The set of alternatives introduced are the ones in (58-a.) and [b.].
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(58) a. F-Alternatives: [ q.9x.q =  w.food(x)(w) & eat(x)(Manuel)(w)]
’the set of proposition of the form "Manuel ate x", for some x
(Manuel ate a banana, Manuel ate an apple...)’
b. CT-Alternatives: {[ q.9x[q =  w. food(x)(w) & eat(x)(Manuel)(w)]],
[ q.9x[q =  w.beverage(x)(w) & drink(x)(Manuel)(w)]], ...}
’the set of question meanings like "What did he P", for some
time P (What did Manuel eat, What did Manuel drink, What did
Manuel draw...)’
This is explains why the exhaustivity implicature of the sentence, given in (59),
was perceived as strong in the experiment. The presence of a contrastive topic
made exhaustification mandatory.
(59) a. Manuel ate a banana (w) & 8p [p in F-Alt & p 6=  w. Manuel
ate a banana in w ! ¬p(w)]
’Manuel only ate a banana.’
There are some open questions arising with this analysis. One regards the
generation of alternatives for contrastive topics. Constant (2014) oﬀers an
elegant solution to getting the relevant alternatives using compositional inter-
pretation. He makes use of Hamblin functional application to derive the set of
questions that contrastive topics have been argued to introduce. However, it
is unclear how the alternatives focus introduces can be "passed on" to be used
for pointwise functional application and at the same time be evaluated by an
exhaustivity operator. A way to explain this is to assume that diﬀerent layers
of meaning are involved. I will leave this question for further research. The
important upshot of the analysis is that both contrastive focus and contrastive
topics are relevant notions for obligatory exhaustification.
Chapter 4
Obligatory "again"
4.1 "Again" in aﬃrmative sentences
It has already been observed in the literature on Maximize Presupposition
that the presupposition trigger "again" is obligatory when its presupposition is
entailed by the context (Sauerland 2008a, Percus 2006, Chemla 2008). Leaving
out "again" in contexts in which its presupposition is satisfied will yield an
oddness eﬀect, see (1).
(1) a. John went to Norway last year.
b. #He went to Norway this year.
Whereas Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures agree on the
fact that (1-a.) is odd they diﬀer with respect to the explanation for why it is.
Accounts working withMaximize Presupposition assume that the principle has
been violated in (1-b.). Since the speaker could have uttered the presupposi-
tionally stronger alternative with "again" in (2) the hearer assumes that the
speaker believes its presupposition to be false. The presupposition that John
went to Norway at a contextually given time before this year is given in the
interpretation of (2) in (2-a.).
(2) He went to Norway this year, again.
a. [[[John went to Norway againt1 ] this year ]] =  w: John went to
Norway in w at g(1) & g(1)<this year. Joe went to Norway this
year in w.
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In a context like (2), the contextually relevant time is "last year". The as-
signment function thus assigns the value "last year" to the index of the covert
time variable "again" comes with:
(3) [[[John went to Norway againt1 ] this year ]] = w: John went to Norway
in w last year. Joe went to Norway this year in w.
Since the hearer assumes the presupposition of (3) to be false when hearing
the presuppositionally weaker (1-b), the following inference arises according to
Maximize Presupposition.
(4) ¬ John went to Norway in w last year.
This inference of (1-b) clearly contradicts the context in (1-a) and thus the
whole sentence results in oddness.
The Obligatory Implicature approach proposes that (1-b) is odd due to its
exhaustivity implicature. The assumption is that (1-b) carries focus on "this
year" since it is the only discourse new information in the context in (1-a).
This obligatory focus triggers exhaustification of the QUD "When did John
go to Norway?". This exhaustification will yield the result that "this year" is
the only year where John went to Norway, see (5), thereby contradicting what
was asserted by the first sentence.
(5) [[ EXH ]]([[ When did John go to Norway ]])([[ John went to Norway this
year]]) (w) , [John was in Norway this year](w) &
8q [ q 2 [ p.9t[p=  w [time(t)(w) & John was in Norway at t in w] ] ]
&  w.John was in Norway this year ; q ! ¬ q(w) ]
4.2 Again under negation
4.2.1 Idea and predictions
Given the diﬀerent explanations the two theories provide for (1-b), they also
diﬀer in their empirical predictions for the example with negation in (6-b.).
Whereas Maximize Presupposition predicts the sentence in (6-b.) to be as
degraded as (1-b), Obligatory Implicatures predicts (6-b.) to be acceptable as
opposed to (1-b).
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(6) a. John went to Norway last year.
b. He did not go to Norway this year.
For Maximize Presupposition the explanation for why (6-b.) should be de-
graded remains the same as before. The sentence has a presuppositionally
stronger competitor with "again" which has not been used, see (7). Thus, the
speaker has to believe the presupposition of (6-b.) (given in (7-a.)) to be false,
i.e. that John did not go to Norway at a time preceding this year, see (7-b.).
This, as in the aﬃrmative case before, should yield a contradiction with (6-a.).
(7) He did not go to Norway this year, again.
a. [[ not [ [John did go to Norway againt1 ] this year] ]] = w: John
went to Norway in w last year. Joe did not go to Norway this year
in w.
b. ¬ John went to Norway in w last year.
Obligatory Implicatures predicts that the status of (6-b) is diﬀerent from the
one of (1-b). The assumption behind this prediction is that the QUD that is
exhaustified changes with negation. The implicature resulting from exhausti-
fying this QUD does not yield a contradiction anymore. As was discussed for
"too" in the last chapter, there are two syntactic positions for the exhaustivity
operator in (6-b), below and above negation. The LF where the exhaustivity
operator has scope over negation is given in (8).
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(8)
QUD3
When John not g.t.N.
(EXH)
C3
< s, t >
s C
< s, t >
not VP
NP
John<e>
VP
VP<e,t>
went
AdvP
t.N.
AdvP
this yearF
The exhaustification strategy does not result in a contradiction, see the inter-
pretation of (8) in (9).
(9) [[ EXH ]]([[ When was John not in Norway ]])([[ John was not in Norway
this year ]])(w) , [John was not in Norway this year](w) &
8q [ q 2 [ p.9t.p=  w [time(t)(w) & John was not in Norway at t in
w] ] &  w.John was not in Norway this year ; q ] ! ¬ q(w)
’This year was the only time John did not go to Norway’
If focus instead falls on negation, the QUD becomes a polar question of the
form "Did Peter go to Norway this year?". Exhaustifying the sentence with
respect to this question, does not result in a contradiction either, see (10).
(10) [[ EXH ]]([[Did John go to Norway this year]]w)([[John did not go to
Norway this year]])(w) , [John did not go to Norway this year](w) &
8q [q 2 [ p.p =  w. John was not in Norway this year in w_p =
 w.John was in Norway this year in w] and John did not go to Norway
this year ; q ! ¬q(w) ]
’John did not go to Norway this year’
The LF where negation has scope over the exhaustivity operator represents an
interpretation the sentence does not have, see the tree in (11) and its interpre-
tation in (12).
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(11)
QUD3
When John g.t.N.
not
(EXH)
C3
< s, t >
s C VP
NP
John
VP
VP
went
AdvP
t.N.
AdvP
this yearF
(12) [[ NOT ]] ([[ EXH ]]([[ When was John in Norway ]])([[John was in Nor-
way this year ]])(w)) ,
¬ [ [John was in Norway this year](w) & 8q [ q 2 [ p.9t[p=  w
[time(t)(w) & John was in Norway at t in w] ] ] &  w.John was in
Norway this year ; q ! ¬q(w) ] ]
# ’It is not the case that only this year John went to Norway’
As for the case with "too" and negation discussed in the last chapter, this
LF should be ruled out since it yields an unattested reading. One reason to
dismiss it is to assume that a covert intervention eﬀect occurs which disallows
association of the exhaustivity operator with a focus across negation. How-
ever, under this assumption the exhaustivity operator is not flexible enough to
move across negation and directly c-command its focus. Even if the explana-
tion for why this LF is not available is another one, the fact remains that this
reading does not exist. The reading there negation has low scope does exist.
However, it does not result in a contradiction with a context which establishes
that John went to Norway before this year. Accordingly, Obligatory Implica-
tures does not predict the trigger to be obligatory. Its insertion depends on an
exhaustivity implicature which contradicts the context. Such an exhaustivity
implicature does not arise with negation.
To test the diﬀerent predictions of Obligatory Implicatures and Maximize Pre-
supposition, an oﬀ-line rating study on "again" in aﬃrmative sentence and
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under negation was conducted.
There were two main goals of the experiment. First, the study tested whether
"again" is obligatory in simple aﬃrmative sentences. Second, it tested whether
"again" is obligatory under negation. The two theories introduced in the
beginning do not diﬀer with regard to the predictions for simple aﬃrmative
sentences. Both predict that "again" is obligatory in aﬃrmatives when its pre-
supposition is given in the context. Obligatory Implicatures but not Maximize
Presupposition predicts that "again" is not obligatory in negated sentences
when its presupposition is given in the context. This is because of the assump-
tion of Obligatory Implicatures that exhaustification of a negated sentence does
not lead to a contradiction in contexts where the presupposition of "again" is
verified.
4.2.2 Design and material
For the material, contexts were created that introduced the general setting
and two protagonists, one of which about to make an utterance, see (13). The
utterance consisted of two sentences which served as the target sentences for
the study. The first sentence always satisfied the presupposition of “again”, see
(14). The second target appeared in four diﬀerent conditions, see (14-a.-d.).
(13) Sonja und Nadine sind Kollegen. Sie unterhalten sich über Freizeitak-
tivitäten, die sie letzte Woche gemeinsam unternommen haben. Sonja
sagt:
’Sonja and Nadine are colleagues. They are talking about activities
they did together last week. Sonja says:’
(14) Wir waren am Dienstag schwimmen.
’We went swimming on Tuesay.’
a. Am Freitag waren wir wieder schwimmen.
’We went swimming on Friday, again.’ (-negation,+again)
b. Am Freitag waren wir schwimmen.
’We went swimming on Friday.’ (-negation,-again)
c. Am Freitag war wir nicht wieder schwimmen.
’We did not go swimming on Friday, again.’ (+negation, +again)
d. Am Freitag waren wir nicht schwimmen.
’We did not go swimming on Friday.’ (+negation,-again)
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A 2x2 design was used for the study which crossed the two factors again and
negation. The second target sentence thus appeared in one of the following
four conditions: it appeared with "wieder" ("again") but without negation
(14-a.), without "wieder" and without negation (14-b.), with "wieder" and
with negation (14-c.), or with negation and without "wieder" (14-d.). Six
items were created for each condition, making for 24 experimental items in
total. In addition the study contained 48 filler items.
4.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was created using the free software OnExp (OnExp 1.2 User
Manual). 28 native speakers of German participated in the experiment. They
did the experiment online, on their own computer, after receiving a link to
the experiment. People were asked to read the context carefully and then
read the two target sentences, always uttered by a person appearing in the
context. The target sentences were presented separately in a gray box on the
computer screen. Participants were then instructed to judge the second target
sentence in the given context on an acceptability rating scale ranging from 1 to
5 (5 meaning the sentence is completely acceptable). They were advised that
"acceptable" meant that the sentence made sense in the context and could be
uttered by a native speaker like that.
4.2.4 Results
Analyses were carried out using the R programming language (R Develop-
ment Core Team) as linear mixed eﬀect models (Baayen, Davidson, and Bates
2008), using the program lmer (Bates 2005). The fixed factors were again
(present/absent) and negation (present/absent). Random factors were sub-
jects and items. Additionally, models with random slopes for both subjects
and items were calculated. When an ANOVA revealed a significant diﬀerence
between the models, the more complex one was chosen.
A significant interaction was found between the factors again and negation
(p<.01). Furthermore, highly significant simple and main eﬀects were found
for both factors (all p<.01). Whereas without negation the acceptability of the
sentence significantly increased with the insertion of “again” (M=1,76 without
"again" and M=3.64 with "again"), it decreased the acceptability of sentences
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with negation (M=3.18 without "again" and M=2,8 with "again"). The results
are summarized in figure 4.1 below.
Figure 4.1: Mean acceptability of sentences with "again" and with negation,
with "again" and without negation, without "again" and without negation,
without "again" and with negation
4.2.5 Discussion
The predictions of both theories are borne out regarding "again" in aﬃrmative
sentences. In contexts where its presupposition is fulfilled, leaving out "again"
decreases the acceptability of sentences significantly. This result alone is not
revealing with regard to the question what kind of inference is responsible for
this decrease in acceptability. The most important result in that respect is
the interaction that was found between insertion of "again" and insertion of
negation. Crucially, the acceptability of sentences decreases with the insertion
of "again" when there was negation in the sentence. This is very surprising
from the viewpoint of theories exploiting the maxim Maximize Presupposition.
The findings rather speak in favor of an analysis for the obligatory insertion
of "again" that makes use of exhaustivity implicatures. The results meet the
prediction of Obligatory Implicatures that leaving out the trigger in negated
sentences does not lead to the same oddness as leaving out "again" in simple
aﬃrmative sentences. Moreover, Obligatory Implicatures is able to explain why
inserting "again" into the negated sentence even decreases its acceptability.
The critical sentences were such that the second target had to have focus on
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the temporal phrase (which was an adverbial or prepositional phrase like "on
Friday"). Thereby the QUD evoked by the sentences was always of the type
"When did we P?" according to Obligatory Implicatures, see (15).
(15) [[ When did we P ]] =  p.9t[p = w.[time(t)(w) & P(speakers)(t)(w)]]
The assumption is that with negation the QUD changes do either a polar
question "Did we do Q at t?" or the question "When did we not do Q?". see
(16-a.) and (16-b.).
(16) a. [[ Did we P or not P]]t =
 p.p = w[P(speakers)(t)(w)]_ p= w [ ¬P(speakers)(t)(w)]]
b. [[ When did we not P ]]t =
 p.9t[p = w.time(t)(w) & ¬P(speakers)(t)(w) ]
Exhaustification of an answer to neither of these question yields a contradic-
tion with a context that entails that we did P at a previous time. The fact
that the trigger does not need to be inserted into sentences that answer these
questions is thus explained by Obligatory Implicatures.
The fact that sentences are even degraded when they contain both negation
and "again" is also explained with the assumptions of Obligatory Implicatures.
"Again" is an anaphoric trigger making reference to a specific time (see Beck
2007, Tiemann 2014). Its insertion is a strong indication that the QUD is of
the type "When did we P?". Inserting negation, however, indicates that the
QUD is of the form in (16-a.) to (16-b.). Thus, there are two diﬀerent linguis-
tic cues as to what QUD the second target sentence is supposed to answer (or
what is at issue). Inserting both negation and "again" is therefore a pragmat-
ically dispreferred strategy.
It should be mentioned that the main eﬀect of negation can be explained along
the same lines. Only inserting negation was slightly (but still significantly) less
acceptable than only inserting "again". There are two possible explanations in
line with the Obligatory Implicatures theory. First, it is possible that chang-
ing the QUD within one utterance is pragmatically dispreferred. Second, it
is possible that within this context already the first sentence was (strongly)
exhaustified with respect to the question "When did we P?" By hearing and
exhaustifying that Sonja and Nadine went swimming on Tuesday the reader
knows that they did not go swimming on any other day of the week. This
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makes the next utterance with negation simply redundant.
Another possibility to consider is that the temporal phrase carries information
focus, whereas negation carries contrastive focus (Büring 2003, Büring 1997),
as in the example in (17).
(17)
EXH C
< s, t >
s C
NOTCT
VP
TuesdayF
VP
we went swimming
A set of questions of the form "Did we go swimming at t or not?" is introduced
for a contextually given set of relevant points in time by contrastive focus, see
(18-b.). In addition a set of propositions of the form "when did we not go
swimming" is introduced by focus, see (18-a.).
(18) a. F-Alternatives: the set of proposition of the form  p.9t[p =
 w.time(t)(w) & ¬swimming (speakers)(t)(w) ]
{ We did not go swimming on Tuesday, we did not go swimming
on Friday, ... }
b. CT-Alternatives: the set of questions of the form  p.p = w.swimming
(speakers)(t)(w)]_ p= w.¬swimming(speakers)(t)(w)]]
{ Did we go swimming on Tuesday, did we go swimming on
Wednesday, ... }
Exhaustifying the sentence with respect to the focus alternatives results in the
implicature that we only did not go swimming on Tuesday, see (19).
(19) We did not go swimming on Tuesday (w) & 8p [p in F-Alt & p 6= [ w.
We did not go swimming at Tuesday in w] ! ¬p(w)]
At the same time an inference arises through the presence of contrastive focus
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that there is one question in the CT-Alternatives which has not been answered
and whose answer is distinct from the ordinary value of the sentence. Together
with the implicature in (19) this suggest that there is at least one day on which
we went swimming. Since this is given in the context, this kind of interpre-
tation only again could be considered redundant but not contradictory. This
analysis thus does not speak against the assumption that in the presence of
contrastive focus obligatory exhaustification of information focus is triggered.
This obligatory exhaustification does not yield a contradiction and insertion
of the trigger is not assumed to be obligatory under Obligatory Implicatures.
4.2.6 Summary
The study overall supports the view of Obligatory Implicatures that the in-
sertion of "again" should follow from the independently needed mechanism of
exhaustification. The general pragmatic principle Maximize Presupposition is
not suited for explaining the phenomenon. It would predict that "again" is
obligatory under negation. The facts about "again" under negation also sup-
port the claim that "again" and "too" pattern alike and that their behavior
should be explained by assuming the same underlying mechanism. To further
support this view, additional evidence for the influence of the presence of a
question on the insertion "again" has to be found.

Chapter 5
Obligatory Factives - Knowledge
versus Belief
Another contrast that has received attention in the literature on Maximize
Presupposition is the one between the embedding verbs "know" and "believe".
The following, purely theoretical, chapter is dedicated to this contrast and
how it is explained by the two diﬀerent theories introduced in chapter 2. As
opposed to "too" and "again", the trigger "know" has been argued to have a
non-presuppositional lexical alternative. The main question addressed is thus
whether the insertion of "know" depends on information structural factors, as
predicted by Obligatory Implicatures or should be subsumed under a principle
working with lexical competition on the level of presupposition, as Maximize
Presupposition. In section 5.1. I will discuss the meaning of "know" and how
it is distinct from the meaning of the embedding verb "believe". I will review
and adopt an approach to "know" which sees its presuppositions just as an
entailment. In section 5.2. I will show how this approach makes the right
predictions for the insertion of "know" under negation. In section 5.2. I will
furthermore argue, that the inferences from using "believe" are implicatures
which become weaker or stronger with the lexical competition introduced in
the context. They are thereby not dependent on the ("weak") presupposition
of "know".
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5.1 The meaning of "know"
The factive verb "know" presupposes the truth of its complement, see (2-a.).
As a result, the presupposition of (1-b.) is that Peter has a sister. The ob-
servation is that "know" is obligatory when its presupposition is entailed by
the context. The verb "believe" has the same assertion as "know", see (2-b.),
but lacks its presupposition. The sentences with "believe" is unacceptable in
a context where its complement is known to be true, see (1-a.).
(1) Peter has a sister.
a. John # believes that Peter has a sister.
b. John knows that Peter has a sister.
(2) a. [[ know ]]g =  w. p. x: p(w). BELIEF(p)(x)(w)
b. [[ believe ]]g =  w. p. x. BELIEF(p)(x)(w)
c. [[ BELIEF ]]g =  p. x.  w. 8w’ [w’ is compatible with x’s beliefs
in w ! p(w’)]
Accounts working withMaximize Presupposition explain this contrast by claim-
ing that "believe" and "know" are on a scale of presuppositional strength,
where "know" is the strongest item on the scale. Using (2-a.) in a context like
(2), where the presupposition of "know" is fulfilled is degraded since it violates
Maximize Presupposition.
For Obligatory Implicatures, the explanation used for the obligatory occurrence
of "too" and "again" can be extended in a straightforward way to the data
surrounding "know". The idea is that "know" is inserted obligatorily when the
implicature that "believe" triggers contradicts the context. Unlike Maximize
Presupposition approaches the Obligatory Implicature account furthermore as-
sumes that this implicature is the result of exhaustification of the QUD, not a
lexical scale. I will show and argue that, even though it is plausible in many
contexts that "know" and "believe" are relevant alternatives, they do not have
to be.
As for the cases before, the QUD is assumed to be retrieved from focus. For
the two sentences in (2-a.) and (2-b.) the most natural place to put focus is on
the verbs "believe" and "know", respectively. This is because John’s attitude
towards the proposition in (2) is the only discourse new information and thus
seems to be at issue. More concretely, the QUD with respect to which the
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sentence (2-a.) is mandatorily exhaustified is hence "What is the R such that
John R that Peter has a sister?", where R is a propositional attitude. The
result of this exhaustification is given in (3) below.
(3) [[ EXH ]]([[ What is the R John R Peter has a sister ]])([[ John believes
Peter has a sister ]]) ,
John believes Peter has a sister(w) & 8q[ q 2 [ p.9R.PropAtt(R)(w)[p
=  w. John R Peter has a sister in w] ] &  w.John believes Peter has
a sister ; q ! ¬q(w)]
The R that is asked for, however, is assumed to be restricted to propositional
attitudes that are salient (and relevant) alternatives to "believe" in the con-
text. Without further contextual information, the most salient alternative to
"believe" is "know" since both express a degree of certainty with regard to
the proposition that follows. Under this assumption the question set that is
exhaustified only contains "John knows that Peter has a sister" and "John
believes that Peter has a sister". Approaches to obligatory triggers that make
use of Maximize Presupposition would assume that these two propositions
are identical with respect to their assertion. Exhaustifying the sentence with
"believe" should hence not exclude the sentence with "know" since it cannot
distinguish between them based on assertive strength. However, there is some
evidence that the competition and distinction between "know" and "believe"
is not just based on the presupposition of "know".
First, when putting an overt only in the sentence with "believe" it can be seen
that the inference arises that the sentence with "know" is not true. However,
the presupposition of "know" does not project in this case.
(4) John only believes that Peter has a sister, he does not know it.
(4) does not presuppose that Peter has a sister. What is negated in the second
conjunct is not the assertion since this would yield a contradiction with the
first conjunct. However, it also not the presupposition that is negated, i.e. as
a case of local accommodation. If the presupposition of the second conjunct
in (4) was accommodated locally then the result would be the one (5).
(5) ¬ (Peter has a sister & believe(John)(Peter has a sister))
"It is not the case that Peter has a sister and John believes it."
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Negation would have access to both assertion and presupposition with local
accommodation. The interpretation one would get for (5) is one where Peter
does not have a sister. This is clearly not what (4) states.
These facts suggest that sentences with "know" and "believe" are not equally
informative. The sentence in (5) can only be used both in contexts where it
is still at-issue whether Peter has a sister or not. What is negated is just that
John does not have strong evidence to believe that Peter has a sister.
These data are consistent with recent approaches to the meaning of "know"
where it is considered to be a so called "soft" trigger whose presupposition
only arises (and projects) in certain contexts (Abusch 2002, Simons et al.
2011, Abrusan 2011, Romoli 2011). Abusch (2002) calls the presuppositions of
soft triggers "pragmatic" because of their sensitivity to contextual information,
especially the presence of alternatives. She presents similar data as the one in
(4) above to argue that the presupposition of "know" is suspendable (as op-
posed to the semantic presuppositions of hard triggers like "too" and "again")
when contrasted with weaker embedding verbs like "suspect", compare (6).
(6) John suspects Mary is having an aﬀair, he does not know it. (Abusch
2002, p.2)
The same is predicted by Simons et al. (2011) who claim that the presuppo-
sition of "know" can only project if its complement is not at issue. It is very
clear that it is still at issue whether Mary is having an aﬀair in (6). Thus,
the presupposition of "know" does not project. It seems that in competition
with "believe" (and other non-presuppositional propositional attitude verbs) -
that is when the QUD is about a propositional attitude - the presupposition
of "know" is not what defines the contrast between the verbs. Rather it seems
that it is about the degree of certainty the attitude verbs express, where using
"know" suggest having the highest degree of certainty possible.
The empirical picture that arises poses a problem for Maximize Presupposi-
tion. If "know" loses its presuppositional status in competition with other
propositional attitude verbs, Maximize Presupposition is unfit to explain the
oddness of "believe"-sentences in contexts where the presupposition of "know"
is fulfilled.
The facts rather align with a recent proposal made by Romoli (2011) in combi-
nation with Obligatory Implicatures. Romoli (2011) assumes that the comple-
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ment of "know" in unembedded contexts should be just seen as an entailment,
not a presupposition (see also Abrusan 2011)1. In addition to p being an en-
tailment to know p, Romoli (2011) argues, {know p, p} form a scale of which
know p is the strongest element. It entails its alternative (p) in unembedded
sentences. In embedded contexts it is an implicature. This also explains why
the presupposition of "know" sometimes does not to project through all types
of embedding, for example if-clauses, as in (7) below. Projection is a question
of scope of the exhaustivity operator. In this case the implicature is arising
locally, below the if-clause, and is subsequently canceled.
(7) Mary might not be in NY but if Peter knows that she is he will definitely
meet her.
I will adopt the view that the complement of "know" is an entailment in
simple aﬃrmative sentences and assume that know p = believe p ^ p 2. This
still accounts for the fact that the implicature arising from the use of "know"
projects through negation. The sentence in (8) would have the alternative
set in (8-a.). Moreover, the scale is reversed under negation, making ¬p the
stronger alternative which is negated. The result is in (8-b.).
(8) John does not know that Peter has a sister.
a. Alt= { ¬(P has a sister(w) & 8 w’ [w’ is compatible with what x
believes in w] ! P has a sister(w’)), ¬ P has a sister (w) }
b. Exh(A)(John does not know that Peter has a sister) = ¬(P has a
sister(w) & 8 w’ [w’ is compatible with what x believes in w] ! P
has a sister(w’)) & ¬¬ P has a sister (w)
c. "It is not the case that Peter has a sister and John believes it and
Peter has a sister"
"Peter has a sister and John does not believe it."
1However, in Abrusan’s proposal the complement of "know" is an entailment that can
turn into a presupposition via a mechanism that makes use of topic situations.
2I am aware that this is a serious simplification. A more accurate semantics of "know"
would include the evidence the speaker has for believing a certain proposition. However,
for the argument put forward here these details are not crucial. What is important is that
whatever the semantic component is that makes "know" stronger it seems to be operative at
the level of assertion. Furthermore, its negation is what makes the sentence with "believe"
odd when a proposition is in fact known to be true
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5.2 "Know" under negation
It is now possible to oﬀer a more detailed explanation for why "know" is not
obligatory under negation, see (9).
(9) Peter has a sister.
a. John does not believe it.
Parallel to the examples with "too" and "again", the exhaustivity operator
can take scope over negation and below it. Then the operator is scoping over
negation the QUD changes to "What is the R such that John does not R Peter
has a sister?", see (10).
(10)
QUD3
What J not R P has a sister
(EXH)
C3
< s, t >
s C not VP
NP
John
VP
believesF
CP
P has a sister
If, again, the question set is supposed to be restricted to salient alternatives
which in this case are "John does not believe that Peter has a sister" and
"John does not know that Peter has a sister" then exhaustifying the sentence
in (10-b.) with respect to this question set will not generate an implicature at
all. "John does not believe p" is the stronger alternative now and entails "John
does not know p" ; and the exhaustivity operator can only exclude alternatives
that are not entailed. Under the present proposal the sentence with "know"
is only obligatory when the sentence with "believe" has an implicature that
contradicts the context. It is hence predicted that the sentence containing
negation should not be odd and the insertion of "know" not obligatory. The
QUD might once more also change to a polar question ("Does John believe
Peter has a sister or not?"). Exhaustifying (10-a.) with respect to this question
will not lead to a contradiction with the context in (10), either, see (11).
131
(11) [[ EXH ]]([[ Does John believe or not that Peter has a sister ]])([[ John
does not believe Peter has a sister ]])(w) $ [John does not believe
Peter has a sister](w) &
8q [q 2 [ p.p =  w. John believes Peter has a sister in w_p =  w.John
does not believe Peter has a sister in w] and John does not believe Peter
has a sister ; q ! ¬q(w) ]
’John does not believe Peter has a sister’
The second option, once more, is that negation has scope over the exhaustivity
operator as in the LF in (12).
(12)
QUD3
What J R P has a sister
not
(EXH)
C3
< s, t >
s C VP
NP
John
VP
believesF
CP
P has a sister
This LF has the interpretation in (13). It says that John not only believes
that Peter has a sister.
(13) [[ NOT ]] ([[ EXH ]]([[ What R John Peter has a sister ]]w)([[ John be-
lieves Peter has a sister ]])(w)) ,
¬ John believes Peter has a sister(w) & 8q [ q 2 [ p.9R.PropAtt(R)(w).[p
=  w. John R Peter has a sister in w] ] &  w.John believes Peter has
a sister ; q ! ¬ q(w) ]
# ’It is not the case that John only believes Peter has a sister’
As opposed to the cases with "again" and "too", this reading is not completely
out but requires that the implicatures is immediately made explicit, as in (14).
(14) John does not believe Peter has a sister, he knows it.
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As discussed by Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2011), this reading is a special
case which requires strong focus on "believe" and a special form of meta-
linguistic negation. It is not easily available without the continuation in (14).
Most importantly, the implicature it yields in this case is not contradictory
to the fact that Peter has a sister. Thus, the insertion of the trigger is not
predicted by Obligatory Implicatures in this scenario, either.
Maximize Presupposition would predict (9-a) to have the stronger competitor
with "know" in (15-a.), which has the interpretation in (15-b.) The sentence
in (9-a) should yield the missing trigger inference in (15-c.) and should be
contradictory to the context.
(15) Peter has a sister.
a. John does not know that Peter has a sister.
b. [[ John not know Peter has a sister ]]g =  w: Peter has a sister in
w. BELIEF(Peter has a sister)(Peter)(w)
c. ¬ Peter has a sister in w
This prediction is not borne out. However, as Chemla 2008 notes the sen-
tence in (15-a.) and (9-a) are actually not equivalent on the level of assertion
due to the fact that "believe" is a neg-raising verb whereas "know" is not.
That is, (14-a.) translates to the stronger (16-a.), whereas (15-a.) stays the
weaker (16-b.) on the level of assertion.
(16) a. believe(J)(¬Peter has a sister)
b. ¬believe(J)(Peter has a sister)
Chemla (2008) notes that it would be necessary to have the alternatives in
(17-a.) and (17-b.) for Maximize Presupposition to make the right prediction
that (17-a.) can have the inference in (17-c.).
(17) a. John does not believe that Peter has a sister.
b. John knows that Peter does not have a sister.
c. Inference: Peter has a sister.
This requires the stipulation that "alternatives should not be thought of as
syntactic objects" (Chemla 2008, p.20). The issue of neg-raising does not arise
with the alternative proposal presented. It is fixed by the QUD whether the
relevant alternatives are propositional attitudes John has towards Peter having
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a sister or Peter not having a sister. What kind of inference arises with the use
of "believe" (Peter has a sister or Peter does not have a sister) thus depends
on the context. For example, (18-a.) will be fine in the context C in (18)
where Peter has a sister and odd in a context C’ where Peter does not have
one3. This is because an inference arises that Peter has a sister by the use of
"believe" in (18-a.), see the derivation in (18-a.)to (18-d.). The reverse holds
for the sentence "John believes that Peter has a sister" as will be shown below.
(18) C: Peter has a sister.
C’: Peter does not have a sister.
a. p= John believes Peter does not have a sister.
b. Q= 8 w’[w’ is compatible with what x believes in w] ! (¬P has
a sister)(w’), 8 w’[w’ is compatible with what x believes in w] !
(¬P has a sister)(w’) & (¬P has a sister)(w)}
c. Exh(Q)(p) = 8 w’[w’ is compatible with what x believes in w]
! (¬P has a sister)(w’) & ¬ (8 w’[w’ is compatible with what x
believes in w] ! (¬P has a sister)(w’) & (¬P has a sister)(w))
d. = "John believes Peter does not have a sister and it is not the
case that John believes that Peter does not have a sister and Peter
does not have a sister"
"John believes Peter does not have a sister and Peter has a sister"
If negation has scope over the attitude verb, then the QUD, as mentioned
before, changes to a polar question or to a question about what attitudes
John does not have towards a proposition. No inference arises that could
contradict the context since now the scale is reversed with "not believe" being
the strongest alternative. Thus, (19-a.) is acceptable in both contexts in (19).
(19) C: Peter does not have a sister.
C’: Peter has a sister.
a. John does not believe Peter has a sister.
3The sentence becomes better with an additive: "John glaubt auch, dass Peter keine
Schwester hat"/"John also believes that Peter does not have a sister". However, in this case
it is presupposed that "Peter does not have a sister is true" and the inference cannot arise
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5.3 Obligatory implicatures of "believe"
The proposition with "know" is more informative than the one with "believe"
according to these assumptions. The obligatory insertion of "know" can be
explained by exploiting the mechanism described above. The result of exhaus-
tifying the sentence that contains "believe" repeated in (20-a.) below with
respect to the restricted question set (for the alternative question "Does John
believe or know that Peter has a sister?") given in (20-b.) would be the one in
(20-c.).
(20) Peter has a sister. # John believes Peter has a sister.
a. John believes that Peter has a sister.
b. Q = { (8 w’ 2 BEL(J)(w) ! (P has a sister)(w’)), (8 w’ 2
BEL(J)(w) ! (Peter has a sister)(w’) & Peter has a sister(w)) }
c. EXH(Q)= (8 w’ 2 BEL(J)(w) ! (Peter has a sister)(w’)) and
¬ (8 w’ 2 BEL(J)(w) ! (Peter has a sister)(w’) & Peter has a
sister(w))! ¬ Peter has a sister (w).
"John knows Peter has a sister" is not entailed by "John believes that Peter
has a sister" under the assumptions made. Exhaustifying the latter sentence
will result in the implicature that the former sentence is false. When further
assuming that "know p" is equal to "believe p ^ p" this amounts to saying
that p is false since "believe p" is part of the assertion of (20) and cannot be
excluded. The oddness of (20) is hence predicted. The implicature of the sen-
tence, which is the result of mandatory exhaustive interpretation, contradicts
what is entailed by the context.
Another fact that speaks in favor of analyzing the inferences arising with "be-
lieve" sentences as a result from exhaustifying sentences with regard to alter-
natives generated by the QUD rather than lexical scales is that the inference
arising with "believe" crucially changes with the context. It has been show
above that, if the complement of "believe" is entailed by the context, a very
likely competitor to the "believe"- sentences is a sentence with "know". How-
ever, if it is not entailed by the context that the complement is true, then
"know" is not necessarily the relevant competitor. The sentences in (21-a.)
and (22-a.) have diﬀerent inferences due to the respective contexts they are
embedded in.
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(21) Are you sure you closed the windows?
a. I believe so.
(22) Do you think Paul married Sue?
a. I believe so.
In (21), the sentence with "believe" has the inference that the speaker is not
sure that s/he closed the windows. The sentence with "believe" has an infer-
ence which cannot be the result from competition with "know". Its presuppo-
sition is not fulfilled in the context. The inference is predicted to occur if it
is an implicature resulting from exhaustifying the QUD. This QUD is about
the degree of certainty regarding the truth of "I closed the windows". This
degree of certainty can be expressed by diﬀerent embedding verbs, in the cases
above "be sure that" and "believe". The scale evoked, which is also crucial for
establishing the QUD, is sketched in (23).
(23) { n. x is n% certain that p} = {x is 100% certain that p, x is 90%
certain that p, x is 80% certain that p ...}
The alternatives triggered by using propositional attitude verbs do stand in an
entailment relation with one another. This makes the implicatures arising from
exhaustification in the cases of attitude verbs scalar implicatures. Accordingly,
the question which is evoked by using embedding verbs should be the one in
(24).
(24) [[ How certain is x that p? ]] = [ p.9n[p = p is n-certain in w]]
The meaning of diﬀerent attitude verbs are associated with diﬀerent probabili-
ties on a probability scale. The relevant alternatives can be narrowed down by
context, however, as shown by (21) and (22). Since there is only one relevant
alternative in these contexts, contrastive focus should be evoked, which, as was
argued in chapter 3, makes the implicature obligatory. This seems to be the
right prediction since canceling the implicature in this case is odd, see (25).
(25) Are you sure you closed the windows?
a. ??I think so. In fact, I am sure.
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5.4 Conclusion
The data suggest that Maximize Presupposition is not the right principle to
account for the obligatory insertion of the factive verb "know". Especially the
fact that "know" is not obligatory under negation suggests that the inferences
arising when using "believe" instead of "know" are implicatures. This view is
supported by the observation that the strength of the inference changes with
context, more specifically the attitude verb "believe" is contrasted with. In
direct competition with "know", the presupposition of "know" furthermore
does not project. This speaks in favor of an analysis which treats the com-
plement of "know" as an entailment which is part of the lexical scale "know"
evokes. Rather than the presuppositional status it is the degree of certainty
that is expressed on the level of assertion by these attitude verbs which seems
to be the crucial and defining factor in their competition. Since the relevant
scale contains elements which stand in an entailment relation the implicatures
resulting from exhaustification should be considered scalar implicatures. The
oddness of "believe" in contexts where its complement is known to be true
is thus better explained by assuming it is the result of exhaustification of a -
potentially contextually restricted - ordered scale.
Chapter 6
Obligatory definites
The original case discussed to motivate the maxim Maximize Presupposition
(Heim 1991) is the obligatory use of definite determiners. Most of the empirical
predictions of the principle have been shown to work for the definite/indefinite
distinction. It is a shortcoming of recent approaches to obligatory presuppo-
sition triggers that they fail to observe that these data, especially regarding
negation, diﬀer significantly from the data observed for other presupposition
triggers. The last chapters have shown that the insertion of the triggers "too",
"again", and "know" is not obligatory under negation. Moreover, it has been
argued that their insertion depends on discourse level concerns, more specifi-
cally what kind of focus is introduced, contrastive or information focus. Section
6.1. of this chapter is dedicated to the singular definite. In section 6.1.2. I
will report an oﬀ-line study on its insertion under negation. The second half
of the chapter, 6.2., discusses the plural definite. Section 6.2.1. reports a
reading time study which tested the influence of discourse on the insertion of
the plural definite. The chapter will show that the empirical picture arising
for obligatory definites is significantly diﬀerent from the picture arising for the
obligatory triggers discussed in chapter 3 to 5.
6.1 The singular definite
6.1.1 Meaning of the definite determiner
In her original proposal ofMaximize Presupposition, Heim (1991) observes that
the following two sentences in (1) and (2) have the same assertion but diﬀer in
what they presuppose. Both assert the existence of a reading boy, see (1-a.)
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and (2-a.). However, (1) presupposes that there is a unique boy in the domain
of discourse (see (1-b.)) whereas (2) lacks this presupposition.
(1) The boy is reading.
a. Assertion: 9x[boy(x) & reading(x)]
b. PSP: 9x8y[boy(y) $ y=x ]
(2) A boy is reading.
a. Assertion: 9x[boy(x) & reading(x)]
The observation furthermore was that (1) has to be used when the presup-
position of the definite is fulfilled, whereas (2) will result in oddness in that
context. The example used to show this was (3).
(3) a. #A father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
b. The father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
The obligatory insertion of the definite determiner is something that follows
straightforwardly from Maximize Presupposition. The indefinite has the miss-
ing trigger inference that the presupposition of the definite does not hold. This
special inference has been called the “antiuniqueness” eﬀect of the indefinite.
It is responsible for the contrast between (3-a.) and (3-b.).
Trying to extend the explanation of Obligatory Implicatures to the above phe-
nomenon is less straightforward. The first problematic point for the theory as
it stands now is the unclear role of the QUD in the use of the indefinite and defi-
nite determiner. It seems that the sentences in (1) and (2) address are diﬀerent.
Whereas (1) answers a question about an individual like "Who is reading?",
(2) makes a quantitative statement like "how many boys are reading?". This
is expected under a standard analysis which treats definite NPs as individuals
of type <e> and indefinites as quantifiers of type <<et>,<<et>,t>> (Heim
and Kratzer 1998).
According to Obligatory Implicatures, sentences with an indefinite determiner
should be odd in contexts that fulfill the presupposition of the definite be-
cause they have an unwanted implicature resulting from the exhaustification
of a QUD. If we take sentences with indefinites to make a statement about
quantity (How many boys are reading?) the implicature of (2) would be that
exactly one boy is reading. This implicature is not, however, contradictory to
139
a context that verifies the presupposition of the definite counterpart "The boy
is reading" (that there is exactly one boy), see the derivation in (4).
(4) a. [[ How many boys are reading ]]=  p.9n[9x[p =  w.[boys(x)(w) &
reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=n]]]
b. [[ EXH ]]([[ How many boys are reading ]])( [[ A boy is reading ]]) ,
9x [ boy(x)(w) & reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=1]](w)&
8q[q2[ p.9n[9x[p= w.boys(x)(w) & reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=n]]]
&  w.9x[boy(x)(w)& reading(x)(w)& card(x)(w)=1];q! ¬q(w)]
’Exactly one boy is reading’
c. (There is exactly one boy and) exactly one boy is reading.
Since a contradiction arising from an unwanted exhaustivity implicature is the
reason for inserting the trigger according to Obligatory Implicatures, obligatory
insertion of the definite would not be predicted based on the implicature of
the indefinite in (4-a.). However, the data show very clearly that the definite
must be inserted if there is only one unique boy in the discourse. Moreover,
the definite is the only trigger that seems to be obligatory in embeddings, i.e.
under negation, in questions and if-clauses, see (5-a.) to (5-c.).
(5) a. If # a / the father of the victim did not arrive then we have to call
the mother.
b. Did # a / the father of the victim arrive?
c. #A / The father of the victim did not arrive.
This is unsurprising given what was just said. The definite does not scopally
interact with negation or other operators. No matter what QUD is triggered
with negation and what exhaustification strategy might be chosen to evaluate
it, the definite is not aﬀected. To show that the definite in fact diﬀers from
other triggers in this crucial aspect, a rating study was conducted that tested
the obligatory insertion of the German definite determiner in simple aﬃrmative
sentences and under negation. Before I move on to a possible extension of
Obligatory Implicatures to the singular definite this study will be reported in
the next section.
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6.1.2 The singular definite under negation
Design and Material
To substantiate the hypothesis that the definite determiner is obligatory under
negation empirically, an oﬄine study was conducted which was constructed
parallel to the one for "again" reported in chapter 4. Contexts were created
which satisfied the presupposition of the definite determiner. An example is
given in (6) below.
(6) Tina hat sich am Wochenende eine Wohnung angeschaut.
’Tina was looking at an apartment last weekend.’
Two factors were manipulated for the target items which were presented in
this context. First, to see whether the definite is really obligatory in this con-
text, the target either contained a definite or indefinite determiner (+/-def).
Second, to see whether negation had an influence on the obligatoriness of the
trigger the targets either contained negation or not (+/-neg). The study thus
had a two by two design crossing the factors negation and definiteness.
A sample item in all four conditions for the context in (6) above is given in
(7).
(7) a. Die Wohnung war sehr teuer. (+def, -neg)
’The apartment was expensive.’
b. Eine Wohnung war sehr teuer. (-def, -neg)
’An apartment was expensive.’
c. Die Wohnung war nicht sehr teuer. (+def,+neg)
’The apartment was not expensive.’
d. Eine Wohnung war nicht sehr teuer. (-def,+neg)
’An apartment was not expensive.’
Six items were created for each condition resulting in a total of 24 experimental
items. 24 German native speakers did the experiment online by following a
link. The experiment was programmed using the free software OnExp (OnExp
1.2 User Manual). The study had 48 filler items. Participants were first
presented with the context sentences and then with the target sentence in one
of the four conditions. They were asked to judge the acceptability of the last
sentence they saw on a scale from 1 to 7, where 7 was completely acceptable.
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Predictions
Maximize Presupposition straightforwardly predicts the definite determiner to
be obligatory both in aﬃrmative and negated sentences when its presupposi-
tion is met in the context. Using the indefinite should result in oddness in
these contexts, again for both negated and unnegated sentences, since missing
trigger inferences project. That is using the weaker (9) when the presupposi-
tion of the stronger (8) is fulfilled will lead to the inference in (10), that the
presupposition of (8) in (8-b.) is false.
(8) The boy is not reading.
a.  w. ¬reading(w)(◆x[boy(w)(x)])
b. 9x8y [boy(w)(y) $ y=x]
(9) A boy is not reading.
a.  w.9x [boy(w)(x) & ¬reading(w)(x)]
(10) ¬9x8y [boy(w)(y) $ y=x]
Obligatory Implicatures, as it stands now, does not predict the definite de-
terminer to be obligatory at all. This is because the insertion of an exhaustivity
operator into a structure with an indefinite does not result in a contradiction
with a context which entails the presupposition of the definite. Accordingly,
the scope interaction of exhaust and negation does not play a role. Neither con-
figuration will yield a contradiction. The first option is that negation changes
the QUD to "How many boys did not read", see (11). The resulting implicature
is not contradictory to the fact that there is one unique boy, see (12).
(11)
QUD3
How many boys are not reading
(EXH)
C3
< s, t >
s C not VP
NP
A boy
VP
reading
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(12) [[ EXH ]]([[ How many boys are not reading]])( [[ A boy is not reading]])
, 9x [ boy(x)(w) & ¬ reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=1]] &
8q [q 2 [ p.9n[9x[p =  w.boys(x)(w) & ¬reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=n]]]&
 w.9x[boy(x)(w) & ¬reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=1];q ! ¬q(w)]
’Exactly one boy is not reading’
As before, the LF where negation has scope over the exhaustivity operator
represents an interpretation the sentence does not have, see the tree in (13)
and its interpretation in (14).
(13)
QUD3
How many boys are reading
not
(EXH)
C3
< s, t >
s C VP
NP
a boy
VP
reading
(14) [[ NOT ]]([[ EXH ]]([[ How many boys are reading ]])([[ A boy is reading
]]) , ¬ [ 9x.[boy(x)(w) & reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=1] &
8q [ q 2 [ p.9n[9x[p =  w.boy(x)(w) & reading(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=n]]]
&  w.9x[boy(x)(w)& reading(x)(w)& card(x)(w)=1];q ! ¬q(w)]]
# ’It is not the case that exactly one boy is reading’
Neither of the structures above produce an implicature which is contradic-
tory to the presupposition of the definite. Accordingly, Obligatory Implicatures
does not predicts its obligatory insertion under negation.
I should note at this point that there is of course a reading of the sentence "A
boy is not reading", which I am neglecting here, because it was not a contex-
tually salient one in the experimental items.1 In this reading, negation also
has scope over the indefinite but no exhaustivity operator is present below
negation. This yields the interpretation that no boy is reading, see (15).
1Also the preferred way to express this reading would be using "kein Junge" ("no boy"),
where the negation of the indefinite is more transparent.
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(15)  w.¬9x [boy(w)(x) & reading(w)(x)]
The sentence is truth-conditionally equivalent to "No boy is reading" which
is also infelicitous in a discourse which established that there is a unique in-
dividual boy. However, this infelicity is not due to an implicature since the
scale involved (numbers of boys) is reversed under negation, making (15) the
strongest alternative.
Results
Analyses were carried out using the R programming language (R Development
Core Team) as linear mixed eﬀect models (Baayen, Davidson, and Bates 2008),
using the program lmer (Bates 2005). The fixed factors were definiteness
(definite/indefinite) and negation (present/absent). Random factors were
subjects and items. Additionally, models with random slopes for both subjects
and items were calculated. When an ANOVA revealed a significant diﬀerence
between the models, the more complex one was chosen.
There was no significant interaction between the factors definiteness and
negation (p>.25). There were significant simple and main eﬀects for both
factors. The acceptability of sentences decreased significantly when the indef-
inite instead of the definite was used (M=2.56 versus M=6.325, p<.01). This
eﬀect was significant with negation, M=6,08 for the condition +def/+neg
versus M=2,42 for the condition -def/+neg (p<.01). It was also signifi-
cant without negation, M=6.57 for the condition +def/-neg and M=2.7 for
-def/-neg (p<.01). There was also a main eﬀect of negation. Negation de-
creased the acceptability of sentences significantly (M=4,62 versus M=4,25).
This eﬀect of negation showed up for the indefinite determiner (M=2.42 versus
M=2.7, p<.01) as well as for the definite determiner (M=6.08 versus M=6.57,
p>.01). The results are summarized in 6.1 below.
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Figure 6.1: Mean acceptability of negated and unnegated sentences with a
definite determiner or an indefinite determiner
Discussion
The predictions of Maximize Presupposition are borne out. The definite is
obligatory both in negated and unnegated sentences. So far, Obligatory Impli-
catures fails to make this prediction.
A slightly modified version of Obligatory Implicatures, however, could poten-
tially capture the distinction between definites and indefinites, at least in sim-
ple aﬃrmative sentences. The claim remains that the definite is obligatory
when the sentence with the indefinite yields an unwanted exhaustivity im-
plicature. However, the scales operated with can no longer be coming from
information structure or the QUD but must be lexical. Taking the standard
assumption that existential quantifiers are on the same Horn-scale with uni-
versal quantifiers, the implicature in (16-b.) is yielded by the existential claim
in (16).
(16) A boy is reading.
a. Assertion: 9x [boy(x)(w) & reading(x)(w)]
b. Implicature: ¬8y [boy(y)(w) ! reading(y)(w)]
c. ! 9y[y6=x & boy(y)(w) ! ¬ reading(y)(w)]
The implicature in (16-b.) requires there to be at least one boy who is not
reading to not result in empty quantification, see (16-c.). The antiuniqueness
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eﬀect of the indefinite alone can thus be explained by assuming that it trig-
gers a scalar implicature that requires there to be more than one item in the
domain the indefinite quantifies over: "If ’some shoe’ is to implicate ’not all
of the shoes’ then ’some shoe’ should come with the the presupposition that
there is more than one shoe" (Kratzer 2003). Unlike before, this inference
does not hinge on whether a sentence is exhaustified with respect to the QUD.
The implicature in (16-b.) is a scalar implicature based on well-defined lexical
alternatives (those that stand in an entailment relation).
However, this view is problematic for two reasons. First of all, "antiunique-
ness" can be a much weaker inference than a presupposition or mandatory
implicature. The sentence in (17) does not say that there is more than 6 ft
long catfish. It only says that it is not known that there is exactly one (Heim
1991).
(17) Robert caught a 6 ft long catfish.
This is not predicted by theories that assume that antiuniqueness is a presup-
position of the indefinite. Theories that work with Maximize Presupposition
and assume competition with the definite in this case do make the right pre-
dictions, though. Pragmatic reasoning would only yield that it is not part of
the common ground that there is exactly one 6 ft long catfish.
Second, it is hard to explain from the viewpoint of Obligatory Implicatures
why all sentences in which quantifiers quantify over domains that are known
to contain only one item result in infelicity, see (18).
(18) a. #All fathers of the victim arrived.
b. #No father of the victim arrived.
The same holds for domains that are known to only have two individuals in
them. Using the quantifiers "no", or "every" is infelicitous (see (19)) whereas
the presuppositional counterpart is fine (see (20)).
(19) a. #All arms of John are broken.
b. #No arm of John is broken.
(20) Both arms of John are not broken.
The oddness of these examples is not predicted under Obligatory Implicatures
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since none of these sentences have implicatures that contradict the context.
In fact, they do not have any implicatures at all. Maximize Presupposition
provides an explanation for the facts since it operates under the assumption
that each of these quantifiers are in competition with "the" and "both", re-
spectively.
Another way of dealing with presuppositional versus non-presuppositional de-
terminers is to assume that they are an exception to the cases discussed so far
in that they do involve scales that operate on the presuppositional domain.
The alternatives that are defined via these scales seem to be obligatorily active,
independently from what the focus and QUD is. Moreover, these scales can be
exhaustified in the same way like the scales involved in implicatures. This is
the core of a proposal by Magri (2009). He argues that an implicature account
works when one adopts a grammatical theory of implicatures and further as-
sumes that implicatures can be mandatory. The data in (20-a) and (20-b)
actually speak in favor of such a grammatical approach to implicatures he
claims. The heart of his proposal is that he adds another notion of entailment
to the grammar besides ordinary logic entailment. This kind of entailment
is entailment given common knowledge and includes propositions of the form
"People have one father" and "People have two arms".
His proposal is based on two basic assumptions that makes use of this notion
of entailment, the Blindness Hypothesis (BH) and the Mismatch Hypothesis
(MH) given in (21) and (22) below.
(21) The notion of entailment relevant for the definition of the exhaus-
tivity operator EXH is that of logical entailment rather than that of
entailment given common knowledge (Wck) (Blindness Hypothesis)
(22) If the blind strengthened meaning of a sentence ' is a contradiction
given common knowledge (EXHpsp(') \ Wck = ;), then sentence
sounds ' odd (Mismatch Hypothesis)
The BH says that implicatures are blind to common knowledge, the MH says
that they can be obligatory and hence obligatorily contradict common knowl-
edge. Magri notes that this accounts for cases as the following.
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(23) Mary is conducting a survey on the first and last names of Italian
children. She knows all Italian children inherit the last name of their
father. All children of a given couple share the last name. This week
she has interviewed five children of five couples in order to record their
names.
a. ' = # Some children of couple C have a long last name.
b.  = The children of couple C have a long last name.
Magri assumes that <some, the> is a Horn-scale, hence ' is a scalar alterna-
tive of  and  logically entails ' (the opposite doesn’t hold, since there is a
world, not compatible with common knowledge Wck, where only some of the
children of couple C have a long last name). Hence, the strengthened meaning
of ' boils down to '^¬ namely "Some but not all of the children of couple C
have a long last name". This strengthened meaning is a contradiction given the
piece of common knowledge that all the children inherit the last name of their
father and thus have the same last name. Since this implicature is mandatory
and blind to common knowledge the oddness of (23-a) is predicted.
Crucially Magri (2009) modifies the Mismatch Hypothesis and Blindness Hy-
pothesis to work for presuppositions. He postulates a similar mechanism is at
play for presuppositional versus non-presuppositional sentences with the same
assertion. He assumes sentence ' containing a presuppositional item denote
a partial function from possible worlds into truth values. 'psp is the domain
of such a function, namely the presupposition carried by '. Strengthening is
performed for the presupposition 'psp of a sentence ' just as for the assertion.
This is captured by the BH and MH modified for presuppositions, given in
(24) and (25) below.
(24) The notion of entailment relevant for the computation of the strength-
ened presupposition EXHpsp(') of a sentence ' is that of logical en-
tailment rather than that of entailment relative to common knowledge.
(25) If the blind strengthened presupposition of a sentence ' contradicts
common knowledge Wck, then ' sounds odd.
He shows how this works for the contrast between (26-a) and (26-b) below.
(26) a. ' = #Every child of couple C has a long last name.
b.  = The children of couple C have a long last name.
148
He assumes that distributive predication with definite subjects requires the
predicate to be operated by the distributivity operator Dist. The distributiv-
ity operator Dist does something more according to him: It also introduces
the so-called homogeneity presupposition, namely the presupposition that the
property [[ VP ]]w either holds of all the atomic parts y of x or else does not
hold of any of them. This is spelled out in (27) below.
(27) Dist [[ VP ]]w =  x. 8y[ y AT x ! [[ VP ]]w(y) ] _ 8y[ y AT x ! ¬
[[ VP ]]w(y) ]
Now the domain restrictions of the sentences ' and  in (26) are given in (28)
below. ' has all possible worlds in its domain whereas  is only defined in
worlds where every child or no child of couple C have a long last name due to
its presupposition.
(28) a. 'psp = W
b.  psp = Y ES [NO
c. YES = {w : every child of couple C has a long last name in w}
d. NO = {w : no child of couple C has a long last name in w}
 psp logically asymmetrically entails 'psp. Hence, the set of alternatives that
are excludable with respect to ' is the following: Exclpsp(') = { }. Following,
the blind strengthened presupposition of ' boils down to (29) which says that
the presupposition of  is false.
(29) EXHpsp(') = 'psp ^ ¬ psp = ¬ psp
This strengthened presupposition of ' is hence that it is not the case that all
or no children of couple C have the same last name. This is a contradiction
given the piece of common knowledge that all the children of a given couple
share the same last name. The oddness of the sentence ' in (26-a) is therefore
predicted by the MH and BH for presuppositions.
Under Magri’s theory all sentences with quantified NPs are in competition
with sentences that are containing definite NPs. The sentences with the are
the stronger alternatives since they are restricted to worlds where there is only
one item in the domain of the subject DP whereas the domain of its com-
petitors is not restricted. Hence, exhaustifying these competitors with respect
to the presuppositional domain would lead to the mandatory inference that
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there is not exactly one item in the set of fathers of the victim. This clearly
contradicts what we know and hence the competitor has to be used.
Another possible view on the facts that is consistent with Obligatory Impli-
catures is to claim that the oddness of the sentences in (18) and (19) are
not directly related to the fact that there is a competing item with a pre-
supposition. Another hypothesis would be that these data show that there
are restrictions on what suitable domains for diﬀerent quantifiers are. Use of
non-presuppositional determiners only becomes infelicitous if it is part of the
common ground that the domain they quantify over contains only one or two
individuals, that is when the number of items in the domain of the quantifier
is no longer at issue. That is, even though Maximize Presupposition makes the
right empirical predictions for the insertion of the definite it does not really
provide an explanation for why we have this mechanism in our grammar. The
key to understanding the facts might lie in the issue of what are appropriate
questions to ask and what kind of questions are triggered with which quan-
tifiers. Looking at the domains of quantifiers and their relation to the QUD
triggered by the definite and other quantifiers might be revealing with regard
to this question. To gain some further insight into this issue, the competition
between the universal quantifier and the plural definite will be investigated in
the next section. Based on the data, I will argue that there is a principled way
of explaining under which circumstances using a quantifier leads to oddness.
This explanation does not hinge on competition with the definite, even though
the two issues are connected.
6.2 The plural definite
Even when assuming that for the cases of quantified determiners lexical scales
are involved in the generation of an implicature, Obligatory Implicatures faces
as problem when it comes to the competition between the definite (and "both")
with the universal quantifier. Using the universal quantifier where the presup-
position of “both” or "the" are fulfilled will give rise to a missing trigger in-
ference. That is, Maximize Presupposition accounts straightforwardly for the
oddness of (30-a.) (adopted from Magri (2009)) and (31-a.).
(30) a. #All children of family B have a long last name.
b. The children of family B have a long last name
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(31) a. #All hand are broken.
b. Both hands are broken.
The universal quantifier is the strongest item on a Horn scale. No implicature
is yielded by (31-b.) and (30-b.). Thus, Obligatory Implicatures has problems
to account for the same data. The insertion of the trigger in these cases seems
to be unrelated to the implicatures the sentences otherwise would have.
The purpose of this section is to show that Obligatory Implicatures can con-
tribute something to the debate what the distinction between plural definite
and universal quantifier is based on. In the following subsection, I will provide
the theoretical background on what people have claimed the semantics of the
plural definite to be. Then I will present some experimental background on
the distinction between the definite and universal quantifier. In the last sub-
section I will present a reading time study that compared the plural definite
with the universal quantifier. It will be shown that Maximize Presupposition
does not make the right predictions for when the one has to be used over the
other but that the picture is more complicated. It will be argued that the de-
cision for using the plural definite and the universal quantifier does not hinge
on the presuppositional status of these items alone; however, is connected to
it. The diﬀerence will be argued to lie in the diﬀerent QUDs they evoke. What
is at-issue for quantificational sentences is presupposed for definites. This is
mirrored in the questions they answer. The study provides insights into the
question why all quantificational determiners are infelicitous with domains
which are known to contain only one item. It is related to the fact what are
felicitous questions to ask in a context.
6.2.1 The plural definite and the QUD
There are two basic types of theories that try to account for the distribution
and meaning of the plural definite and how it contrasts with the meaning and
distribution of the universal quantifier.
Strong theories assume that both the plural definite and the universal quan-
tifier involve universal quantification over a set (Löbner 1985, Brisson 1996,
Heim 2012, Büring and Križ 2013). For the definite, this universal quantifica-
tion is usually assumed to be part of the presupposition; for the quantifier, it
is part of the assertion. Weak theories assume that the plural definite intro-
duces existential quantification and only receives a universal reading through
151
a strengthening mechanism. (Malamud 2012, Magri to appear).
If strong theories are correct then Maximize Presupposition would predict that
the definite should always be preferred over the universal if a suitable plural ref-
erent is provided by the context. Since the universal quantifier is the strongest
item on a Horn-scale and thus does not yield an implicature, no such preference
for the plural definite in the same context would be predicted by Obligatory
Implicatures.
An experimental study on the diﬀerence between the usage of the two items
will be discussed in this section. It will preceded by some theoretical discus-
sion of the distinction between these determiners. Moreover, I will shortly
review two previous studies which investigated the meaning of the plural defi-
nite, especially the issue of the availability of non-maximal/maximal readings.
The study presented will add to this debate. Furthermore, it will give insights
into the predictions of Maximize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures
regarding the obligatory insertion of the plural definite. It seems that this
insertion is driven by factors that go beyond the presuppositional status of
the definite. Especially the status of the QUD in using the definite over the
universal will be addressed. The finding suggest that the infelicity of using
quantificational determiners in contexts where a specific domain is given might
have a principles explanation that is only reflected in the principle Maximize
Presupposition.
6.2.2 Theoretical background
A standard assumption is that plural definites, just like their singular coun-
terparts, denote individuals of type <e> (Heim 2012). They furthermore in-
troduce a maximality presupposition saying that this individual is maximal in
the context with respect to the property it combines with, see the lexical entry
of "the" in (32-a.) and the relevant definition of maximality in (32-b.) (Heim
2012).
(32) a. [[ the ]] =  P: 9x8y[MAX(P)(y) $ x=y]. ◆x[MAX(P)(x)]
b. MAX(P) =  x. P(x) & ¬9y[P(y) & x<y]
This definition of maximality extends to singular definites as well since the
extension of a singular noun like "boy" can only contain atoms. When there
are three individual boys in the scenario there is no unique maximal element
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in the extension of "boy" and the presupposition would be false. However, for
the plural "boys" there is a unique maximal element, the unique sum of all
boys. Heim (2012) also notes that thus the presupposition of plural definites
is merely existential because every non-empty set has a unique maximum.
The diﬀerence to the universal quantifier is straightforward. For universal
quantifiers maximality is asserted and not presupposed, see the lexical entry
in (33).
(33) [[ all ]] =  P. Q.8y[ P(y) ! Q(y) ]
The distinction based on a standard theory of definites and universal quanti-
fiers is the level of interpretation at which maximality comes in.
There is another type of presupposition that plural definites have been associ-
ated with in the literature. It is referred to as the uniformity or homogeneity
presupposition (Löbner 1985, Büring and Križ 2013, Križ 2015). Introducing
this presupposition captures the observation that a plural predicate has to ei-
ther hold of all the individuals that are part of the definite argument or none
of them: "[...] if the referent is not homogeneous with respect to the predicate
[...] the predicate will not yield a truth-value." (Löbner 1985). It has been
argued to be the result of plural predication in combination with definite plural
subjects (Beck 2001).2.
Since homogeneity is presupposed in sentences with a plural definite it projects
under negation. The sentence in (34-a.) is odd in the scenario described in (34)
since there is one boy that did not go swimming. However, the sentence in [b.]
is just as odd because it can only mean that all the boys did not go swimming
which is also not true. As opposed to that, maximality and homogeneity can
be negated in sentences with a universal quantifier as in (34-c.) (Büring and
Križ 2013).
(34) C: John, Bill and Mike went to the beach. John and Bill went swim-
ming, whereas Mike stayed at the shore.
a. A: # The boys went swimming.
b. B: # No, the boys didn’t go swimming. Mike stayed at the shore.
c. B: No, all boys didn’t go swimming. Mike stayed at the shore.
2See Büring and Križ (2013) and Križ (2015) for a diﬀerent view where the definite itself
carries this presupposition
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There is, however, a fact about plural definites that requires the above
accounts to be adjusted. Definites can refer to a subset in the discourse if it
is made salient, as in (35-b.) (adopted from Schlenker 2004).
(35) 10 girls are in this class.
a. 3 girls raise their hand.
b. The girls have a question.
c. All girls have a question.
Heim (2012) claims that in the case of (35) it is even the preferred option to
refer to the smaller set - the three girls who raise their hand - with the definite.
She argues that sub-pluralities are always more salient and that the definite
is more sensitive to salience than the universal quantifier is. At first glance,
there seems to be a straightforward solution to this problem for strong accounts
given that the presupposition of the definite is quantificational in nature and
thus should be sensitive to domain restriction. This is usually captured by
inserting a covert domain restriction variable (von Fintel 1994, Marti 2003)
into the semantic representation, see a modified lexical entry of "the" and the
maximality operator in (36) below.
(36) a. [[ the ]] =  P: 9x8y[MAXC(P)(y) $ x=y]. ◆x[MAXC(P)(x)]
b. MAXC(P) =  x. P(x) & C(x) & ¬9y[P(y) & C(y) & x<y]
However, there are certain questions that arise with the assumption that the
observed fact has to do with domain restriction and salience, the main one
being: why is the universal quantifier not sensitive to salience in the same
way?
There is a second, related, question regarding non-maximal readings of plural
definites which is why using the definite is possible even when no salient sub-
domain can be identified. A commonly discussed example in the literature is
the one in (37) below (Yoon 1996, Brisson 1996, Schwarzschild 1996, Malamud
2012, Križ 2015).
(37) I left the windows open.
The claim is that this sentence can be felicitously uttered even if the speaker
did not leave all the windows open. Moreover, there does not need to be a
salient sub-plurality in the discourse to which "the windows" could refer.
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There have been diﬀerent approaches to incorporating this observation into
theories of the plural definite (Yoon 1996, Brisson 1996, Malamud 2012).
Brisson (1996) assumes that non-maximality is equivalent to what has been
called "weak distributivity" (Beck 2001, Schwarzschild 1996). She proposes
that a distributivity operator that comes with a contextually given Cover
(Schwarzschild 1996) is operative in these cases. This Cover picks out salient
subgroups, see the definition in (38). The analysis of a sentence like (39) with
a distributivity operator that is sensitive to a Cover is given in (39-a.).
(38) X covers Y iﬀ
a. X is a set of nonempty subsets of Y
b. 8y [y2 Y] 9x [x2 X] ! [ y 2 x ]
(39) The girls Distrjumped in the lake.
a. 8x [ x 2 [[ Covi ]] & x ✓ [[ The windows ]]! x 2 [[ are open ]] ]
Brisson (1996) argues that a cover can be ill-fitting with respect to the subject
DP if there is no set of cells whose union is equivalent to the set of individuals
in the DP. This fact allows for non-maximal reading like the one in (37).
Brisson (1996) thereby "locates the source of non-maximality in the VP - more
specifically, in the D operator, with its context-sensitive domain variable". She
claims that adding the floating quantifier "all" will force the cover to be a good
fit, i.e. no exceptions will be allowed, as in (40).
(40) All the girls jumped in the lake.
This account of non-maximal readings also makes use of the fact that the
Distributivity Operator is in its core a quantifier and involves a type of domain
restriction, a so called Cover. The diﬀerence to the domain restriction account
discussed before is that this cover can be "ill-fitting", it only needs to be a sub-
plurality of the set quantified over. It does not have to be defined by a certain
property within the context, i.e. it does not have to be a salient subgroup.
This has the advantage that it can capture the exception cases mentioned
above as well as all other non-maximal cases. As the term "ill-fitting" already
suggests, non-maximal readings should always be the dispreferred option of
using the plural definite. The account does not capture that the availability
of non-maximal readings is dependent on specific factors. It seems to depend
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on the number of exceptions as well as the number of individuals talked about
in total in the context. When talking about only three boys who went to the
shore as in (34-a), for example, the reading seems to be unavailable. Also its
availability is dependent on whether the exceptions are relevant to the current
issue or not, as is shown by antonym examples like in (41) (c. Križ 2015).
Whereas (41-a.) could mean that a subset of glasses is dirty, (41-b.) means
that all glasses are clean.
(41) a. The glasses are dirty.
b. The glasses are clean.
Based on these observations, a recent paper of Križ (2015) argues that the
exception cases should be treated separately from cases as (35). The latter
case, he claims, is in fact a maximal reading for a smaller domain. However,
real non-maximality comes in through a quality implicature. In his account a
maximal-reading is accepted when a sentences is "true enough" in the context.
More precisely, the exceptions need to be irrelevant for the sentence to count
as true.
A remaining problem for strong accounts like the ones reviewed so far is the
contrast with the universal quantifier: why is only the maximal reading avail-
able for universal quantifiers? Brisson (1996) argues that "all" forces the cover
to be a good fit, without explaining why this should be so. Križ (2015) claims
that for the universal quantifier every exception is relevant. This is because
even one exception makes the universal statement false whereas for the definite
there is something like a gray zone where the sentence is "true enough" even
though there is an exception. However, no formal account of this is provided.
It is, moreover, a stipulation that there exists a notion of "true enough" for
the definite but not the quantifier.
A very diﬀerent approach to non-maximal readings is taken by Malamud (2012)
and Magri (2014). They claim that the plural definite has a very weak seman-
tics which is pragmatically strengthened in certain cases. In their view, the
plural definite only presupposes existence of a group. In fact, Heim already
noted that existence of a group is enough to satisfy the maximality presuppo-
sition of the definite since every set has a unique maximum. However, when
assuming a weak semantics of the definite, the property described does not
have to hold for all individuals in this group but can hold only for some of
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them. Deriving an "all" semantics for "the" happens via some mechanism of
pragmatic strengthening. These accounts do not face a problem when explain-
ing non-maximal readings since this is just the core semantics of the plural
definite. The question that arises for them is what the conditions are under
which pragmatic strengthening happens or is disallowed.
Malamud (2012) calls her approach the "Decision Theory Approach", since
it makes reference to decisions speakers and hearers make in a conversa-
tion to achieve certain goals. The basis of her approach is a combination of
"Schwarzschild’s proposal with a principled way of how and when the various
interpretations arise." (Malamud 2012: 128) She notes that domain narrowing
accounts, like the ones discussed above, face the problem that salience and rel-
evance are not notions that are always relevant in account for the meaning of
the plural definite. For example, to know the exact composition of the cover is
not necessary for uttering (42-a.) felicitously. The semantics she introduces for
a sentence like (42-a.) below are underspecified, they just state that a certain
subpart of the plurality of windows is the agent for the possibly plural state
of being open (see (42-b.)).
(42) a. The windows are open.
b.  w.9e.Distropen(e,w) & DistrAg(e) =  x.Distrwindow(x,w)3
c. Paraphrase: there is an event e which is an opening event and the
agent of the event is the maximum of the plurality x such that x
opens a window in w
Malamud (2012) attempts to spell out explicitly the contextual factors in-
volved for when pragmatic strengthening happens. To explain under which
circumstances a maximal reading of the definite is licensed, Malamud (2012)
first introduces a relevance ordering for propositions, see the definition in (43).
(43) Proposition p is more relevant (better to learn) for resolving DeP4
than q (p > DePq) iﬀ
3  is a sum operator and is defined as the supremum of the objects that are in extension
of the plural predicate DistrP (Link 1983). It is thus equivalent to Heim’s MAX operator,
defined above.
4DeP are decision problems agents in a conversation try to resolve. "A DeP is a triple
<P,U,A>, where the probability function P represents agent’s beliefs, utility function U
reflects the agent’s preferences, and a set of (mutually exclusive) actions A the agent chooses
from." (Malamud 2012: 129)
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a. p eliminates more actions as non-optimal than q does or
b. p eliminates the same number of actions as q does, and q entails
p (i.e. q is over-informative)
Furthermore, she introduces a deictic variable. the relevance operator REL,
which encodes information about covers only when necessary and relevant to
the hearer’s goals (see Malamud (2012) for technical details).
Now the circumstances for strengthening are defined as follows: "the only way
to force a maximal interpretation is for REL to produce a single most-relevant
proposition, so that the existential quantification over propositions is over a
singleton set."(Malamud:2012:131) In all cases where the relevance operator
fails to identify a unique most-relevant proposition in the set, existential quan-
tification over propositions is activated, which results in the weaker claim that
one of the propositions in the set holds. For example, in the case of (42-a)
above, if it is not relevant which windows are open because it is not essential
for the hearer’s goals, all propositions which state that some windows are open
are equally most helpful. The non-maximal reading is thus accounted for5
A more recent theory by Magri (2014) shares the same spirit: "the plain mean-
ing of a plural definite such as the boys is always just existential, whereby it is
equivalent to the corresponding indefinite some boys. The universal meaning
of the definite arises through a mechanism of double strengthening" (Magri
(2014): 2) . Double strengthening through stacked exhaustivity operators is
allowed, he claims, since both competitors, the definite and the indefinite, have
an implicatures. "Some boys" triggers the first order scalar implicature "only
some boys", whereas the definite triggers the second order implicature "not
only some boys" which contradicts the implicature of the indefinite. His pro-
posal is an extension of an analysis of plural morphology proposed by Spector
(2007). Here the fact that the plural can mean "at least two" is also explained
by double exhaustification. It is activated due to the fact that the singular
is in competition with both the plural and "two", whereas the plural is only
in competition with the singular. The inference of the plural disappears in
downward-entailing contexts. Magri’s proposal works similarly for the defi-
nite. Its maximal reading is yielded by double exhaustification, see (44).
5Interestingly, she compares this mechanism with giving partial or full answers to a QUD.
Whether these weak semantics for the definite arises with the same quantity as the mention-
some reading of answers to questions is up for debate. It seems that both cases are indeed
rather limited in their availability.
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(44) [[ The ]] = EXH(EXH(The))
= EXH(The) & ¬ EXH(Some)
= THE & ¬ (Some & ¬ All)
= All
In simple aﬃrmative sentences this strengthening is the default and mandatory
according to Magri (2014). In downward entailing environments this strength-
ening disappears. The definite under negation in (45-a.) patterns with the
existential quantifier in (45-c.) not with universal in (45-b.).
(45) a. Mary didn’t see the boys.
b. Mary didn’t see each of the boys.
c. Mary didn’t see any of the boys.
The same holds for the definite embedded under "at most". In the context
in (46-a.) using the definite is infelicitous, so is using the indefinite in (46-c.).
However, the universal in (46-b.) is fine.
(46) I know that there are three boys: Adam, Bill, and Carl. Furthermore,
I know that both Adam and Bill only saw some of the pictures. Thus.
. .
a. #At most one boy has seen the pictures.
b. At most one boy has seen all of the pictures.
c. #At most one boy has seen some of the pictures.
The non-maximal reading of the definite Magri (2014) assumes to be a case of
a "sloppy reading" of the definite.
In sum, one can identify two main approaches to the semantics of the plural
definite. There are strong accounts of plural definites that say that plural
definites presuppose homogeneity (Löbner 1985, Magri 2014, Büring and Križ
2013) and maximality (Heim 2011). Under this view the definite universally
quantifies over a set and is thus in direct competition with the universal quan-
tifier. The only diﬀerence is that for the universal the maximality component
is part of the assertion, whereas it is part of the presupposition for definites.
These approaches assume that the pragmatically weaker, non-maximal read-
ings occur due to salience constraints of the plural definite (Heim 2011, Brisson
1996). To formalize this the maximality operator in the presupposition of the
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definite can be made sensitive to a domain restriction. An alternative is to
assume a cover variable for the distributivity operator that is always active in
plural predication with definite subjects (Brisson 1996, Schwarzschild 1996). A
question that arises is why weakening is disallowed for the universal quantifier.
Whereas some proposals point in the direction that the relevance of exceptions
plays a role, this is not spelled out formally. There are also weak accounts of
the plural definite which say that non-maximality is the core meaning of plural
definites. They existentially quantify over a sub-plurality. Maximality comes
in through pragmatic strengthening which is either default (Magri 2014) or
relevance driven (Malamud 2012). Under this view, the definite plural should
have a weaker meaning than the universal quantifier.
In how far these theories make the right empirical predictions has not been
subject to much investigation. In the next section, two experiments will be
reported that have tested some of the assumptions outlined in the previous
section. After that a study on the distinction between the universal quantifier
and the plural definite will be reported that sheds further light on the issue.
I will argue that strong theories do make the right predictions and that the
issue of domain narrowing is, in fact, related to whether quantification over a
set is part of the assertion or presupposition. It will be shown that Maximize
Presupposition is not fully equipped to account for the competition but that
the distinction requires incorporation of the notion of a QUD.
6.2.3 Previous experimental work
In this section I will report two recent studies directly contrasting weak and
strong theories of plural definites. Both use the universal quantifier as a con-
trol item in their experiments and are therefore also revealing with regard to
the diﬀerences between the two.
Schwarz (2013) uses a reaction-time study with a picture verification task to
test the predictions of strong and weak theories. He summarizes those predic-
tions as follows: Under the strong account, the literal meaning of a definite is a
maximal one, whereas non-maximal interpretations are derived pragmatically.
Thus the non-maximal readings should be slower than the maximal one since
they require additional pragmatic reasoning. On the weak account, the literal
meaning of statements with plural definites either involve (the equivalent of)
existential quantification or are underspecified with respect to maximality. In
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this case non-maximal interpretations are based on the literal meaning alone,
whereas maximal ones require pragmatic strengthening. Accordingly, maximal
interpretations should be slower than non-maximal ones.
In the experiment, participants were presented with a picture with nine dots.
Depending on the condition some or all of the dots were black. The design
tested when and how fast non-maximal readings were derived depending on
several factors. First, it was tested whether the clustering of the shapes of the
relevant color plays a role in how readily available these non-maximal readings
are. Then, it was looked at in how far the number and proportion aﬀects non-
maximal interpretations. Moreover, the influence of whether something like a
standard set by other shapes present in the display might aﬀect the willingness
to give a non-maximal judgment was tested.
First, Schwarz (2013) looked at the proportion of maximal readings for the
plural definite depending on these factors. He found that there was a majority
(70%) of maximal response choices, and 30% non-maximal response choices in
average over all conditions (meaning 30% of the time people said the sentence
with the plural definite is true in contexts where not all of the dots were black).
A fully contiguous distribution of black circles yielded a significant increase in
non-maximal responses. Looking at the reading times next, they found that
non-maximal responses took significantly longer than maximal ones. Schwarz
(2013) argues that the results show, first, that maximal readings are preferred
over non-maximal readings and, second, that maximal readings most likely do
not involve additional pragmatic reasoning processes.
Schwarz (2013) claims that the findings are not consistent with the view that
statements with definite plurals and distributive predicates generally involve
a homogeneity presupposition due to the limited availability of non-maximal
interpretations. He furthermore notes that the variation observed between the
conditions cannot be explained in terms of Malamud’s (2012) analysis. The
goals of the speaker or hearer did not vary between the tasks and the trials
and thus did not influence the choice for a maximal/non-maximal interpre-
tation. Schwarz (2013) thus concludes that non-maximal answers are really
based on a maximal semantics, but that maximality only has to hold within a
restricted domain. He mentions that more needs to be said on such an analysis
to account for the diﬀerences between definite plurals and other quantifiers.
He points out that no comparable weakening is possible with the universal
quantifier.
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Schwarz’s findings are thus consistent with strong approaches to plural defi-
nites, that assume pragmatic weakening through domain restriction or covers,
such as Heim’s (2011) or Brisson’s (1996) analyses. His results also suggest
that the exceptions do play a role in the decision whether a maximal reading
is available. Color and shape of the circles that did not fit the description
influenced the availability of maximal readings.
The goal of Kriz and Chemla’s (2014) experiment was to find truth-value gaps
for the cases where the plural definite did not refer to the maximum. That
is, they tried to prove that the presupposition of the plural definite was not
satisfied when the definite referred to a subset of individuals in the discourse.
For that purpose, they also used picture verification tasks with colored dots.
They tested plural definites with two groups of participants, one had the choice
between the judgments completely true and not completely true, the other had
the choice between completely false and not completely false.
They found that in a "gap"-situation - when a definite referred to a subset of
dots in the picture and the presupposition was not satisfied - the completely
false and completely true judgments do not add up to 100, as in a regular false
situation.
They show that there is a statistical interaction between sentences ("the" vs
"all") and true-corresponding responses in the two tasks (comparing completely
true vs not completely false). There are more not completely false responses
than completely true responses in the gap condition, but only for the the sen-
tences.
Križ and Chemla (2014) argue on the basis of these data that they found evi-
dence for a truth-value gap for the "the" condition. Participants are reluctant
to make absolute judgments for the non-maximal cases whereas they are very
clear on judging the sentences with universal quantifiers true or false. A ques-
tion that arises with the design of the experiment is: What does it mean for
something to not be completely false? The authors note themselves that in
the absence of "completely" no clear gap was found and the results could not
be reproduced.
Both studies thus found evidence suggesting that the plural definite is based
on a maximal semantics. However, two issues remain unresolved. The first
one is the question of relevance and salience. It is hard to judge based on a
set of dots what is relevant and irrelevant or even more or less salient informa-
tion. The results from Schwarz (2014) point in the direction of certain factors
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influencing the decision. However, they are not revealing with respect to the
linguistic contexts that furnish maximality. A related issue is the question of
contrast with the universal quantifier. It does not allow for the same restric-
tions and does not produce a truth-value gap. However, no explanation so far
is given for why this should be so. The next section will present a study on the
diﬀerence between the two lexical items using linguistic material. An analysis
will be provided that uses the QUD to account for their respective distribution
and use.
6.2.4 Reading time study
Idea and material
The general idea behind the experiment was to test the predictions of the weak
and strong theories outlined above. Instead of presenting pictures with dots,
linguistic material was used for the contexts in which the universal quantifier
or plural definite were presented. Contexts were created that introduced a
set of individuals with a numeral (first context sentence, (47-a.)) and then
established a subset of this set of individuals with a partitive construction
(second context sentence, (47-b.)).
(47) a. In die Sprechstunde von Hannes kommen acht Studenten.
’Eight students are coming to Hannes’ oﬃce hours.’
b. Fünf der Studenten kommen aus Tübingen.
’Five students are from Tübingen.’
In addition to the context, two target sentences were created. The first target
sentence either had a plural definite, (48-a.), or a universal quantifier in it
(48-b.).
(48) a. Die Studenten brauchen eine Unterschrift von Hannes.
’The students need a signature.’
b. Alle Studenten brauchen eine Unterschrift von Hannes.
’All students need a signature.’
The assumptions was that, by that time, participants had to decide whether
the NP containing the definite or universal quantifier referred to the bigger
or smaller set in the context. Importantly, a bias towards one or the other
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option was tried to be avoided. As opposed to the example in (35) there was
no obvious connection between the property of the sub-plurality introduced
and the property the definite/universal combined with in the target (for the
example case in (47) and (48) being from Tübingen and needing a signature).
The second target sentence was meant to disambiguate. It referred back to the
set mentioned in the previous test sentence with a numeral, either the smaller
or bigger one used in the context. Moreover, a discourse connective "deshalb"
("this is why") was used to make clear that the two targets were related by
content (referred to the same set).6 This way it became clear with the second
target whether the set referred to with the definite or universal quantifier was
the bigger or smaller set introduced in the context. An example is given in
(49).
(49) Deswegen gibt Hannes acht/fünf Studenten seine Unterschrift.
’This is why Hannes is giving his signature to eight/five students.’
Two independent factors were manipulated for the study. First, the quanti-
fier used in the first target was manipulated. The sentence either contained
a definite determiner (Def) or universal quantifier (qua). Second, it was
manipulated whether the numeral in the second target picked up the smaller
(Small) or bigger (Big) set in the context. The two conditions quantifier
and size of domain were crossed. Accordingly, there were four conditions
in total in the study: QuaBig, QuaSmall, DefBig, DefSmall. Six items
were created per condition which made a total of 24 items.
Procedure
32 participants (German native speakers) first saw and read the context as
a whole on a computer screen. The experiment was programmed with the
software E-Prime. A moving window technique was used for the target sen-
tences so that the reading times could be measured on-line. The sentences
were presented to the participants word by word. The exception to this were
the critical NPs in the target sentences ("All /The students" and "eight/five
students" in the example above) which were presented as a unit, respectively.
6That was necessary since using the numeral after already having introduced the set
violated the novelty-condition (Heim 1982). Since this violation appeared in all conditions,
it is expected to influence the results evenly across conditions and was not considered a
factor for the analysis.
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After reading the context and target sentences people were asked how coherent
they thought the whole discourse was on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 being totally
coherent). For the analysis, the reading times on the critical NPs targets were
considered. Especially interesting was the NP ("eight/five students") in the
second target. At this point it turned out whether the decision made regarding
the domain of quantification for the universal/plural definite in the previous
sentence was correct.
Predictions
First, I want to summarize once more the empirical predictions of the theo-
ries discussed for the reading times and coherency of these sentences, especially
their predictions in interaction withMaximize Presupposition. Strong accounts
of the plural definite assume that it presupposes uniformity and maximality.
They predict that the definite should preferably refer to the bigger set men-
tioned in the context. This is because the presupposition of the definite would
otherwise be violated7. Reading times should be lower in the DefBig con-
dition than in the DefSmall condition on the second target sentence. The
discourse should be judged more coherent in the DefBig condition. In com-
bination with Maximize Presupposition, this theory would predict that the
definite should be judged more coherent with the bigger set than the quanti-
fier (DefBig over QuaBig) since the definite presupposes what the quantifier
merely asserts.
If weakening through domain restriction is possible for the definite in the same
way as it is for other quantifiers, a similar behavior of the universal and the def-
inite in reading times and coherency is expected. Two possible restrictions are
available in the discourse. Accordingly, a real ambiguity should be observed.
In combination with Maximize Presupposition, the definite should always be
better than the quantifier since the domain restriction is part of the presup-
position.
If, however, the definite is somehow more reactive to salience as claimed by
Heim (2012) then it should also be better than the universal in referring to
the smaller set. This is because the sub-plurality that is mentioned last should
be more salient in the context. The reading times would then expected to be
higher vor DefBig than for DefSmall. However, no such diﬀerence would
7Assuming that restricting the domain is not allowed
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Theory Predictions Coherence Prediction RT
Strong / MaxPSP DefBig>QuaBig DefSmall>QuaSmall
Strong+DomRestr DefBig>QuaBig
DefSmall>QuaSmall
DefBig<QuaBig
DefSmall<QuaSmall
Weak DefSmall>DefBig DefBig>DefSmall
Table 6.1: Theoretical predictions for reading times and coherency judgments
for sentences with the plural definite and universal quantifier
be expected for the quantifier (if anything, the reading times should display
the opposite behavior).
According to the weak accounts, a non-maximal reading corresponds to the
literal interpretation of the definite. There is no need for strengthening for
reasons of relevance in the sense of Malamud (2012). Weak accounts would
thus predict the definite being to be judged more coherent when referring to
the smaller set than when referring to the bigger set. Reading times should
be higher with the bigger set than with the smaller set. If "blind" doubled
strengthening is performed in the sense of Magri (2014), the definite should be
better with the bigger set. However, in the DefSmall condition this obliga-
tory implicature has to be canceled. Accordingly, increased reading times on
the second target and a lower coherency for the DefSmall condition than for
DefBig would be expected.
The predictions for coherency judgments and reading times on the critical NP
("five/eight students") in the second target are summarized in table 6.1.: the
symbol ">" means "faster than" for reading times, it means "more acceptable"
for the coherency judgments.
Results
The results of the experiment are summarized next. First, the coherency judg-
ments will be reported, then the results for reading times will be discussed.
Analyses were carried out using the R programming language (R Develop-
ment Core Team) as linear mixed eﬀect models (Baayen, Davidson, and Bates
2008), using the program lmer (Bates 2005). The fixed factors were size of
set (big/small) and quantifier (the/all). Random factors were subjects and
items. Additionally, models with random slopes for both subjects and items
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were calculated. When an ANOVA revealed a significant diﬀerence between
the models, the more complex one was chosen.
For the acceptability ratings, there was a highly significant interaction between
the two conditions size of domain (big/small) and type of quantifier
(def/qua) for coherency (p<.01). There was no main eﬀect of quantifier.
However, there was a significant main eﬀect of size(p<.01): the definite and
the universal quantifier were judged more coherent when referring to the bigger
set than to the smaller set (M=3.7 versus M=2.5).
There were also significant simple eﬀects of size for both the quantifier and
definite (p<.01). Both simple eﬀects were in the same direction. The universal
quantifier was judged more coherent with the bigger set (M= 3.9 versus M =
2.2). Also, the plural definite was judged more coherent with the bigger set
(M=3.5 versus M=2.7).
Interestingly, there was another simple eﬀect of quantifier for the two con-
ditions small and big set (p<.01). Referring to the smaller set was more
coherent with the definite than with the universal (M=2.7 versus M=2.2).
When the bigger set was meant, the universal quantifier was judged more co-
herent than the definite (M=3.9 versus M=3.5). Results are summarized in
figure 6.2 below.
Figure 6.2: Average coherency judgments for sentences with a definite de-
terminer or universal quantifier when referring to the bigger or smaller set
mentioned in the context
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For the reading times, there was a marginally significant interaction on the
critical word between size of domain and type of quantifier in reading times
(p<.09). In the Def condition the critical NP ("five/eight students") in the
second target was read slower when the bigger set was referred to; it was read
faster with the quantifier when the bigger set was meant. There were no main
or simple eﬀects for reading times on the critical word. There were no other
reading time eﬀects on the first word, critical word+1, or final word. The
interaction on the critical word is shown in 6.3 below.
Figure 6.3: Average reading times of the critical region referring back to the
smaller or bigger set mentioned in the context ("5/8 students") in the second
target depending on the quantifier used in the first target
Discussion
In sum, the results show that a maximal interpretation is the default and
preferred interpretation for definites. Discourses where the definite refers to
the more salient sub-plurality are perceived as less coherent than in the cases
where it refers to the bigger set. The definite is not better in referring to the
bigger set than the universal quantifier, however. This speaks against a strict
version of the strong theory (disallowing domain restriction) in combination
withMaximize Presupposition. The definite is better at referring to the smaller
set than the universal quantifier. The results can thus also not be explained by
a theory which assume that both quantifier and determiner always allow for
domain restriction in combination with Maximize Presupposition. This theory
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predicts that the definite is always preferred due to its presupposition.
Which one of the quantifiers is preferred, crucially changes with the size of
domain referred to. That is, whereas restricting the domain is possible for
the definite (albeit it not being the first interpretation), domain narrowing is
strongly dispreferred for the universal quantifier. This is also reflected in the
diﬀerence in reading times on the critical word depending on quantifier and
size of the set. The universal is read faster when referring to the bigger set,
the definite faster when referring to the smaller set.
In accordance with the results from Schwarz (2013), a strong theory that al-
lows for pragmatic weakening seems to make the right predictions for the use
of the plural definite. This kind of theory has to still specify (a) under which
circumstances domain narrowing is allowed for the definite and (b) why it is
not allowed for the universal.
I want to argue that the key to answering both these questions is the level of
meaning where domain restriction plays a role. Whereas the domain restric-
tion is part of the assertion and thus at-issue content for the universal it is
part of the presupposition for the definite. The approach is in line with the
observation of Križ (2015) that for the universal exceptions are relevant. I
assume that this is because quantity and maximality are directly at issue for
the universal, creating a QUD of the form "How many P are/did Q?".
For definites it seems that the issue which domain we are talking about (in-
cluding the issue what the size of the domain is) needs to be resolved since the
existence of such a domain is presupposed. Definites do not answer a question
of quantity but of reference. What is at issue for the sentences with plural def-
inites is whether the property described by the VP holds of the individuals in
that given domain or not. There were two possible sets of individuals/domain
restrictions that could verify the presupposition in the experiment. In the case
with the definite, the QUD changes and people are confronted with a genuine
ambiguity. It depends on what kind of question they accommodate: What did
the x in the bigger/smaller set do?
As opposed to the cases with the universal, using the definite with the smaller
or bigger set is not a question of informativity but about failed reference. When
asking about the bigger set it would be strange to answer what the smaller set
did (even when an entailment relation holds), compare the example in (50).
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(50) A: There are ten students in my class, 4 boys and 6 girls.
a. B: Did the girls submit their homework?
b. A: # The students did.
c. A: All students did.
To make the analysis of the two quantifiers which is in line with the experi-
mental results more explicit, let me return to the most commonly discussed
example discussed in the literature, repeated in (51), again to illustrate this
point.
(51) There are ten girls in this class.
a. 3 girls raise their hand.
b. All girls have a question.
c. The girls have a question.
It seems very clear that the "girls in this class" mentioned in (51) function
as the domain restriction for the existential statement in (51-a.). That is, the
existential quantifier behaves as predicted and is sensitive to domain narrowing.
The semantic representation of the two context sentences in (51) and (51-a.)
are provided in (52-a.) and (53-b.).
(52) [ [ 10 girls ] are in this class ]
a. 9x[girls(x) & in this class(x) & card(x)=10]
(53) [ [ 3 girls C ] raise their hand ]
a. g(C) =  x. x is in this class
b. 9x[girls(x) & g(C)(x) & raise their hand(x) & card(x)=3]
9x[girls(x) & in this class(x) & raise their hand(x) & card(x)=3]
The QUD that is answered with the quantificational statement in (53) is sup-
posed to be the one in (54).
(54) [[ How many girls raise their hand ]]g=
 p. p =  w.9n9x[girls(x)(w) & raise their hand(x)(w) & card(x)(w)=n]
This question is already quantificational in nature. To make it relevant to
the context, it is probably about the only set of girls available in the context
up to this point, which are the "ten girls in the class". That is, the domain
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restriction that is operative in (54) is supposed to be already encoded in the
semantics of the question, see (55).
(55) [[ How manyC girls raise their hand ]]g=
 p.p =  w.9n9x[girls(x)(w) & in this class(x)(w) & raise their hand(x)(w)
& card(x)(w)=n]
’How man girls in this class raise their hand?’
Since restricting quantification is assumed to already be involved in the ques-
tion, the decision for C depends on the accommodated QUD. I assume that,
without further contextual pressure, this C has to remain stable as long as the
QUD stays quantificational in nature. (51-b) clearly also answers a quantifi-
cational question. In this case, the question set is assumed to be restricted to
the lexical alternatives "some" and "all". Moreover, the C it used remains the
same as before. That is, (51-b) is supposed to answer the following QUD in
(56).
(56) [[ Did someC or allC girls have a question ]]g =
 p.p =  w.9x[girls(x)(w) & in this class(x)(w) & have a question(x)(w)]
_ p=  w.8x[girls(x)(w) & in this class(x)(w)]! have a question(x)(w)
This analysis captures the observation that even the smallest exceptions make
a diﬀerence for making a truthful statement (answer the QUD truthfully) with
the quantifier (c. Križ 2015). The question is not about a property that a cer-
tain group possesses or not but about the quantity of individuals who have this
property. Making "some girls have a question" true and not "all girls have a
question" requires there to be at least one girl who does not have a question.
That is one exception is enough to make the stronger meaning false and the
weaker automatically true.
The analysis works with the stipulation that it is a pragmatic default to main-
tain the same domain restriction for quantificational questions within one con-
text. However, this seems to fit the empirical picture. Without further indica-
tion that the domain changed, C will remain stable, compare the example in
(57).
(57) I have ten students in my class.
a. Five students are from Berlin.
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b. Three/ Some students are blond.
It seems that the statements in (57-a.) and (57-b.) make claims about diﬀerent
sets of students in my class. With enough contextual pressure this default can
be overruled. Several factors, like how big the sub-plurality considered is,
and what relations are expressed by the statements, overrule this constraint,
compare (58).
(58) I had 60 students in my Introduction to Semantics class.
a. 20 students received a grade better than "good".
b. All students attended the tutorial regularly.
The example shows that if there is an explicitly relation and a big enough
set, "all" can refer to sub-pluralities. Note that the data on "all" could be
explained without assuming that C is predefined by the question. Rather,
universal statements with diﬀerent domain restrictions could be considered
to be in competition ("Did all 3 or did all 10 girls ask a question?"). The
biggest domain restriction is chosen because the universal statement is thus
the strongest according to the "Strongest Meaning Hypothesis" (Dalrymple
et al. 1998). The preference to refer to the bigger set with "all" would be
predicted. This is because "all girls in this class have a question" entails "all
girls in this class who raise their hand" have a question. However, this would
make the wrong predictions for "some". For sentences with an existential,
the entailment patterns for (51) are reversed since "some" is upward mono-
tonic. "Some students in this class are blond" does not entail that "some
students from Berlin in this class are blond" but vice versa. A preference for
using "some" with the smaller set should thus be observed which does not fit
the empirical picture. By saying that domain restrictions are specified in the
question and preferably remain stable through using diﬀerent quantificational
statements the data are more accurately explained.
The definite plural is assumed to pattern diﬀerently from the universal because
it evokes a diﬀerent QUD. The lexical entry of the definite is repeated in (59).
(59) a. [[ The ]] =  P: 9x8y[MAXC(P)(y) $ x=y]. ◆x.MAXC(P)(x)
b. MAXC(P) =  x. P(x) & C(x) & ¬9y[P(y) & C(y) & x<y]
"The girls" in (51-c) has two possible referents, the ten girls in the class and
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the three girls that raise their hand (and are in this class). This corresponds
to two diﬀerent domain restrictions the maximality operator can take, see the
two diﬀerent referents that are possible in (60) and (61) below.
(60) a. [[ The girls ]] = ◆x.girls(x) & in this class(x) & ¬9y[girls(y) & in
this class(y) & x<y
= ◆x. (girl1+...+girl10)(x)
= GIRLS10
(61) a. [[ The girls ]] = ◆x.girls(x) & raise hand(x) & in this class(x) &
¬9y[girls(y) & raise hand(y) & in this class(y) & x<y
= ◆x. (girl1+girl2+girl3)(x)
= GIRLS3
There are thus two diﬀerent meanings for (62-a.), depending on which of the
plural individual in (60) and (61) is taken, see (62-b.) and (62-c.).
(62) a. [ [ The girls ] [ *[ have a question ] ] ]
b. 8y [AT(y) & y G10 ! y has a question]
c. 8y [AT(y) & y G3 ! y has a question]
The question that is answered by (51-c) is one about individuals who have a
question. Given that the contexts only contains two (plural) individuals the
restricted question set for this question is presented in (63).
(63) [[Who has a question ]]=  p.9x.[p =  w.person(x)(w) & has-a-question(x)(w)]
=  p. p=  w [ GIRLS10 has a question in w ] _ p=  w [GIRLS3 has
a question in w ]
Without further contextual input, it is just ambiguous what set of girls is
meant by "the girls", i.e. which of the two answers in the question set is given
by (35-b). In this case, however, the "Strongest Meaning Hypothesis" could
explain the preference for referring to the bigger set. Since "the girls in this
class have a question" entails "the girls who raise their hand in this class"
have a question, the former is the stronger statement and thus has to be used.
However, the option to refer to the smaller set remains genuinely available. If
there is contextual pressure to resolve the ambiguity in a way that will make
the definite refer to the smaller set, then this will be the preferred option (over
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using the strongest claim as the default). This is what is supposed to happen
for the standard example in (51).
It seems that Maximize Presupposition would predict a general preference of
using the plural definite over the universal quantifier when there is a plural
set in the context that it can refer to. This is not the case. The choice of
quantifier is dependent on other discourse factors, especially what the QUD
is. Based on the data it is doubtful that these items should be considered to
be truth-conditionally equivalent in one and the same context. Whether they
make the same assertion depends on the choice of domain. This again depends
on several factors, and diﬀerent ones for the quantifier and definite. For the
quantifier number of items in a domain is at issue, exceptions are thus not
allowed. Moreover, there is a preference for keeping the domain stable for all
quantificational questions in one and the same context. For the definite, the
number of items and the composition of the domain is not at-issue. There is a
real ambiguity of reference with more than one set in the context. There is a
preference for using the stronger claim within set of answers if the ambiguity
cannot be resolved based on context. It is important to note that the system
still requires there to be a principle Maximize Presupposition. It is operative
in the question set of the QUD. The alternatives evoked have to be defined in
the context.
This analysis oﬀers a new perspective on why quantifiers cannot combine with
domains known to contain only one individual. The question a sentence with
a quantifier evokes is "Do some or all x in C do P?". This is an infelicitous
question to ask given that neither of the answers in the question set can ever
be false in a world where it is presupposed that there is only one x in C. Apart
from applying a principle like Maximize Presupposition the data can thus be
explained by assuming that there is a ban on introducing questions whose
possible answers are truth-conditionally equivalent. Since universal quantifiers
evoke QUD with only two alternative propositions in their question set, it
is infelicitous to use them when there is no world where one of them could
be false. However, given the facts about embedding, this would require the
assumption that these questions arise below the level of the clause.
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6.3 Summary and outlook
The data presented in section 6.1. speak in favor of an analysis of obliga-
tory definites that makes use of the principle Maximize Presupposition. It
seems that the obligatory insertion of definites is not related to an implica-
ture yielded by exhaustifying a QUD. Rather it looks as if lexical competition
between the indefinite and definite does play the crucial role in inserting the
definite obligatorily. This is supported by the finding of the study conducted
on the insertion of the definite under negation. The results suggest that the
definite is obligatory under negation. This is expected underMaximize Presup-
position. Obligatory Implicatures does not predict the definite to be obligatory
in aﬃrmative sentences or under negation since exhaustification of a sentence
with an indefinite with regard to the QUD is not contradictory to a context
which entails the presupposition of the definite.
In section 6.2. the question was pursued whether there is a principled expla-
nation for why all quantifiers, not only the indefinite, cannot be used with
domains known to only contain one individual besides assuming a competition
with the definite. A study was reported on the use of the definite plural and
universal quantifier. It was shown that the presuppositionality of the definite is
not the defining factor in the competition with the universal quantifier. When
one is preferred over the other is dependent on the diﬀerent types of contexts,
especially the size of domain talked about. I propose that the questions that are
generated by the quantifier and the definite are diﬀerent. Moreover, I assume
that there are restrictions on what these questions have to look like. An ap-
propriate question set must contain alternatives which are truth-conditionally
distinct. This explains why universal quantifiers in general do not work with
singleton domains. For the definite, there is a restriction on the question set,
too: The alternatives therein must be individuals and thereby must all observe
the principle Maximize Presupposition. However, more research is needed on
the topic, especially regarding these questions being active in embedding struc-
tures.
The data together suggest that competition between presuppositional deter-
miners and their non-presuppositional counterparts is activated obligatorily
and below the level of the clause. Rather than assuming that Maximize Pre-
supposition is a purely pragmatic principle one could entertain the idea that
the principle is operative on the level of morpho-syntax. Based on the empir-
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ical data I would like to suggest that Maximize Presupposition is applied for
definiteness and other features. One background assumption is that whether
definiteness is expressed morphologically is a question of the grammar of a
specific language. Features license the overt realization or not in a language.
In English, having an article is obligatory, with the exception of the bare plural
(Heim 2012).
(64) Books arrived.
Based on this observation, Heim (2012) argues that definiteness should be
considered a feature, see the lexical entries for the features +/- DEF in (65)
below.
(65) a. [[ [-DEF] ]] =  P.  Q. 9x [P(x) & Q(x)]
b. [[ [+DEF] ]] =  P: 9x.8y.[MAX(P)(y) $ x=y]. ◆x[MAX(P)(x)]
There is cross-linguistic evidence for this view as well. In languages like Danish,
the definiteness feature is not only visible on the determiner, but also on the
adjective (Katzir 2011):
(66) den stor-e gaml-e hest
DEF big old horse
’the big old horse’
Depending on the syntactic configuration, it can also be expressed on the noun
itself:
(67) hest-en
DEF horse
’the horse’
According to Katzir (2011), grammar is dictates the morphological realizations
of features like definiteness, while the economy principle restricts their distri-
bution. Adopting this view, I assume the following structure for an English
Determiner Phrase:
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(68) QP
Qua
QP
Q
every/some/all
DP
Def+/-
DP
D
The
NP
dog
Every DP is c-commanded by a QP which is headed by a quantifier. A
quantificational interpretation of the NP is blocked when the D head is filled,
the existential/universal feature the quantifier carries cannot associate with
the Noun across the D head. The D head is obligatorily filled with "the"
in English when the DP is definite. This is obligatorily the case when the
presupposition of the feature +DEF is fulfilled. It is thus an example of the
principle Maximize Presupposition at work. The meaning of universal and
existential quantification remain the same. However, as for determiners it is
the quantificational feature associated with quantifiers that carries meaning,
not the quantifier itself, see (69).
(69) a. [[ 8 ]] =  P.  Q. 8x [P(x) ! Q(x)]
b. [[ 9 ]] =  P.  Q. 9x [P(x) & Q(x)]
Since features carry the meaning, the morphological realization of (quantifica-
tional) determiners is semantically vacuous, see (70-a.). The quantifier "all"
is special in that it can take a plural individual and quantify over its atomic
parts, see (70-b.)
(70) a. [[ the/a/every/some ]] = ;
b. [[ all ]] =  y<e>.  P<e,t>. 8x [x y & At(x) ! f(x)]
For the compositional interpretation of examples containing quantifiers or def-
inites this view does not change anything for the analysis, see the examples in
(71) and (72).
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(71) [ [ 8 [ Every dog ]] [snores] ]
a. [[ 8 ]]( [[ dog ]])( [[ snores ]])
b. 8x [dog(x) ! snores(x)]
c. ’Every dog snores’
(72) [ [ DEF [ the dog ]] [snores] ]
a. [[ snores ]] ([[ +DEF ]]([[ dog ]]))
b. snores(◆x. MAX(dog)(x))
c. The unique dog snores.
The view presented is better equipped to explain cross-linguistic variation.
Definiteness can be expressed in languages that choose not to morphologically
mark it, like for example Russian. With enough contextual pressure an NP is
obligatorily definite in Russian as well. This should also be considered a case
of Maximize Presupposition. Since the non-presuppositional indefinite is not
overtly expressed in Russian (and similar languages) either a missing trigger
inference cannot arise in these languages.
Another advantage of this proposal is that is accounts for the obligatory oc-
currence of other feature markings. According to Sauerland (2002) masculine
gender (MASC), singular (SG) and present (PRES) are featurally less marked
than feminine gender, plural and past, respectively. He argues that when the
latter are inserted instead of their competitors, the resulting sentences are pre-
suppositionality stronger and should thus have to be used as a consequence
of the principle Maximize Presupposition. Accordingly, MASC, SG and PRES
should give rise to an inference that presupposition of their competitor is not
true.
Obligatory Implicatures cannot account for obligatory insertion of presupposi-
tional features. This is because features can neither carry focus nor be subject
to the QUD. The insertion of presuppositional features can thus not follow
from an exhaustivity implicature which ends up contradicting the context.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the inferences arising from using the
presuppositionally weaker item really are connected to the presupposition of
the competitor. According to Percus (2006), the sentence in (73-a.) does not
presuppose that all professors are male. However, (73-b.) presupposes that all
professors are female.
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(73) a. Every professor decorated his oﬃce.
b. Every professor decorated her oﬃce.
The same can be observed for French plural pronouns. Sentences with pro-
nouns carrying the neutral masculine gender feature have the inference that not
all referents are female, wheras sentences where the pronoun has female gen-
der has the presupposition that the referents are all female. These inferences
project under negation, just like the inference resulting from the indefinite, see
(74).
(74) a. Ils ne vivent pas a Paris.
They [MASC] do not live in Paris.
) "They" are not all female.
b. Elles ne vivent pas a Paris.
They [FEM] do not live in Paris.
) "They" are all female.
Another example discussed in the literature is the competition between present
and past tense. Sauerland (2002) argues that the PRES operator does not
introduce a presupposition on its own, but rather should be interpreted as a
non-past due to competition with the PAST operator. He observes that the
sentence in (75) is true even when some of the Tuesdays where the speaker
fasts are in the past. It is only false when all of them are in the past.
(75) Every Tuesday this month I fast.
In sum, the observation is that the choice for a specific feature or tense seems
to be driven by their presuppositions. The inferences the so called unmarked
forms (MASC, PL, PRES) trigger an inference that the presupposition of the
competitor is false.
Parallely to the definite/indefinite distinction, this is subject to cross-linguistic
variation. This is due to the fact that morphologically marking gender, number
or tense is a question of the grammar of a given language, as well. In sum,Max-
imize Presupposition is better equipped to account for obligatory phenomena
which do evoke lexical scales of the form {+FEATURE, -FEATURE}, where
one feature is marked by a presupposition. For German (and English), these
scales seem to exist for the features +DEF, +FEM, +PAST, and +SG.
Chapter 7
Summary of the results
In this dissertation, I have looked at the most commonly discussed examples of
obligatory presupposition triggers. I presented two proposals for how to ana-
lyze obligatory presupposition triggers in discourse. The first theory exploits a
principle Maximize Presupposition. The second theory is based on Obligatory
Implicatures. I tested the empirical predictions of these theories for diﬀerent
presupposition triggers using experimental methods.
The theories diﬀer with respect to two main points. The first point regards
the inferences arising from not using the trigger. The second point regards the
type of alternatives they assume to be involved in the insertion of the trig-
ger. Maximize Presupposition predicts presupposition triggers to have lexical
alternatives. Using an alternative results in a special inference which projects.
Obligatory Implicatures assumes the relevant alternatives to be focus alterna-
tives representing possible answers to a QUD. The inferences arising from not
using the trigger are assumed to be implicatures resulting from exhaustifica-
tion of a proposition with respect to the question set of the QUD.
Based on these diﬀerent assumptions, the theories make diﬀerent empirical
predictions for the obligatory insertion of a presupposition trigger, first, under
negation and other holes for presuppositions, and, second, for the influence
of the QUD on the insertion of the trigger. Maximize Presupposition predicts
triggers to be obligatory under negation and the QUD to not have an influence.
Obligatory Implicatures predicts triggers to not be obligatory under negation
and the QUD to have an influence.
These two main predictions were tested for a number of individual triggers in
chapters 3 to 6. Whereas the German equivalents of triggers "too", "again"
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and "know" are not obligatory under negation, as shown by sections 3.1., 4.1.
and 5.1, the definite determiner is obligatory under negation, as was shown by
section 6.1. As regards the influence of the QUD, it could be seen for "too"
and "know" in sections 3.2. and 5.2. that it depends on contextual alterna-
tives and the QUD whether an inference arises when they are not used. This
suggests that in these cases the inferences arising from not using the trigger
are exhaustivity implicatures. It was argued in section 6.2. that for the inser-
tion of the plural definite the QUD plays a role as well. When using a plural
definite the question set can only contain presuppositional alternatives. An
overview over which findings reported supported which of the theories Max-
imize Presupposition and Obligatory Implicatures is given in the table in 7.1
below.
Figure 7.1: Overview over the empirical findings supporting Maximize Presup-
position and Obligatory Implicatures
The most important finding of the thesis is thus that not all presupposition
triggers should be treated alike when it comes to their obligatory insertion.
One class of trigger is better accounted for by using Obligatory Implicatures,
another set of triggers should be explained using Maximize Presupposition. I
will provide a more detailed characterization of the source of this diﬀerential
treatment in the following two sections.
7.1 Why Obligatory Implicatures?
The empirical evidence presented in chapters 3 to 5 have shown that Maximize
Presupposition is not the right principle to account for the obligatory inser-
tion of the presupposition triggers "again", "too", and "know". Competition
for these items is not operative on the lexical but propositional level and is
dependent on information structure, i.e focus tells us what the alternatives to
consider are. I will refer to this first class of triggers as "discourse-managing
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triggers" since it is their discourse function, avoiding or canceling an implica-
ture by introducing a presupposition, which drives their obligatory insertion.
I will summarize the arguments I put forward for the claim that the insertion of
the triggers "too", "again" and "know" follows from Obligatory Implicatures
in the following two subsections. Section 7.1.1. summarizes the arguments
coming from the embedding of triggers under negation, section 7.1.2. iter-
ates the arguments based on sensitivity of this class of triggers to discourse.
In section 7.1.3. I will present some further evidence for the view that the
triggers "too", "again" and "know" should be put in one class, the class of
discourse-managing triggers, when it comes to obligatory insertion.
7.1.1 Evidence from negation
First evidence for assuming that the above triggers fall into the same class
comes from the observation that all of them are not obligatory under nega-
tion. This is predicted by Obligatory Implicatures since it is in these contexts
where the QUD changes to a negative or polar one. Exhaustifying the sen-
tence without the trigger with respect to a negative question does not yield a
contradiction. The general pattern is the one in (1).
(1)
QUDi
*not
EXH
Ci not ⇠
Ci XP
XF
Whether the trigger is obligatory under negation depends on the interaction
of negation with the exhaustivity operator according to Obligatory Implica-
tures. When negation is below the operator, the focus alternatives also have
to contain negation due to Question-Answer-Congruence. Exhaustification of
these alternatives does not yield a contradiction with a positive context. The
version where negation is below the operator is to be ruled independently, since
the according exhaustivity implicature is not attested. This makes the right
empirical prediction that the triggers "again", "too", and "know" do not have
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to be inserted under negation.
It makes further predictions for the (local) contexts under which these triggers
are obligatory. It should be fine to leave out the triggers in embedding struc-
tures if the exhaustivity operator is not attested in these embeddings. It was,
for example, also shown in section 3.2.1. that the additive is not obligatory in
the second conjunct of a conjunction. Exhaustifying the individual conjuncts
is ruled out on independent grounds, therefore this finding can be explained
by Obligatory Implicatures. The obligatory insertion of discourse-managing
triggers is dependent on the interaction of diﬀerent embedding operators with
the exhaustivity operator. One would have to test this hypothesis further by
looking at additional embedding operators, especially downward-entailing op-
erators, like antecedents of conditionals, questions and the first argument of
universal quantifiers. If the empirical generalization outlined is correct, then
how obligatory a discourse-managing trigger is in these context is a measure
of how obligatory exhaustification is in embedded environments. This is an
important finding beyone the issue of obligatory triggers since it adds to the
current debate whether the exhaustivity operator is a syntactically flexible op-
erator generating local implicatures and part of the grammar (Chierchia, Fox,
and Spector 2011).
7.1.2 Evidence from discourse sensitivity
The dependency of the obligatory insertion of the triggers "again", "too" and
"know" on diﬀerent discourse factors has especially been shown for the in-
sertion of the additive particle in section 3.2. Its insertion depends on how
relevant alternatives are in the context. However, it was argued that the pure
presence of alternatives (as represented by a question) did not pose enough
pressure to exhaustify. This could be due to the fact that, as opposed to
scalar implicatures, the relevant alternatives are not lexical and do not stand
in an entailment relation with one another. The data suggest that contrast
is the crucial factor for exhaustification. In the case of scalar items, this con-
trast is part of the lexical meaning since it always has just one relevant scalar
alternative. For particularized conversational implicatures like the ones dis-
cussed in the thesis it is important that it is known what the alternatives to
consider are, but also how many relevant alternatives there are. If only one
relevant alternative was made prominent in the context exhaustification was
183
mandatory. In contexts where there are more alternatives to consider, or the
nature of these alternatives was underspecified, exhaustification was optional.
As a result, exhaustification should not be considered mandatory in all matrix
clauses, but should be considered mandatory with contrastive focus. Most im-
portantly, there was a correlation between mandatory exhaustification and the
necessity of inserting the additive particle. If there was mandatory exhaustifi-
cation, leaving out the trigger is more dispreferred. This supports the view of
Obligatory Implicatures.
A special case is "believe" versus "know" since lexical competition seems to
be conventionalized in this case. It was shown that with other relevant al-
ternatives, the inference from using "believe" gets weaker. This also speaks
in favor of treating the insertion of "know" as following from exhaustification
strategies.
7.1.3 Further evidence
There is evidence beyond the one presented in this dissertation that the trig-
gers at issue fall into the same category with regard to the mechanism behind
their obligatory insertion. For all of them, a certain amount of cross-linguistic
stability can be observed. Additives, factives and iteratives exist in many lan-
guages with identical meanings and presuppositions 1, for example Hungarian,
French, German, English, Guarani (Simons et al. 2011) and Salish (Matthew-
son 2006).
Obligatory Implicatures predicts the obligatoriness of these items to be cross-
linguistically stable. It is expected that the obligatory insertion follows from
the same general mechanism of exhaustification in these languages. The inser-
tion of triggers like "again", "too", and "know" is related to discourse manage-
ment. Inserting them marks that a QUD has already been answered, whereas
not inserting them will force a focus and thereby yield an unwanted exhaus-
tivity implicature. Presuppositions are one type of non-at-issue content. It is
predicted that triggers that have this kind of discourse function in any given
language also share the presuppositional status of the triggers discussed here.
It is important to note, however, that not only presuppositional items have the
power to cancel an implicature or keep it from arising. As has been shown in
chapter 3, the discourse connective "and" is another lexical item that marks
1If we take projection to be the crucial characteristic.
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non-exhaustivity but does so on the level of assertion. It is expected under
Obligatory Implicatures that the syntactic environments where exhaustivity
implicatures do not arise and the trigger is not obligatory should also be the
same across languages. The mechanism working with Obligatory implicatures
is operative in cases where an optional lexical element is added into the struc-
ture for discourse reasons. It is unproblematic from a conceptual point of
view to explain the insertion of this subset of triggers with the mechanism of
exhaustification of the QUD. It is independently needed, i.e. for (embedded)
questions and other (embedded) implicatures.
7.2 Why Maximize Presupposition?
In section 6 of the dissertation I presented arguments for whyMaximize Presup-
position is the right principle to account for the obligatory insertion of definite
determiners. I will summarize these arguments in the next section 7.2.1.. I will
discuss some further evidence from acquisition and cross-linguistic research in
7.2.2..
7.2.1 Evidence from negation and discourse-sensitivity
Under Obligatory Implicatures the insertion of presupposition triggers is mo-
tivated by an implicature which ends up contradicting the context. This is
why the trigger should be less obligatory in contexts where this implicature
does not arise. Under Maximize Presupposition, the insertion of the trigger is
less dependent on contextual factors since it is due to automatically activated
lexical competition. The evidence suggests that the obligatory insertion of the
definite follows fromMaximize Presupposition. It was shown that the insertion
of the definite is not dependent on discourse factors, specifically it is obliga-
tory irrespective of what the QUD is. Furthermore, Maximize Presupposition
accounts for the fact that all quantifiers, even those lacking implicatures, are
infelicitous when the presupposition of the definite is fulfilled, see (2).
(2) a. #Every father arrived.
b. #Did every father of the victim arrive?
c. If # every father of the victim arrived...
d. I saw # every father of the victim on the street.
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Assuming that the examples in (1) and (2) are blocked because of the local
competition with the stronger definite determiner explains the data. Moreover,
it was demonstrated that the obligatory occurrence of the definite is indepen-
dent of the operators it is embedded under. Specifically, it was shown in 6.1.
that the singular definite is obligatory under negation. The data suggest that
lexical competition is involved in the insertion of definites. Since exhaustifica-
tion below negation is blocked it cannot be the relevant factor for the insertion
of the definite. Also what kind of QUD is exhaustified is not relevant. It was
argued in section 6.2. that it is possible to account for the data in (2) by
assuming that quantifiers in general evoke infelicitous questions in this case.
The question set of "Did all or some fathers arrive?" cannot contain false an-
swers with singleton domains. The question asked must be about individuals.
That is, all the alternatives in the question set must be presuppositional. As
a result, Maximize Presupposition is still needed to work for the alternatives
in the question set of the QUD.
Based on these data and the observation that presuppositional features display
similar behavior, I argued that Maximize Presupposition is operative on the
level of morphology, not discourse, and is needed to maximize the presuppo-
sition of a given feature, if a language marks this feature overtly (Sauerland
2008b, Sauerland 2008a). The obligatory insertion of a second class of triggers,
those carrying presuppositional features, thus follows fromMaximize Presuppo-
sition which says that the presuppositionally stronger feature has to be chosen
when possible. For German and English, the obligatory marking of the defi-
niteness feature by using the definite determiner over the indefinite and other
quantifiers when possible is one case of Maximize Presupposition.
7.2.2 Further evidence
Further evidence that Maximize Presupposition is the right principle to ac-
count for the insertion of definites comes from acquisition. Children very early
understand when and how to use the definite determiner correctly, especially
when they have strong evidence (Rozendaal and Baker 2008). Rozendaal and
Baker (2008) compare French, English and Dutch speaking children with re-
gard to how accurately they associate the indefinite and definite with given-
ness/novelty and specific/non-specific uses. They observe that French children
are the first to use the definite correctly and base this on the fact that a deter-
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miner is always required in French. Children in general soon associate definites
with givenness. They use the definite for given material 60-80% of the time
(depending on language) by the age of 3 years and 3 months. They rarely
use the indefinite incorrectly for given material (around 5% of the time). In
contrast, they do not associate the indefinite with novelty at that age. For
discourse new material they use the indefinite, definite and bare nouns almost
equally. This suggests that children know how to use the definite before they
know what the indefinite means. This is not surprising given the wide range
of meanings the indefinite can receive. However, it also means that it is prob-
ably not the implicature resulting from the indefinite that motivates children
to use the definite with given material. The data are more in line with the
assumption that children acquire the presupposition of the definite and the
general pragmatic principle that they should maximize presuppositions that
are fulfilled by the context with their utterance.2
Furthermore, as opposed to what was observed for other triggers above, a wide
range of cross linguistic variation in the domain of determiners can be observed
(Chierchia 1998). There is already a fair degree of variation with respect to
the syntactic and morphological representation of determiners within language
families, i.e. southeast Asian languages (Simpson 2005). Cantonese and Man-
darin, for example, lack articles and number morphology altogether. It is an
open issue whether the classifier + noun combination or bare nouns they use
instead (covertly) express definiteness or indefiniteness and should be consid-
ered determiner-like (Cheng and Sybesma 1999, Cheng and Sybesma 2005, Wu
and Bodomo 2009). The same questions have been investigated for bare nouns
in Russian and other Slavic languages (Pereltsvaig 2006, Kagan and Pereltsvaig
2011). Already based on the fact that plural nouns in English do not require
a determiner, it has been argued that there is not necessarily a relation be-
tween morphologically marking of a determiner and a noun being interpreted
as a definite or indefinite description (Heim 2012). Definiteness should thus
be considered a feature which a language chooses do morphologically express
or not. As a consequence, it should also be a question of the grammar of an
individual language whether this feature is obligatorily expressed, as predicted
by Maximize Presupposition.
2If assuming that all presuppositional phenomena are subsumed under a principle Maxi-
mize Presupposition, this would lead to the expectation that children know when the uses of
"know", "too", and "again" are obligatory at the same time when they acquire the obligatory
use of the definite, which is doubtable (Sigrid Beck, p.c.).
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7.3 Summary
Based on the empirical data, I propose a view on obligatory presupposition
triggers which puts them into two classes. These two classes are to be distin-
guished based on the mechanism behind their obligatory insertion, Obligatory
Implicatures or Maximize Presupposition. As a result, I argue that both mech-
anisms are active and needed in natural language.
The first class of triggers are discourse-managing items which are inserted
obligatorily to cancel or avoid an exhaustivity implicature in certain contexts.
Additive, iteratives and factives fall into this first class of triggers. A direct
correlation between the local and global factors for exhaustification and oblig-
atory insertion of these triggers can be established. The insertion of this first
class of obligatory triggers thus follow from the independently needed mecha-
nism of exhaustification and can give us further insights into the nature of this
mechanism.
The second class of triggers includes presuppositionally marked features which
are obligatorily inserted due to Maximize Presupposition. The principle should
be reformulated as a grammatical constraint which is operative on a level
smaller than the lexicon and automatically activated. Rather than eliminat-
ing the option that some items are ordered on a scale of presuppositional
strength, it is important to define what these items and scales are for a given
language. Taking into consideration the evidence so far, the domain where
we expect these scales is limited to morphological features which have a pre-
suppositional marked and unmarked form, not lexical items. For German it
was shown that definiteness should be considered one of these features, which
makes the obligatory insertion of definite determiners a case of the principle
Maximize Presupposition.

Appendix A
Material experiment 1
(1) a. A: Peter hat gestern in seiner WG eine Party geschmissen.
b. B: Wer ist zu der Party gekommen? / Ja, hab ich schon gehört.
c. A: Maria ist zu der Party gekommen.
d. C: Julia ist zu der Party gekommen.
C: Julia ist auch zu der Party gekommen.
C: Und Julia ist zu der Party gekommen.
(2) a. A: Anni hat gestern im Garten gearbeitet.
b. B: Was hat sie gepflanzt? / Habe ich schon gesehen.
c. A: Anni hat Bohnen gepflanzt.
d. C: Anni hat Kürbisse gepflanzt.
C: Anni hat auch Kürbiss gepflanzt.
C: Und Anni hat Kürbisse gepflanzt.
(3) a. A: Micha ist gestern im Freibad gewesen.
b. B: Wer war mit ihm dort? / Schön.
c. A: Janina war mit ihm dort.
d. C: Hannah war mit ihm dort.
C: Hannah war auch mit ihm dort.
C: Und Hannah war mit ihm dort.
(4) a. A: Gestern haben die Schulferien angefangen.
b. B: Wer hat seit gestern Urlaub? / Das muss ja viele freuen.
c. A: Herbert hat seit gestern Urlaub.
d. C: Gerd hat seit gestern Urlaub.
C: Gerd hat auch seit gestern Urlaub.
C: Und Gerd hat seit gestern Urlaub.
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(5) a. A: Maria ist gestern umgezogen.
b. B: Wer hat beim Umzug geholfen?/ Das hab ich schon gehört.
c. A: Karo hat beim Umzug geholfen.
d. C: Sebastian hat beim Umzug geholfen.
C: Sebastian hat auch beim Umzug geholfen.
C: Und Sebastian hat beim Umzug geholfen.
(6) a. A: Peter war gestern bei Ikea.
b. B: Was hat er gekauft?/ Das hat er mir schon erzählt.
c. A: Er hat einen Kleiderschrank gekauft.
d. C: Er hat ein Bett gekauft.
C: Er hat auch ein Bett gekauft.
C: Und er hat ein Bett gekauft.
(7) a. A: Susi war am Wochenende in Paris.
b. B: Was hat sie angeschaut?/ Das ist aber schön.
c. A: Sie hat den Eiﬀelturm angeschaut.
d. C: Sie hat den Arc de Triomphe angeschaut.
C: Sie hat auch den Arc de Triomphe angeschaut.
C: Und sie hat den Arc de Triomphe angeschaut.
(8) a. A: Lisa hatte gestern Geburtstag.
b. B: Was hat sie bekommen? /Das wusste ich gar nicht.
c. A: Sie hat einen Messerblock bekommen.
d. C: Sie hat eine CD bekommen.
C: Sie hat auch eine CD bekommen.
C: Und sie hat eine CD bekommen.
(9) a. A: Hans studiert an der Uni Würzburg.
b. B: Was studiert er? /Ach so.
c. A: Er studiert Politik.
d. C: Er studiert Geschichte.
C: Er studiert auch Geschichte.
C: Und er studiert Geschichte.
(10) a. A: Am Freitag war in Reutlingen Stadtfest.
b. B: Wer ist hingegangen?/ Das ist immer spaßig
c. A: David ist auf dem Stadtfest gewesen.
d. C: David ist auf dem Stadtfest gewesen.
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C: David ist auch auf dem Stadtfest gewesen.
C: Und David ist auf dem Stadtfest gewesen.
(11) a. A: Helga war nach dem Arbeiten noch in der Stadtbibliothek.
b. B: Was hat sie ausgeliehen. /Ach was.
c. A: Sie hat einen Roman ausgeliehen.
d. C: Sie hat ein Spiel ausgeliehen.
C: Sie hat auch ein Spiel ausgeliehen.
C: Und sie hat ein Spiel ausgeliehen.
(12) a. A: Karin hat sich gestern mit Ingo getroﬀen.
b. B: Was haben sie unternommen? / Das ist ja eine Überraschung.
c. A: Sie waren Abendessen.
d. C: Sie waren im Kino.
C: Sie waren auch im Kino.
C: Und sie waren im Kino.
(13) a. A: Frank war auf dem Wochenmarkt.
b. B: Was hat er gekauft?/ Wie immer
c. A: Er hat Äpfel gekauft.
d. C: Er hat Suppengrün gekauft.
C: Er hat auch Suppengrün gekauft.
C: Und er hat Suppengrün gekauft.
(14) a. A: Theo hatte am Wochenende Putzdienst.
b. B: Was hat er geputzt?/ Ach ja richtig.
c. A: Er hat das Bad geputzt.
d. C: Er hat die Küche geputzt.
C: Er hat auch die Küche geputzt.
C: Und er hat die Küche geputzt.
(15) a. A: Simone war mit ihrem Sohn im Zoo.
b. B: Was haben sie sich angesehen?/ Das ist schön.
c. A: Sie haben Eisbären angeschaut.
d. C: Sie haben Schlangen angeschaut.
C: Sie haben auch Schlangen angeschaut.
C: Und sie haben Schlangen angeschaut.
(16) a. A: Peter hat gestern für die WG gekocht.
b. B: Was hat er gekocht? / Das ist sehr nett von ihm
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c. A: Er hat Gemüselasagne gemacht.
d. C: Er hat eine Suppe gemacht.
C: Er hat auch eine Suppe gemacht.
C: Und er hat eine Suppe gemacht.
(17) a. A: Simon ist gerade von einer Kreuzfahrt zurückgekommen.
b. B: Wo ist er gewesen?/ Das war bestimmt cool.
c. A: Er war auf den Bahamas.
d. C: Er war auf Kuba.
C: Er war auch auf Kuba.
C: Und er war auf Kuba.
(18) a. A: Rita hat bei einer Verlosung gewonnen.
b. B: Was hat sie gewonnen?/ Das ist ja cool
c. A: Sie hat zwei Karten fürs Musical gewonnen.
d. C: Sie hat einen Getränkegutschein gewonnen.
C: Sie hat auch einen Getränkegutschein gewonnen.
C: Und sie hat einen Getränkegutschein gewonnen.
(19) a. A: Paulas Sohn Tim geht jetzt jeden Dienstag zum Schwimmen.
b. B: Wer geht mit ihm?/ Das ist erstaunlich.
c. A: Jan geht mit ihm schwimmen.
d. C: Daniel geht mit ihm schwimmen.
C: Daniel geht auch mit ihm schwimmen.
C: Und Daniel geht mit ihm schwimmen.
(20) a. A: Christian liegt seit gestern mit einer Lungenentzündung im
Krankenhaus.
b. B: Wer hat ihn besucht?/ Das habe ich schon gehört.
c. A: Sibylle hat ihn besucht.
d. C: Kerstin hat ihn besucht.
C: Kerstin hat ihn auch besucht.
C: Und Kerstin hat ihn besucht.
(21) a. A: Tills Band hatte gestern einen Auftritt.
b. B: Was haben sie gespielt?/ War bestimmt ein Erfolg.
c. A: Sie haben Pink Floyd gespielt.
d. C: Sie haben die Rolling Stones gespielt.
C: Sie haben auch die Rolling Stones gespielt.
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C: Und sie haben die Rolling Stones gespielt.
(22) a. A: Anja arbeitet jetzt gelegentlich in einer Kneipe.
b. B: Wann muss sie arbeiten?/ Das hat bestimmt Spaß gemacht.
c. A: Sie muss am Montag arbeiten.
d. C: Sie muss am Mittwoch arbeiten.
C: Sie muss auch am Mittwoch arbeiten.
C: Und sie muss am Mittwoch arbeiten.
(23) a. A: Verena hat gestern Abend den Lieferservice bestellt.
b. B: Was hat sie bestellt?/ Das ist aber ungewöhnlich.
c. A: Sie hat Pizza bestellt.
d. C: Sie hat Salat bestellt.
C: Sie hat auch Salat bestellt.
C: Und sie hat Salat bestellt.
(24) a. A: Jonas war gestern auf einer Signierstunde des FC Bayern München.
b. B: Von wem hat er ein Autogramm bekommen?/ Das ist ja cool
c. A: Er hat von Mario Gomez ein Autogramm bekommen.
d. C: Er hat von Philipp Lahm ein Autogramm bekommen.
C: Er hat auch von Philipp Lahm ein Autogramm bekommen.
C: Und er hat von Philipp Lahm ein Autogramm bekommen.
(25) a. A: Inge ist gestern auf dem Weg nach Hause bestohlen worden.
b. B: Was wurde ihr geklaut?/ Das ist ja furchtbar.
c. A: Ihr wurde der Geldbeutel geklaut.
d. C: Ihr wurde das Handy geklaut.
C: Ihr wurde auch das Handy geklaut.
C: Und ihr wurde das Handy geklaut.
(26) a. A: Oliver hat gestern sein Auto zur Repartur gebracht.
b. B: Was ist kaputt?/ Na endlich
c. A: Der Kühler ist kaputt.
d. C: Die Bremsen sind kaputt.
C: Die Bremsen sind auch kaputt.
C: Und die Bremsen sind kaputt.
(27) a. A: Birgit hat angefangen ehrenamtlich zu arbeiten.
b. B: Wo arbeitet sie?/ Das passt zu ihr.
c. A: Sie arbeitet in einer Suppenküche.
194
d. C: Sie arbeitet in einem Altenheim.
C: Sie arbeitet auch in einem Altenheim.
C: Und sie arbeitet in einem Altenheim.
(28) a. A: Susi war am Wochenende auf einem Festival.
b. B: Wer hat gespielt?/ Das ist typisch.
c. A: Die Ärzte haben gespielt.
d. C: Die Toten Hosen haben gespielt.
C: Die Toten Hosen haben auch gespielt.
C: Und die Toten Hosen haben gespielt.
(29) a. A: Frauke hat angefangen als Lehrerin zu arbeiten.
b. B: Was unterrichtet sie?/ Das hätte ich nicht gedacht.
c. A: Sie unterrichtet Deutsch.
d. C: Sie unterrichtet Sport.
C: Sie unterrichtet auch Sport.
C: Und sie unterrichtet Sport.
(30) a. A: Bei Sonja wurde eine Allergie festgestellt.
b. B: Wogegen ist sie allergisch? / Das überrascht mich nicht.
c. A: Sie ist gegen Birke allergisch.
d. C: Sie ist gegen Pappel allergisch.
C: Sie ist auch gegen Pappel allergisch.
C: Und sie ist gegen Pappel allergisch.
(31) a. A: Karin hat wieder angefangen, Sport zu machen.
b. B: Was macht sie? / Das sieht man.
c. A: Sie spielt Tennis.
d. C: Sie geht Joggen.
C: Sie geht auch Joggen.
C: Und sie geht Joggen.
(32) a. A: Robert war am Wochenende bei einer Hochzeit.
b. B: Was gab es zu essen? / Das war bestimmt nett.
c. A: Es gab Kalbsfilet zu essen. C: Es gab Wolfsbarsch zu essen.
C: Es gab auch Wolfsbarsch zu essen.
C: Und es gab Wolfsbarsch zu essen.
(33) a. A: Ina hatte gestern Hochzeitstag.
b. B: Was hat sie bekommen? / Wie schön!
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c. A: Sie hat Rosen bekommen.
d. C: Sie hat eine Halskette bekommen.
C: Sie hat auch eine Halskette bekommen.
C: Und sie hat eine Halskette bekommen.
(34) a. A: Hans hat gestern ein interessante Debatte im Fernsehen gese-
hen.
b. B: Wer hat an der Debatte teilgenommen?/ So so.
c. A: Angela Merkel hat an der Debatte teilgenommen.
d. C: Gregor Gysi hat an der Debatte teilgenommen.
C: Gregor Gysi hat auch an der Debatte teilgenommen.
C: Und Gregor Gysi hat an der Debatte teilgenommen.
(35) a. A: Wanda war gestern auf der Sperrmüll-Deponie.
b. B: Was hat sie abgegeben?/ Das ist eine gute Idee.
c. A: Sie hat einen Tisch abgegeben.
d. C: Sie hat einen Küchenstuhl abgegeben.
C: Sie hat auch einen Küchenstuhl abgegeben.
C: Und sie hat einen Küchenstuhl abgegeben.
(36) a. A: Gestern hat ein Sturm bei Tom Schäden angerichtet.
b. B: Was ist beschädigt worden? /Das ist ja ärgerlich.
c. A: Ein Fenster ist beschädigt worden.
d. C: Ein Beet ist beschädigt worden.
C: Ein Beet ist auch beschädigt worden.
C: Und ein Beet ist beschädigt worden.

Appendix B
Material experiment 2
(1) Tom kommt gerade vom Einkaufen wieder. Er hat für seine Mitbe-
wohner [Lena, Daniel und Arne] Schokolade gekauft.
a. [Nur] /Toms /Mitbewohner /Arne /mag /gern /Schokolade.
b. Toms /Mitbewohner /Lena /und /Daniel /mögen /auch /gern /Schoko-
lade.
(2) Petra bestellt zu ihrem Geburtstag Pizza. Sie hat ihre Nachbarn [Jonas,
Hannes und Tom] eingeladen.
a. [Nur] /Petras /Nachbar /Jonas /kommt /zum /Pizza /essen.
b. Petras /Nachbarn /Hannes /und /Tom /kommen /auch /zum /Pizza
/Essen.
(3) Julian spielt Gitarre in einer Band. Er mag seine Bandkollegen [Rafael,
Matti und Benni].
a. [Nur] /Julians /Bandkollege /Rafael /hat /vorher /in /einer /an-
deren /Band /mitgespielt.
b. Julians /Bandkollegen /Benni /und /Matti /haben /auch /vorher
/ in /einer /anderen /Band /gespielt.
(4) Carla ist gerade bei einer Hochzeitsfeier. An ihrem Tisch sitzen ihre
Schulfreunde [Pascal, Finn und Karo].
a. [Nur] /Carlas /Schulfreund /Pascal /hat /eine /Begleitung /mit-
gebracht.
b. Carlas /Schulfreunde /Finn /und /Karo /haben /auch /eine /Be-
gleitung /mitgebracht.
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(5) Lena bringt ihre drei Kinder [Lotte, Maxi und Nathanael] vor der Arbeit
zur Schule.
a. [Nur] /Lenas /Sohn /Nathanael /bringt /sehr /gute /Noten /nach
/Hause.
b. Lenas /Kinder /Lotte /und /Maxi /bringen /auch /sehr /gute
/Noten /nach /Hause.
(6) Claudia genießt gerade die Sonne auf der Dachterrasse, die sie mit ihren
Mitbewohnern [Paul, Jule und Saskia] teilt.
a. [Nur] /Claudias /Mitbewohnerin /Jule /hat /Pflanzen /auf /der
/Terrasse.
b. Claudias /Mitbewohner /Paul /und /Saskia /haben /auch /Pflanzen
/auf /der /Terrasse.
(7) Christine ist Oberschwester in der Kinderklinik. Sie verbringt gerade
ihre Mittagspause mit ihren Kolleginnen [Martina, Sigrid und Jana].
a. [Nur] /Christines /Kollegin /Jana /hat /am /nächsten /Tag /Nachtschicht.
b. Christines /Kolleginnen /Martina /und /Sigrid /haben /auch /am
/nächsten /Tag /Nachtschicht.
(8) Jonas hat amWochenende Geburtstag. Er fragt seine Kumpels [Gregor,
Basti und Roman], ob sie ihm beim Einkaufen helfen.
a. [Nur] /Jonas’ /Kumpel /Roman /kommt /zum /Einkaufen /mit.
b. Jonas’ /Kumpels /Basti /und /Gregor /kommen /auch /mit /zum
/Einkaufen.
(9) Thomas informiert sich vor seiner Promotion mit seinen Kommilitonen
[Alex, Stefan und Sara] über Stipendien.
a. [Nur] /Thomas’ /Kommilitonin /Sara /hat /sich /auf /Stipendien
/beworben.
b. Thomas’ /Kommilitonen /Alex /und /Stefan /haben /sich /auch
/auf /Stipendien /beworben.
(10) Gregor fährt nach Österreich in den Urlaub. Er besucht die größeren
Städte [Salzburg, Linz und Wien].
a. [Nur] /Wien /hat /Gregor /sehr /gut /gefallen.
b. Salzburg /und /Linz /haben /Gregor /auch /sehr /gut /gefallen.
(11) Hannes sitzt gerade in seiner Stammkneipe. Er diskutiert mit seinen
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Kollegen [Jan, Frederik und Lars] über Fußball.
a. [Nur] /Hannes’ /Kollege /Lars /spielt /selber /in /einem /Verein
/Fußball.
b. Hannes’ /Kollegen /Frederik /und /Jan /spielen /auch /Fußball
/in /einem /Verein.
(12) Karolin möchte ihre Kommode verkaufen. Sie ruft ihre Schwestern
[Carla, Dana und Franziska] an und fragt sie, ob sie Interesse haben.
a. [Nur] /Karolins /Schwester /Carla /will /die /Kommode /kaufen.
b. Karolins /Schwestern /Dana /und /Franziska /wollen /auch /die
/Kommode /kaufen.
(13) Simon macht im Sommer mit seinen Freunden einen Europaurlaub mit
dem VW Bus. Sie fahren durch die südlichen Länder [Italien, Kroatien
und Österreich].
a. [Nur] /Kroatien /hat /günstiges /Benzin.
b. Italien /und /Österreich /haben /auch /günstiges /Benzin.
(14) Helga sucht nach einem geeigneten Studienplatz. Sie schaut sich Uni-
versitäten mit ihrer Mutter [in Leipzig, Berlin und München] an.
a. [Nur] /Berlin /ist /Helga /groß /genug /zum /Studieren.
b. Leipzig /und /München /findet /Helga /auch /groß /genug /zum
/Studieren.
(15) Marie macht eine hochalpine Bergtour. Ihre Wanderfreunde [Klaus,
Jan und Sandra] begleiten sie.
a. [Nur] /Maries /Begleiter /Klaus /hat /Wanderstöcke /dabei.
b. Maries /Begleiter /Jan /und /Sandra /haben /auch /Wander-
stöcke /dabei.
(16) Sabine war gerade beim Bäcker. Sie kauft Brezeln für ihre Söhne
[Elias, Matthias und David].
a. [Nur] /Sabines /Sohn /David /will /seine /Brezel /sofort /essen.
b. Sabines /Söhne /Matthias /und /Elias /wollen /auch /ihre /Brezeln
/sofort /essen.
(17) Clara ist im Park spazieren. Sie führt ihre Hunde [Dora, Cesar und
Rex] Gassi.
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a. [Nur] /Claras /Hund /Rex /jagt /einer /Hundedame /hinterher.
b. Ihre /Hunde/ Dora /und /Cesar /jagen /auch /einer /Hundedame
/hinterher.
(18) Simone braucht für Silvester ein neues Kleid. Sie geht mit ihren Mit-
bewohnerinnen [Janina, Frida und Hannah] einkaufen.
a. [Nur] /Simones /Mitbewohnerin /Janina /findet /ein /schönes
/Kleid.
b. Simones /Mitbewohnerinnen /Hannah /und /Frida /finden /auch
/ein /schönes /Kleid.
(19) In Christinas WG ist gerade ein Zimmer frei geworden. Sie lädt die
potenziellen Untermieter [Thomas, Gregor und Matthias] zu einem
Besichtigungstermin am Abend ein.
a. [Nur] /Der /Bewerber /Thomas /ist /Student.
b. Die /Bewerber /Gregor /und /Matthias /sind /auch /Studenten.
(20) Sarah ist im Alpenverein. Sie geht mit ihren Wanderfreunden [Frida,
Sarah und Hannes] am Wochenende klettern.
a. [Nur] /Sarahs /Freundin /Frida /klettert /erst /seit /einem /Jahr.
b. Ihre /Freunde /Hannes /und /Suse /klettern /auch /erst /seit
/einem /Jahr.
(21) Sabine ist Deutschlehrerin und diskutiert mit ihren Zwölftklässlern
[Prag, Rom und Wien als] mögliche Ziele für eine Kursfahrt.
a. [Nur] /Prag /findet /bei /den /Schülern /große /Zustimmung.
b. Rom /und /Wien /finden /auch /große /Zustimmung /bei /den
/Schülern.
(22) Anna wünscht sich für ihren Geburtstag etwas Besonderes. Sie geht
mit ihren Schwestern [Lisa, Janine und Kathrin] in die Oper.
a. [Nur] /Annas /Schwester /Lisa /gefällt /die /Auﬀührung /sehr
/gut.
b. Annas /Schwestern /Kathrin /und /Janine /gefällt /die /Auf-
führung /auch /sehr /gut.
(23) Bernd kommt gerade vom Arbeiten nach Hause. Er füttert sofort seine
Katzen [Paula, Suse und Carlotta].
a. [Nur] /Bernds /Katze /Paula /schleicht /ihm /liebevoll /um /die
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/Beine.
b. Seine /Katzen /Carlotta /und /Suse /schleichen/ ihm /auch /liebevoll
/um /die /Beine.
(24) Johanna braucht für einen Kuchen noch Zutaten. Sie fragt ihre Nach-
barn [Holger, Maxim und Luise] nach Zucker.
a. [Nur] /Johannas /Nachbar /Holger /hat /Zucker /im /Haus.
b. Johannas Nachbarn Maxim /und /Luise /haben /auch /Zucker
/im /Haus.

Appendix C
Material experiment 3
(1) Jan ist nach Hause gekommen, hat seine Jacke abgelegt, einen Apfel
und eine Scheibe Toast gegessen und sich vor den Fernseher gesetzt.
a. Er hat auch eine Birne gegessen.
b. Er hat eine Birne gegessen.
c. Er hat keine Birne gegessen.
d. Er hat einen Apfel gegessn.
(2) Karla ist zur Party gekommen, hat alle begruesst, Petra und Simon
umarmt und hat sich in die Kueche gesetzt.
a. Sie hat auch Lisa umarmt.
b. Sie hat Lisa umarmt.
c. Sie hat Lisa nicht umarmt.
d. Sie hat Petra umarmt.
(3) Rita ist nach Italien gefahren, hat sich ein Auto gemietet, hat Rom und
Florenz besucht und ist nach Hause gefahren.
a. Sie hat auch Venedig besucht.
b. Sie hat Venedig besucht.
c. Sie hat Venedig nicht besucht.
d. Sie hat Rom besucht.
(4) Saskia ist ins Buero gekommen, hat einen Kaﬀee gekocht, Frida und
Hannah begruesst und sich an ihren Schreibtisch gesetzt.
a. Sie hat auch Sonja begruesst.
b. Sie hat Sonja begruesst.
c. Sie hat Sonja nicht begruesst.
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d. Sie hat Frida begruesst.
(5) Florian ist zur Bank gegangen, hat Geld abgehoben, Stefan und Sabine
getroﬀen und ist zum Arbeiten gegangen.
a. Er hat auch Kai getroﬀen.
b. Er hat Kai getroﬀen.
c. Er hat Kai nicht getroﬀen.
d. Er hat Stefan getroﬀen.
(6) Lars ist zur Uni gefahren, in die Bibliothek gegangen, hat ein Buch und
eine Zeitschrift ausgeliehen und ist nach Hause gefahren.
a. Er hat auch ein Hoerbuch ausgeliehen.
b. Er hat ein Hoerbuch ausgeliehen.
c. Er hat kein Hoerbuch ausgeliehen.
d. Er hat ein Buch ausgeliehen.
(7) Petra ist zum Einkaufen gefahren, war im Alnatura, hat ein Brot und
eine Flasche Rotwein gekauft und ist nach Hause gefahren.
a. Sie hat auch Butter gekauft.
b. Sie hat Butter gekauft.
c. Sie hat keine Butter gekauft.
d. Sie hat Brot gekauft.
(8) Georg ist ins Freibad gegangen, ist ein paar Bahnen geschwommen, hat
ein Eis und Pommes gegessen und ist nach Hause gefahren.
a. Er hat auch eine Cola getrunken.
b. Er hat eine Cola getrunken.
c. Er hat keine Cola getrunken.
d. Er hat ein Eis gegessen.
(9) Susi ist zum Geburtstag gekommen, hat das Geschenk ueberreicht, ein
Bier und einen Gin Tonic getrunken und ist nach Hause gegangen.
a. Sie hat auch ein Glas Wein getrunken.
b. Sie hat ein Glas Wein getrunken.
c. Sie hat kein Glas Wein getrunken.
d. Sie hat ein Bier getrunken.
(10) Maxim ist zu seinen Eltern gefahren, hat seine Schwester getroﬀen,
den Boiler und das Flurlicht repariert und ist heim gefahren.
205
a. Er hat auch den Geschirrspueler repariert.
b. Er hat den Geschirrspueler repariert.
c. Er hat den Geschirrspueler nicht repariert.
d. Er hat den Boiler repariert.
(11) Frida ist in die Kantine gekommen, hat sich zu Kollegen gesetzt, eine
Suppe und einen Salat gegessen und ist wieder zum Arbeiten gegangen.
a. Sie hat auch ein Steak gegessen.
b. Sie hat ein Steak gegessen.
c. Sie hat kein Steak gegessen.
d. Sie hat eine Suppe gegessen.
(12) David ist in die Kueche gekommen, hat Kaﬀee gekocht, ein Marme-
ladenbrot und eine Banane gegessen und ist zur Arbeit gefahren.
a. Er hat auch Cornflakes gegessen.
b. Er hat Cornflakes gegessen.
c. Er hat keine Cornflakes gegessen.
d. Er hat eine Banane gegessen.
(13) Hannes ist auf das Volksfest gegangen, hat zwei Bier getrunken, eine
Waﬀel und ein Lebkuchenherz gekauft und ist nach Hause gelaufen.
a. Er hat auch eine Zuckerstange gekauft.
b. Er hat eine Zuckerstange gekauft.
c. Er hat keine Zuckerstange gekauft.
d. Er hat auch eine Waﬀel gekauft.
(14) Sabine ist auf das Grillfest gekommen, hat ein Steak gegessen, mit
Gregor und Frank getanzt und ist nach Hause spaziert.
a. Sie hat auch mit Lukas getanzt.
b. Sie hat mit Lukas getanzt.
c. Sie hat nicht mit Lukas getanzt.
d. Sie hat mit Gregor getanzt.
(15) Robert ist zur Weihnachtsfeier gegangen, hat Gluehwein getrunken,
Erika und Lisa ein Geschenk ueberreicht und ist nach Hause gefahren.
a. Er hat auch Dana ein Geschenk ueberreicht.
b. Er hat Dana ein Geschenk ueberreicht.
c. Er hat Dana kein Geschenk ueberreicht.
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d. Er hat Erika Geschenk ueberreicht.
(16) Benni ist zur Post gegangen, hat ewig angestanden, hat ein Paket und
ein Einschreiben abgeholt und ist zur Arbeit gefahren.
a. Er hat auch einen Brief abgeholt.
b. Er hat einen Brief abgeholt.
c. Er hat keinen Brief abgeholt.
d. Er hat ein Paket abgeholt.
(17) Kira ist ins Tierheim gefahren, hat etwas Geld gespendet, eine Katze
und ein Kaninchen adoptiert und ist zurueck in ihre WG gefahren.
a. Sie hat auch einen Hasen adoptiert.
b. Sie hat einen Hasen adoptiert.
c. Sie hat keinen Hasen adoptiert.
d. Sie hat auch eine Katze adoptiert.
(18) Theo ist nach Paris gefahren, hat einen Kaﬀee getrunken, den Eiﬀel-
turm und den Triumphbogen besucht uns ist nach London weiterge-
fahren.
a. Er hat auch Notre Dame angeschaut.
b. Er hat Notre Dame angeschaut.
c. Er hat Notre Dame nicht angeschaut.
d. Er hat den Eiﬀelturm angeschaut.
(19) Jana ist ins Krankenhaus gefahren, hat ihren Vater besucht, Blumen
und Schokolade mitgebracht und mit den Aerzten gesprochen.
a. Sie hat auch eine Zeitschriften mitgebracht.
b. Sie hat eine Zeitschriften mitgebracht.
c. Sie hat keine Zeitschriften mitgebracht.
d. Sie hat Blumen mitgebracht.
(20) Paul ist in sein Zimmer gegangen, hat den Fernseher angestellt, seine
Freundin und seine Mutter angerufen und ist ins Bett gegangen.
a. Er hat auch seinen Kumpel angerufen.
b. Er hat seinen Kumpel angerufen.
c. Er hat seinen Kumpel nicht angerufen.
d. Er hat seine Mutter angerufen.
(21) Cordula ist nach Hause gekommen, hat Spaghetti gekocht, ihre Nach-
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barn Finn und Lars eingeladen und einen Film angeschaut.
a. Sie hat auch ihren Nachbarn Sam eingeladen.
b. Sie hat ihren Nachbarn Sam eingeladen.
c. Sie hat nicht ihren Nachbarn Sam eingeladen.
d. Sie hat ihren Nachbarn Finn eingeladen.
(22) Timo ist zum Wochenmarkt gegangen, hat Dana getroﬀen, einen Ret-
tich und einen Blumenkohl gekauft und ist nach Hause gegangen.
a. Er hat auch Kaese gekauft.
b. Er hat Kaese gekauft.
c. Er hat keinen Kaese gekauft.
d. Er hat einen Rettich gekauft.
(23) Kim ist zu ihrem Klassentreﬀen gegangen, hat viele Leute wieder-
getroﬀen, hat Hackbaellchen und Bowle mitgebracht und sich koestlich
amuesiert.
a. Sie hat auch eine Lachsschnitten mitgebracht.
b. Sie hat eine Lachsschnitten mitgebracht.
c. Sie hat keine Lachsschnitten mitgebracht.
d. Sie hat Hackbaellchen mitgebracht.
(24) Tobi ist zu einem Klavierkonzert gegangen, hat einige Bekannte getrof-
fen, hat mit Susi und Paula Sekt getrunken und das Konzert sehr
genossen.
a. Er hat auch mit Stefanie Sekt getrunken.
b. Er hat mit Stefanie Sekt getrunken.
c. Er hat nicht mit Stefanie Sekt getrunken.
d. Er hat mit Susi Sekt getrunken.

Appendix D
Material experiment 4
(1) Sonja und Nadine sind Kolleginnen. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Freizeitak-
tivitaktivitaeten, die sie in der letzten Woche unternommen haben.
Sonja sagt:
a. Wir waren am Dienstag schwimmen. Am Freitag waren wir [nicht]
[wieder] schwimmen.
(2) Saskia und Jana sind Mitbewohnerinnen. Sie fuellen ein Formular fuer
die Stadtwerke aus, in dem sie die Wartung ihrer Heizung seit dem Jahr
2001 festhalten muessen. Saskia sagt:
a. Der Heizungstechniker hat 2008 unsere Heizung entlueftet. 2012
hat er sie [nicht] [wieder] entlueftet.
(3) Hannah und Tobias sind ein junges Ehepaar. Sie unterhalten sich ueber
die Reinigung des Schornsteins in ihrem gemeinsamen Haus. Hannah
sagt:
a. Der Schornsteinfeger hat im Januar den Schornstein gereinigt. Im
November hat er ihn [nicht] [wieder] gereinigt.
(4) Tina und Lars sind Nachbarn. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Verabredun-
gen zum Mittagessen in der letzten Woche. Tina sagt:
a. Wir waren am Montag zusammen Mittag essen. Am Mittwoch
waren wir [nicht] [wieder] zusammen Mittag essen.
(5) David und Paul sind beste Freunde. Sie unterhalten sich ueber gemein-
same Reisen nach Amerika. David sagt:
a. Wir waren im Maerz in den USA. Im November waren wir [nicht]
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[wieder] in den USA.
(6) Jan und Arne sind alte Schulfreunde. Sie unterhalten sich ueber ihre
letzten Sommerurlaube. Jan sagt:
a. Wir waren vor 3 Jahren gemeinsam im Sommerurlaub. Letztes
Jahr waren wir [nicht] [wieder] gemeinsam im Sommerurlaub.
(7) Janina und Albert sind Geschwister. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Besuche
ihrer Eltern. Janina sagt:
a. Unsere Eltern waren im Januar zu Besuch. Im Maerz waren sie
[nicht] [wieder] zu Besuch.
(8) Gregor und Stefan sind Bandkollegen. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Auftritte
ihrer Band. Gregor sagt:
a. Unsere Band ist im Mai aufgetreten. Im Juli sind wir [nicht]
[wieder] aufgetreten.
(9) Julia und Karin sind Mitbewohnerinnen. Sie unterhalten sich ueber
ihre Vermieterin. Julia sagt:
a. Unsere Vermieterin war am Sonntag da. Am Dienstag war sie
[nicht] [wieder] da.
(10) Simon und Frauke sind Mitbewohner. Sie unterhalten sich ueber ihren
gemeinsamen Mitbewohner Matthias. Simon sagt:
a. Matthias war am Mittwoch bei seiner Freundin. Am Donnerstag
war er [nicht] [wieder] bei seiner Freundin.
(11) Laura und Severin sind Komilitonen. Sie unterhalten sich ueber den
Chor, in dem sie gemeinsam singen. Laura sagt:
a. Unser Chor ist im August aufgetreten. Im Dezember ist er [nicht]
[wieder] aufgetreten.
(12) Gabi und Timo sind ein junges Paar. Sie unterhalten sich ueber ihre
Nachbarn. Gabi sagt:
a. Die Nachbarn haben am Freitag die Polizei gerufen. Am Samstag
haben sie [nicht] [wieder] die Polizei gerufen.
(13) Sarah und David sind ein Ehepaar. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Repara-
turen an ihrem Auto. Sarah sagt:
a. Unser Auto war im Februar in der Werkstatt. Im Dezember war
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es [nicht] [wieder] in der Werkstatt.
(14) Frank und Claudia sind schon lange verheiratet. Sie unterhalten sich
ueber den Gitarrenunterricht ihres Sohnes. Frank sagt:
a. Unser Sohn hatte am Montag Gitarrenunterricht. Am Donnerstag
hatte er [nicht] [wieder] Gitarrenunterricht.
(15) Rita und Sabine sind Geschwister. Sie unterhalten sich ueber die
Krankenhausbesuche ihres Vaters. Rita sagt:
a. Unser Vater war im Maerz im Krankenhaus. Im Mai war er [nicht]
[wieder] im Krankenhaus.
(16) Hannes und Jule sind langjaehrige Mitbewohner. Sie unterhalten sich
ueber ihre Umzuege. Hannes sagt:
a. Wir sind 2008 umgezogen. 2010 sind wir [nicht] [wieder] umgezo-
gen.
(17) Sebastian und Katharina besitzen zusammen eine Tischlerei. Sie un-
terhalten sich ueber Steuerpruefungen. Sebastian sagt:
a. Der Wirtschaftspruefer war 2012 in der Firma. 2014 war der
Wirtschaftspruefer [nicht] [wieder] in der Firma.
(18) Georg und Anne sind gute Freunde. Sie unterhalten sich ueber ihre
gemeinsamen Kinobesuche in letzter Zeit. Georg sagt:
a. Wir waren am Sonntag vor zwei Wochen im Kino. Letzten Freitag
waren wir [nicht] [wieder] im Kino.
(19) Felix und Dana sind beste Freunde. Sie unterhalten sich ueber ihre
letzten Silvester. Felix sagt:
a. Wir haben 2010 gemeinsam Silvester gefeiert. 2011 haben wir
[nicht] [wieder] gemeinsam Silvester gefeiert.
(20) Sascha und Maria sind ein junges Paar. Sie unterhalten sich ueber
ihren Labrador. Sascha sagt:
a. Wir haben unseren Hund im Januar impfen lassen. Im Dezember
haben wir unseren Hund [nicht] [wieder] impfen lassen.
(21) Klara und Bernhard sind ein altes Paar. Sie unterhalten sich ueber
ihren Schrebergarten. Klara sagt:
a. Wir sind am Mittwoch in den Garten gefahren. Am Freitag sind
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wir [nicht] [wieder] in den Garten gefahren.
(22) Andreas und Karolin sind sehr gute Freunde. Sie unterhalten sich
ueber Besuche in Frankreich. Andreas sagt:
a. Wir sind 2009 nach Frankreich gefahren. 2012 sind wir [nicht]
[wieder] nach Frankreich gefahren.
(23) Susi und Daniel sind Mitbewohner. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Ren-
ovierungen in ihrer Wohnung. Daniel sagt:
a. Wir haben 2008 unsere Kueche renoviert. 2011 haben wir die
Kueche [nicht] [wieder] renoviert.
(24) Paul und Katja sind Freunde. Sie unterhalten sich ueber Hochzeiten,
zu denen sie im letzten Jahr eingeladen waren. Paul sagt:
a. Wir waren im Juli auf einer Hochzeit. Im August waren wir [nicht]
[wieder] auf einer Hochzeit.
Appendix E
Material experiment 5
(1) Jan und Karolin haben bei Saturn einen Fernseher gekauft.
a. Der/ Ein Fernseher ist [nicht] von Panasonic.
(2) Rita und Timo haben fuer ein Grillfest einen Lachs gekauft.
a. Der/ Ein Lachs kommt [nicht] von einer Fischfarm.
(3) Sara hat zu ihrem Geburtstag ein Auto geschenkt bekommen.
a. Das/ Ein Auto ist [nicht] blau.
(4) Janine hat fuer ihren Nachbarn ein Paket entgegen genommen.
a. Das/ Ein Paket ist [nicht] sehr schwer.
(5) Lisa hat fuer den Besuch ihrer Mutter einen Kuchen gebacken.
a. Der/ Ein Kuchen ist [nicht] mit Schokolade.
(6) Paul hat fuer seinen Sohn Jonas ein Schaukelpferd gekauft.
a. Das/ Ein Schaukelpferd ist [nicht] sehr stabil.
(7) Sigrid hat fuer ihren Garten eine Rose bestellt.
a. Die/ Eine Rose ist [nicht] zweifarbig.
(8) Simon hat sich ein Surfboard angeschaﬀt.
a. Das/ Ein Surfboard ist [nicht] gruen.
(9) Tina hat sich am Wochenende eine Wohnung angeschaut.
a. Die/ Eine Wohnung war [nicht] sehr teuer.
(10) Lara hat eine Katze aus dem Tierheim adoptiert.
a. Die/ Eine Katze ist [nicht] schwarz.
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(11) Sophie hat fuer ihre Tochter ein Klavier gekauft.
a. Das/ Ein Klavier ist [nicht] aus Buchenholz.
(12) Jennifer hat bei einem Preisausschreiben eine Kreuzfahrt gewonnen.
a. Die/ Eine Kreuzfahrt findet [nicht] im Mittelmeer statt.
(13) Hanna hat von ihrem Bruder eine Postkarte bekommen.
a. Die/ Eine Postkarte ist [nicht] aus Rom.
(14) Ronja hat fuer eine Hochzeit ein Kleid gekauft.
a. Das/ Ein Kleid ist [nicht] aus Seide.
(15) David hat fuer eine Geschaeftsreise nach Paris einen Flug gebucht.
a. Der/ Ein Flug wird [nicht] von British Airways durchgefuehrt.
(16) Ronald hat sich fuer eine Bergwanderung eine Daunenjacke gekauft.
a. Die/ Eine Daunenjacke ist [nicht] blau.
(17) Susanne und Fred haben sich im Kino einen Film angeschaut.
a. Der/ Ein Film spielt [nicht] in Peru.
(18) Katharina hat beim Schreiner einen Schrank reparieren lassen.
a. Der/ Ein Schrank ist [nicht] aus Kirschbaumholz.
(19) Luis hat fuer seinen Malkurs einen Pinsel gekauft.
a. Der/ Ein Pinsel ist [nicht] aus Schweinsborsten.
(20) Gregor hat seiner Tochter fuer die Schule eine Apfel eingepackt.
a. Der/ Ein Apfel ist [nicht] sehr gross.
(21) Susi hat zum Abitur eine Reise geschenkt bekommen.
a. Die/ Eine Reise ist [nicht] fuer zwei Personen.
(22) Bruno hat fuer seine Freundin einen Verlobungsring bestellt.
a. Der/ Ein Verlobungsring ist [nicht] aus Weissgold.
(23) Robert hat beim Optiker eine Brille bestellt.
a. Die/ Eine Brille ist [nicht] von Gucci.
(24) Desiree hat fuer eine Radtour im Urlaub ein Fahrrad geliehen.
a. Das/ Ein Fahrrad ist [nicht] sehr alt.
Appendix F
Material experiment 6
(1) In der Klasse von Sam sind zehn Mädchen. Vier Mädchen singen im
Schulchor.
a. Alle Mädchen /haben /eine Fleißaufgabe /gemacht. /Deswegen/
gibt /Sam /zehn Mädchen /einen Bonus-Stern.
b. Alle Mädchen /haben /eine Fleißaufgabe /gemacht. /Deswegen
/gibt /Sam /vier Mädchen /einen Bonus-Stern.
c. Die Mädchen /haben /eine Fleißaufgabe /gemacht. Deswegen /gibt
/Sam /zehn Mädchen /einen Bonus-Stern.
d. Die Mädchen /haben /eine Fleißaufgabe /gemacht. /Deswegen
/gibt /Sam /vier Mädchen /einen Bonus-Stern.
(2) In der Brigade von Paul sind acht Zimmermänner. Fünf Zimmermänner
haben ihre Ausbildung in Tübingen gemacht.
a. Alle Zimmermänner /singen /Tenor. /Deswegen /rekrutiert /Paul
/acht Zimmermänner /für /seinen Chor.
b. Alle Zimmermänner /singen /Tenor. /Deswegen /rekrutiert /Paul
/fünf Zimmermänner /für /seinen Chor.
c. Die Zimmermänner /singen /Tenor. /Deswegen /rekrutiert /Paul
/acht Zimmermänner /für /seinen Chor.
d. Die Zimmermänner /singen /Tenor. /Deswegen /rekrutiert /Paul
/fünf Zimmermänner /für /seinen Chor.
(3) Im Wohnheim von Marie wohnen zwölf Männer. Fünf der Männer
fahren jedes Wochenende nach Hause.
a. Alle Männer /mögen /Filme. /Deswegen /lädt /Marie /zwölf Män-
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ner /zum /Herr der Ringe Abend /zu /sich /ein.
b. Alle Männer /mögen /Filme. /Deswegen /lädt /Marie /fünf Män-
ner /zum /Herr der Ringe Abend/ zu /sich /ein.
c. Die Männer /mögen /Filme. /Deswegen /lädt /Marie /zwölf Män-
ner /zum /Herr der Ringe Abend /zu /sich /ein.
d. Die Männer /mögen /Filme. /Deswegen /lädt /Marie /fünf Män-
ner /zum /Herr der Ringe Abend /zu /sich /ein.
(4) In die Sprechstunde von Hannes kommen acht Studenten. Fünf der
Studenten kommen aus Tübingen.
a. Alle Studenten /brauchen /eine Unterschrift /von /Hannes. /Deswe-
gen /gibt /Hannes /acht Studenten /seine Unterschrift.
b. Alle Studenten /brauchen /eine Unterschrift /von /Hannes. /Deswe-
gen /gibt /Hannes /fünf Studenten /seine Unterschrift.
c. Die Studenten /brauchen /eine Unterschrift /von /Hannes. /Deswe-
gen /gibt /Hannes /acht Studenten /seine Unterschrift.
d. Die Studenten /brauchen /eine Unterschrift /von /Hannes. /Deswe-
gen /gibt /Hannes /fünf Studenten /seine Unterschrift.
(5) Zu einer Zimmerbesichtigung in Toms WG kommen acht Bewerber.
Fünf der Bewerber sind im ersten Semester.
a. Alle Bewerber /sind /ausländische Studenten. /Deswegen /redet
/Tom /mit /acht Bewerbern /Englisch.
b. Alle Bewerber /sind /ausländische Studenten. /Deswegen /redet
/Tom /mit /fünf Bewerbern /Englisch.
c. Die Bewerber /sind /ausländische Studenten. /Deswegen /redet
/Tom /mit /acht Bewerbern /Englisch.
d. Die Bewerber /sind /ausländische Studenten. /Deswegen /redet
/Tom /mit /fünf Bewerbern /Englisch.
(6) In Johannes Chor sind zehn Frauen. Sechs der Frauen singen Sopran.
a. Alle Frauen /haben /ein Auto. /Deswegen /kommen /zehn Frauen
/mit /dem Auto /zur /Chorprobe.
b. Alle Frauen /haben /ein Auto. /Deswegen /kommen /sechs Frauen
/mit /dem Auto /zur /Chorprobe.
c. Die Frauen /haben /ein Auto. /Deswegen /kommen /zehn Frauen
/mit /dem Auto /zur /Chorprobe.
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d. Die Frauen /haben /ein Auto. /Deswegen /kommen /sechs Frauen
/mit /dem Auto /zur /Chorprobe.
(7) In Lisas Kindergarten sind zwölf Kinder. Sieben der Kinder kommen
bald in die Schule.
a. Alle Kinder /sind /Allergiker. /Deswegen /kocht /Lisa /zwölf
Kindern /ein separates Mittagessen.
b. Alle Kinder /sind /Allergiker. /Deswegen /kocht /Lisa /sieben
Kindern /ein separates Mittagessen.
c. Die Kinder /sind /Allergiker. /Deswegen /kocht /Lisa /zwölf Kindern
/ein separates Mittagessen.
d. Die Kinder /sind /Allergiker. /Deswegen /kocht /Lisa /sieben
/Kindern /ein /separates Mittagessen.
(8) In Franks Malkurs sind neun Hausfrauen. Sechs der Hausfrauen haben
Kinder.
a. Alle Hausfrauen /haben /ein eigenes Pinsel-Set. /Deswegen /muss
/Frank /neun Hausfrauen /keinen Pinsel /für /den Malkurs /lei-
hen.
b. Alle Hausfrauen /haben /ein eigenes Pinsel-Set. /Deswegen /muss
/Frank /sechs Hausfrauen /keine /Pinsel /für /den Malkurs /lei-
hen.
c. Die Hausfrauen /haben /ein eigenes /Pinsel-Set. /Deswegen /muss
/Frank /neun Hausfrauen /keine Pinsel /für /den Malkurs /leihen.
d. Die Hausfrauen /haben /ein /eigenes Pinsel-Set. /Deswegen /muss
/Frank /sechs Hausfrauen /keine Pinsel /für /den Malkurs /leihen.
(9) In Ritas Buchclub sind acht Lehrer. Fünf der Lehrer unterrichten am
Gymnasium.
a. Alle Lehrer /sind /Single. /Deswegen /lädt /Rita /acht Lehrer /zu
/einer Single-Party /ein.
b. Alle Lehrer /sind /Single. /Deswegen /lädt /Rita /fünf Lehrer /zu
/einer Single-Party /ein.
c. Die Lehrer /sind /Single. /Deswegen /lädt /Rita /acht Lehrer /zu
/einer Single-Party /ein.
d. Die Lehrer /sind /Single. /Deswegen /lädt /Rita /fünf Lehrer /zu
/einer Single-Party ein.
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(10) In Pias Yogakurs sind sieben Rentner. Vier der Rentner kommen
regelmäßig in den Kurs.
a. Alle Rentner /sind /verheiratet. /Deswegen /gibt /Pia /sieben
Rentnern /eine Broschüre /für /Partner-Yoga.
b. Alle Rentner /sind /verheiratet. /Deswegen /gibt /Pia /vier
Rentnern /eine Broschüre /für /Partner-Yoga.
c. Die Rentner /sind /verheiratet. /Deswegen /gibt /Pia /sieben
Rentnern /eine Broschüre /für /Partner-Yoga.
d. Die Rentner /sind /verheiratet. /Deswegen /gibt /Pia /vier Rent-
nern /eine Broschüre /für /Partner-Yoga.
(11) In Hans Fußballverein spielen sechs Schreiner. Vier der Schreiner spie-
len schon lange in dem Verein.
a. Alle Schreiner /haben /Knieprobleme. /Deswegen /empfiehlt /Hans
/sechs Schreinern /einen Orthopäden.
b. Alle Schreiner /haben /Knieprobleme. /Deswegen /empfiehlt /Hans
/vier Schreinern /einen Orthopäden.
c. Die Schreiner /haben /Knieprobleme. /Deswegen /empfiehlt /Hans
/sechs Schreinern /einen Orthopäden.
d. Die Schreiner /haben /Knieprobleme. /Deswegen /empfiehlt /Hans
/vier Schreinern /einen Orthopäden.
(12) Zu Inas Geburtstagsparty kommen acht Ärzte. Vier der Ärzte arbeiten
in der Uniklinik von Tübingen.
a. Alle Ärzte /sind /mit /dem Auto /gekommen. /Deswegen /trinken
/acht Ärzte /keinen Alkohol /auf /der Party.
b. Alle Ärzte /sind /mit /dem Auto /gekommen. /Deswegen /trinken
/vier Ärzte/ keinen Alkohol /auf /der Party.
c. Die Ärzte /sind /mit /dem Auto /gekommen. /Deswegen /trinken
/acht Ärzte /keinen Alkohol /auf /der Party.
d. Die Ärzte /sind /mit /dem Auto /gekommen. /Deswegen /trinken
/vier Ärzte /keinen Alkohol /auf /der Party.
(13) In der Tanzgruppe von Irina sind dreizehn Jungen. Sechs der Jungen
haben blaue Augen.
a. Alle Jungen /haben /heute /Quatsch /gemacht. /Deswegen /erteilt
/Irina /dreizehn Jungen /eine Standpauke.
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b. Alle Jungen /haben /heute /Quatsch gemacht. /Deswegen /erteilt
/Irina /sechs Jungen /eine Standpauke.
c. Die Jungen /haben /heute /Quatsch /gemacht. /Deswegen /erteilt
/Irina /dreizehn /Jungen /eine Standpauke.
d. Die Jungen /haben/ heute /Quatsch /gemacht. /Deswegen /erteilt
/Irina /sechs Jungen /eine Standpauke.
(14) Im Zirkus Mahagnoi gibt es sieben Elefanten. Fünf der Elefanten
können auf einem Ball balancieren.
a. Alle Elefanten /haben /eine Kolik. /Deswegen /erteilt /der Tier-
arzt /sieben Elefanten /Auftrittsverbot.
b. Alle Elefanten /haben /eine Kolik. /Deswegen /erteilt /der Tier-
arzt /fünf Elefanten /Auftrittsverbot.
c. Die Elefanten /haben /eine Kolik. /Deswegen /erteilt /der Tier-
arzt /sieben Elefanten /Auftrittsverbot.
d. Die Elefanten /haben /eine Kolik. /Deswegen /erteilt /der Tier-
arzt /fünf Elefanten /Auftrittsverbot.
(15) In Antons Kleintierzüchterverein gibt es elf Züchter. Sieben der Züchter
haben sich auf Kaninchen spezialisiert.
a. Alle Züchter/interessieren sich /für Gartenbau. /Deswegen /lädt
/Anton /elf Züchter /in /seine Kleingartenanlage /ein.
b. Alle Züchter /interessieren sich /für Gartenbau. /Deswegen /lädt
Anton /sieben Züchter /in /seine Kleingartenanlage /ein.
c. Die Züchter /interessieren sich /für /Gartenbau. /Deswegen /lädt
/Anton /elf Züchter /in /seine Kleingartenanlage /ein.
d. Die Züchter /interessieren sich /für Gartenbau. /Deswegen /lädt
/Anton /sieben Züchter /in /seine Kleingartenanlage /ein.
(16) In Mariannes Handarbeitsgruppe sind neun Näherinnen. Fünf der
Näherinnen besitzen eine Nähmaschine.
a. Alle Näherinnen /haben /beim /letzten Treﬀen /ein Projekt /been-
det. /Deswegen /gibt /Marianne /neun Näherinnen /eine neue
Aufgabe.
b. Alle Näherinnen /haben /beim /letzten Treﬀen /ein Projekt /been-
det. /Deswegen /gibt /Marianne /fünf Näherinnen /eine neue
Aufgabe.
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c. Die Näherinnen /haben /beim /letzten Treﬀen /ein Projekt /been-
det. /Deswegen /gibt /Marianne /neun Näherinnen /eine neue
Aufgabe.
d. Die Näherinnen /haben /beim /letzten Treﬀen /ein Projekt /been-
det. /Deswegen /gibt /Marianne /fünf Näherinnen /eine neue
Aufgabe.
(17) In der Theatergruppe von Bernd sind elf Schauspieler. Sechs der
Schauspieler sind verheiratet.
a. Alle Schauspieler /haben /Lampenfieber. /Deswegen /redet /Bernd
/elf Schauspielern /Mut zu.
b. Alle Schauspieler /haben /Lampenfieber. /Deswegen /redet /Bernd
/sechs Schauspielern /Mut zu.
c. Die Schauspieler /haben /Lampenfieber. /Deswegen /redet /Bernd
/elf Schauspielern /Mut zu.
d. Die Schauspieler /haben /Lampenfieber. /Deswegen /redet /Bernd
/sechs Schauspielern /Mut zu.
(18) Im Gemeinderat von Trochtelfingen sitzen sieben Rechtsanwälte. Fünf
der Rechtsanwälte haben eine eigene Kanzlei.
a. Alle Rechtsanwälte /wurden /der Steuerhinterziehung /überführt.
/Deswegen /schließt /der Bürgermeister /sieben Rechtsanwälte
/aus /dem Gemeinderat /aus.
b. Alle Rechtsanwälte /wurden /der Steuerhinterziehung /überführt.
/Deswegen /schließt /der Bürgermeister /fünf Rechtsanwälte /aus
/dem Gemeinderat /aus.
c. Die Rechtsanwälte /wurden /der Steuerhinterziehung /überführt.
/Deswegen /schließt /der Bürgermeister /sieben Rechtsanwälte
/aus /dem Gemeinderat /aus.
d. Die Rechtsanwälte /wurden /der Steuerhinterziehung /überführt.
/Deswegen /schließt /der Bürgermeister /fünf Rechtsanwälte /aus
/dem Gemeinderat /aus.
(19) In der Abnehmgruppe von Birgit sind vierzehn Abnehmwillige. Acht
der Abnehmwilligen machen zum ersten Mal eine Diät.
a. Alle Abnehmwilligen /haben /seit /dem letzten Treﬀen /zugenom-
men. /Deswegen /verordnet /Birgit /vierzehn Abnehmwilligen
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/einen strikteren Ernährungsplan.
b. Alle Abnehmwilligen /haben /seit /dem /letzten Treﬀen /zugenom-
men. /Deswegen /verordnet /Birgit /acht Abnehmwilligen /einen
strikteren Ernährungsplan.
c. Die Abnehmwilligen /haben /seit /dem /letzten Treﬀen /zugenom-
men. /Deswegen /verordnet /Birgit /vierzehn Abnehmwilligen
/einen strikteren Ernährungsplan.
d. Die Abnehmwilligen /haben /seit /dem letzten Treﬀen /zugenom-
men. /Deswegen /verordnet /Birgit /acht Abnehmwilligen /einen
strikteren Ernährungsplan.
(20) In Jörns Bekanntenkreis gibt es sieben Paare. Vier der Paare kennen
sich seit ihrer Schulzeit.
a. Alle Paare /wollen /demnächst /heiraten. /Deswegen /sucht /Jörn
/für /sieben Paare /nach /Hochzeitsgeschenken.
b. Alle Paare /wollen /demnächst /heiraten. /Deswegen /sucht /Jörn
/für /vier Paare /nach /Hochzeitsgeschenken.
c. Die Paare /wollen /demnächst /heiraten. /Deswegen /sucht /Jörn
/für /sieben Paare /nach /Hochzeitsgeschenken.
d. Die Paare /wollen /demnächst /heiraten. /Deswegen /sucht /Jörn
/für /vier Paare /nach /Hochzeitsgeschenken.
(21) Zu Gregors Geburtstag kommen sechs Basketballer. Vier der Basket-
baller spielen zusammen in einem Verein.
a. Alle Basketballer /sind /gerade /Vater /geworden. /Deswegen
/gratuliert /Gregor /sechs Basketballern /zum /Baby.
b. Alle Basketballer /sind /gerade /Vater geworden. /Deswegen
/gratuliert /Gregor /vier Basketballern /zum /Baby.
c. Die Basketballer /sind /gerade/ Vater /geworden. /Deswegen
/gratuliert /Gregor /sechs Basketballern /zum /Baby.
d. Die Basketballer /sind /gerade /Vater /geworden. /Deswegen
/gratuliert /Gregor /vier Basketballern /zum /Baby.
(22) In Thorstens Betrieb arbeiten acht Auszubildende. Fünf Auszubildende
haben einen Hauptschulabschluss.
a. Alle Auszubildenden /machen /viele Zusatzaufgaben. /Deswegen
/lobt /Thorsten /acht Auszubildende.
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b. Alle Auszubildenden /machen /viele Zusatzaufgaben. /Deswegen
/lobt /Thorsten /fünf Auszubildende.
c. Die Auszubildenden /machen /viele Zusatzaufgaben. /Deswegen
/lobt /Thorsten /acht Auszubildende.
d. Die Auszubildenden /machen /viele Zusatzaufgaben. /Deswegen
/lobt /Thorsten /fünf Auszubildende.
(23) In Janas Tierheim arbeiten sechs Schüler ehrenamtlich. Vier der Schüler
kommen jeden Nachmittag.
a. Alle Schüler /sind /über /18 Jahre alt. /Deswegen /dürfen /sechs
Schüler /rauchen.
b. Alle Schüler /sind /über /18 Jahre alt. /Deswegen /dürfen /vier
Schüler /rauchen.
c. Die Schüler /sind /über /18 Jahre alt. /Deswegen /dürfen /sechs
Schüler /rauchen.
d. Die Schüler /sind /über /18 Jahre alt. /Deswegen /dürfen /vier
Schüler /rauchen.
(24) In Fridas Hundeschule sind neun Hunde. Sechs der Hunde sind Schäfer-
hunde.
a. Alle Hunde /sind /noch /Welpen. /Deswegen /steckt /Frida
/neun Hunde /in /die /Welpen-Gruppe.
b. Alle /Hunde /sind /noch /Welpen. /Deswegen /steckt /Frida
/sechs Hunde /in /die Welpen-Gruppe.
c. Die Hunde /sind /noch /Welpen. /Deswegen /steckt /Frida /neun
Hunde /in /die Welpen-Gruppe.
d. Die Hunde /sind /noch /Welpen. /Deswegen /steckt /Frida /sechs
Hunde /in /die /Welpen-Gruppe.
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